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Abstract 
The thesis consists of empirical analysis of the labour supply 
behaviour of married and single females in Egypt, using data from 
the 1984 LFS. 1980 EFS and 1976 Census. 
A utility maximisation approach, in which leisure time and 
consumption goods represent the choice faced by individuals, is used 
to determine work behaviour. The nature of the labour force 
participation decision is examined and a model is presented based on 
the comparison of the market wage and own wage functions. Finally, 
the time-allocation model, which incorporates non-working time, is 
presented and other household decisions, such as the determination 
of family size are brought into the sphere of analysis. 
The results obtained using aggregated data indicate that 
educational attainment and family size and composition are the major 
determinants of labour supply. Wage and income elasticities are 
small. And. overall. a higher unemployment rate creates a 
discouraged;t1orker effect for married females and an added;t1orker 
effect for single females. Similar results are obtained using 
individual data for Cairo, though there exists a discouraged;t1orker 
effect for all marital status groups and the income level is found 
to exert a positive effect contrary to theoretical expectation. 
The use of a framework where household decisions are Jointly 
determined is tested using two simultaneous-equation models. One of 
the conclusions reached is that mothers with higher wage and 
educational levels are in occupations least compatible to 
child-rearing and so have lower fertility levels. The results also 
indicate that completed rather than current fertility levels is a 
better determinant of the decision of a female to work. 
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 
The processess of economic development generally involves the 
transfer of production from small self-sufficient units; the 
household or family; to more specialised production units; factory 
or firm. With economic development, the shift towards the exchange 
of goods and services through the market economy has often resulted 
in the loss of female economic participation(l). 
The economic role of females in Egypt has followed this pattern; 
a pattern witnessed in many developing countries. In the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, females formed an important part of the 
labour force(2). They were engaged mainly in unskilled jobs; 
working in the textiles or food industries. In towns and ci ties 
females also worked as shop assistants, midwives, servants and 
cotton workers. 
The move towards industrialisation and urbanisation restricted 
female employment. And, since the beginning of this century, female 
activity rates have been declining. However in the 1970-80 decade, 
there has been a sharp increase in the activity rate. It rose from 
a figure of 5.5% (1976 census), a representative figure for the 
1970's decade, to 13.8% (as measured by the LFS) in 1984(3). The 
economic participation of Egyptian females needs to be explained. 
The theory used to explain the labour force behaviour of females 
is the neoclassical theory of choice and utility maximisation (4) • 
This framework is also used to explain many aspects of household 
behaviour including the decision to bear children. Reid (1934) and 
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Robbins (1930) laid the foundations on which Becker (1965, 1981) 
developed a theory of time allocation and later a general theory of 
household decision making. A number of empirical studies have been 
used to test the neoclassical model, both in developed and 
developing countries(5). 
Schultz (1974) in reference to fertility behaviour examines the 
suitability of the household model in low-income countries, where 
the economic value of human time is low. He percieves the main 
difficulty not in the inability of the model to explain behaviour, 
but rather in the different and greater economic role households 
perform in low income countries. Among the differences is the 
observation that childcare is not the sole responsibility of the 
mother in less-developed countries and, in addition, market work and 
childcare are complementary rather than alternative uses of time in 
the traditional sector(6). In specific reference to labour supply, 
the model tests the responsiveness of labour supply to changes in 
wages and income. In less developed countries a large informal 
sector operates in the labour market thus weakening the emphasis on 
wages in the model(7). 
The aim of this study is to examine the labour force behaviour 
of females in Egypt using an econometric framework based on the 
neoclassical model of choice. Apart from the intrinsic value of the 
theoretical and empirical study of female labour supply, it is 
essential, before developing direct and indirect policy 
interventions to influence female work behaviour, to study the type 
of work females are engaged in and what factors influence their 
economic activity(S). 
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Policy formulation requires knowledge of the effect of economic 
variables (these include wages and other income) on the work 
behaviour of the individual. In addition, the possible 
understanding of the effect of non-economic variables, such as 
education and family size, on the decision to work would also prove 
useful in the relevant areas of policy making. 
The empirical analysis presented in this study uses 
cross-section survey data collected in Egypt in 1984 (LFS) and in 
1980 (EFS), and the 1976 Census. 
Two main demographic groups are studied: adult married females 
and adult single females. The analysis is applied to individual 
" 
data and aggregate data. Labour supply is measured by the decision 
to participate in the labour force and hours worked. 
This thesis is organised in six chapters including the 
introduction. The following is a brief description of the contents 
of each chapter. 
In Chapter II, a description of the major features of the 
Egyptian labour market and labour force is presented, which serves 
to provide a necessary background for the subsequent analysis of the 
results. First of all, the characterisation of Egypt as a country 
having a labour-surplus economy is considered. The nature of the 
Egyptian labour market is one in which there has been an expanding 
public sector and government intervention in employment and wage 
policy. External migration to oil-producing Arab countries has also 
become a main feature. Next, the trend in the labour force 
participation of females is examined, although the information is 
10 
unavailable of the rates by marital status. A number of 
developments which have influenced the female labour force are 
considered. 
In Chapter III, the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis 
is presented. A utility function consisting of two commodities, 
leisure time and consumption goods, with a budget and time 
constraint is maximised. Following conventional consumer analysis, 
a demand function for leisure is derived from which a supply 
function of labour is obtained. Next, a model is developed to 
explain the decision to participate in the labour market. The 
participation decision is based on the comparison between the market 
wage and own wage. A two equation model is then proposed for the 
purpose of estimation. The first function, the offered wage 
function, is estimated using least squares while the second 
function, the probability of participation function is estimated 
using probit analysis. The own wage function is derived from the 
two equations referred to earlier. A statistical problem in the 
estimation procedure is also discussed; the selection bias that 
arises from using a sample of workers. A correction is proposed. 
Finally, the relationship between female work and other household 
decisions (such as bearing children) is examined through the time 
allocation model, and, the major determinants on female market 
participation are presented. 
In Chapter IV, the differences in the work behaviour of females 
between the governerates of Egypt is analysed. A reduced-form 
participation function, hours of workers function and hours of all 
females function are estimated using least squares regression. The 
analysis uses aggregated cross-section data from two data sources; 
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the 1984 LFS and published data from the 1976 census. The results 
indicate that educational attainment and to a lesser extent family 
size and composition are the major determinants of labour supply. 
The responsiveness of labour supply to wages and income is weak. It 
would also appear that, overall, the unemployment rate in a 
governerate creates a discouraged-worker effect for married females 
and an added-worker effect for single females. 
In Chapter V two approaches used to examine the labour force 
behaviour of females on the individual level are applied. The first 
approach is based on the comparison between offered and asking wage 
functions. A number of hypotheses are examined within this 
framework. It is found that using a sample of workers for the 
estimation of the wage and hours does not produced biased 
coefficient estimates. The results also indicate that females who 
have a greater probability of working are also more likely to work 
longer hours. Educational attainment is found to be an important 
factor, but wage elasticities are very small (being greatest in 
magni tude for divorced females). The level of income provides 
results that are in contrast with the theory. Unemployment exerts a 
discouraged-worker effect for all marital status groups. Finally. 
family size and composition are also important determinants of 
labour supply; the presence and number of children aged less than 
three years is significant for the participation decision whereas 
school-age children (6-11 years) exert an effect on working mothers. 
The aim of the second approach is to examine the relationship 
between labour force participation and fertility decisions in a 
framework were these household decisions are jointly determined. 
Two models are presented and empircally tested. The first is a four 
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equation system in which the endogeneous variables are determined by 
the same set of exogeneous variables. One of the conclusions 
reached is that mothers with higher wages and higher education 
levels are in occupations which are less compatible with 
child-rearing and so reduce fertility levels. The level of 
schooling for the husband and possession of an asset are found to be 
the most straight forward variables in interpretation when 
considering the income effect on fertility levels. The second model 
considered is a two equation recursive system: completed fertility 
levels are assumed to determine current and lifetime labour force 
participation. Although the hypothesis might not be totally 
correct, the use of an imputed equation for the number of children 
born provides statistically significant coefficient estimates, which 
is not the case when the actual number of children is used. 
In Chapter VI. a summary and comparison of results with those 
obtained froll other studies, when applicable, is presented. The 
results, in nearly all cases. are in agreement with theoretical 
eKPectations. The existing data sets provide good results to the 
models adopted. 
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(1) The role of females in economic urban development is 
described in Boserup (1970, 1981) and Schultz, (1981). 
(2) This historical account is described in greater detail in 
Ibrahim (1985). 
(3) It would be of interest to dissect the increase in the rate 
by different marital status, but data are not available. 
Reasons for this increase are discussed in Chapter II. 
(4) The full development of the theory is presented in Chapter 
III. Nee-classical economics is characterised by 
micro-economic theoretical systems in contrast to the 
macro-economic approach of other economic systems (e.g., 
Keynsian) • 
(5) Studies include those of Mincer (1962), Bowen & Finegan 
(1969), Cain and Watts (1973) on US data. Studies using 
British data include Greenhalgh (1977), Layard, Barton and 
Zabalza (1980). Studies on less-developed countries 
include those of Okojie (1985), D'01iveira (1978) and 
McCabe & Rosenzweig (1976), Khandber (1987). 
(6) Okojie (1985) develops this arguement in more detail. 
(7) Criticism of the model even when applied to developed 
countries lies in the structure of nec-classical theory 
itself. Freedom of choice might be an unreasonable 
assumption, it is "a-historical and a-social", Amsden 
(1980). The analysis needs other research areas for 
clarification. An example of this is given by the analysis 
of wages on labour supply. Theory predicts that changes in 
wages can have two opposite effects on labour supply; an 
income effect and substitution effect, but does not explain 
why one effect should dominate. Historical analysis is 
then needed to explain the rise in female economic 
participation; altered parental-child relationships and a 
change in values brought about by changes in prices and 
income, puts "flesh on the skeleton" (Amsden, 1980; p.30) 
of the income and substitution effects. 
(8) A number of articles describe the extent and diversity of 
female work in Shorter and Zurayk (1985). 
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CIIAPTEH II: THE EGYPTIAN LABOUR MARKET AND LABOUR FORCE 
2.1 The Employment Problem 
The 1976 census estimated the population of Egypt to be 38.2 
million. The main trends in populat ion size and the major 
components of population growth are shown in table (2.1). The 
figures indicate a gradual decline in the mortali ty rate, with a 
sharp decline in infant mortality. The trend in fertility rates has 
not been constant. A decline in the rate during the mid-seventies 
was reversed, and the birthrate has remained just below 40 births 
per thousand in the population. The rates, though in accordance 
with other countries at Egypt's level of economic development, are 
still high(l). These trends have resulted in a rate of natural 
increase that has reached nearly 3%. 
Egypt's main resource is the alluvial soil of the Nile Valley 
and Delta; the Nile making Egypt one of the oldest agrarian 
societies in history. The rural labour force represented 65% of the 
total labour force in 1960 and 56% in 1976 (1976 census figures). 
The agricultural labour force represented 56% of the total labour 
force in 1960 and 44% in 1976 (1976 census figures). These figures 
indicate a transfer of the labour force from rural areas and 
agricultural activity to urban areas and industrial activity. 
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Table 2.1 Population size and indices for Egypt, 1960-84 
-----------
Rate Population 
Birth Mortality natural Infant size 
Year rate rate increase mortality (OOOs) 
----------------------------------------------------
1960 42.9 16.9 26.0 168(a) 26.085 
1966 40.9 15.8 25.1 30.188 
1976 36.6 11.8 24.8 U6(a) 38.198 
1977 37.5 11.8 25.7 38.794 
1978 37.4 10.5 26.9 39.767 
1979 40.2 10.9 29.3 40.889 
1980 37.5 10.0 27.5 132(b) 42.126 
1981 37.3 10.4 26.9 44.673 
1983 37.6 10.0 27.6 45.915 
1984 38.4 9.4 29.0 47.191 
---------------------------------------
Rates per thousand population 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1985: Arab Republic of Egypt 
(a) Source: Seatheram (1983) 
(b) Source: 1980 EFS (for females aged 15-49 years) 
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The predominance of the agricultural sector (though this is no 
longer the case) led to the characterisation of Egypt as a country 
having a labour-surplus economy (2); that is, one in which labour in 
the traditional (agricultural) sector is considered an abundant, 
unproductive asset. It has been argued that by moving agricultural 
labour into the modern industrial sector, industrial output will 
rise without any loss in agricultural output. This assumes that the 
marginal productivity of agricultural labour is zero or close to 
zero(3) • Development economists have thus argued that, with the 
available capital in the industrial sector, the success of economic 
growth would only depend on the labour reallocation process, i.e., 
through rural-urban migration(4). 
The experience of less-developed countries, including Egypt, 
shows that the labour-surplus hypothesis is addressing a different 
problem. Capital-intensive techniques imported from more developed 
countries, which were thought to be favourable to the development 
process (smaller wage bills means higher profits which can be re-
invested), have only aggravated a situation where the work-force was 
fast increasing through high rates of population growth. 
The problem faced is not one of labour reallocation, but one of 
employment and job creation for the ever-increasing work force. 
17 
Table 2.2 Size and growth of the labour force and 
dependant population 
Table 2.2a 
----------------------------------_._----
Age Group 
Population Size 
(OOOs) 
Year 
1960 1976 
--------------------------
-15 
15-64 
65+ 
11077.3 
13871. 6 
891.4 
145599.1 
20604.4 
1301.4 
Proportion of the 
Population 
1960 
.43 
.54 
.03 
Year 
1976 
.40 
.56 
.04 
-------------------------------_._----
Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics 
Table 2.2b 
Size of labour Dependency Young-age Old-age Effective 
Year force (OOOs) Ratio Dependency Dependency Dependency 
----------------------------------------------------------
1960 7832 .85 .79 .055 1.53 
1976 11132 .79 .71 .07 1.43 
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To illustrate the problem of job-creation, figures from table 
(2.2) indicate that the size of the work force has increased by 
nearly 50%. The dependency ratio is declining, (.85 to .71) showing 
a decrease in young-age dependency plus a slight increase in old-age 
dependency. However, only 56% of those aged 15-64 were economically 
active in 1960 and 54% in 1976. The effective dependancy rate is 
then 1.53 in 1960 and 1.43 in 1976. The problem of population 
growth then, it would seem, lies in the difficulty of job-creation 
for the work force rather than the provision of support for 
dependants. (Although it is simultaneously not a dependancy problem 
in the sense that the unemployed are dependant). 
The remaining part of the Chapter is concerned with a brief 
description of the labour market and labour force in Egypt. 
2.2 The Egyptian Labour Market 
Egypt lies in the desert belt which stretches across the 
northern hemisphere from the Atlantic Ocean through Arabia to China. 
The area of Egypt is one million square kilometres, but less than 5% 
(35,580 sq. Km) of the country, mainly along the Nile Valley, is 
habitable. Consequently, the density of the inhabited area is high, 
about 1000 per square kilometre (1976 census). liThe most striking 
feature of Egypt's urban and rural areas is that both are crowded. 
Not only do cities and towns have high population densities, but the 
country-side is dotted with closely spaced villages, many large 
enough to count as small towns in other countries". (Ikram (1980) : 
p.105) • 
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The expansion of agricultural employment is constrained by the 
limited amount of cultivable land as well as the existing labour-
intensive nature of the agricultural technology in use(5). A study 
by Mohieldin(6) addressed the labour-surplus problem in rural Bgypt. 
The study locates the surplus labour on small farms (less than five 
feddans(7) which have a surplus of man-labour, while large farms in 
the same region can suffer from a shortage of woman and child 
labour. Thus, to characterise the rural labour market as a labour-
surplus one is too general a description. Also, although half the 
total work force is located in rural areas, over half the money 
income of the rural population is derived from non-agricultural 
activities. It seems that there is a large rural non-agricultural 
sector. The movement between these sectors and other sectors in the 
Egyptian labour market is shown in figure (2.1)(8) 
During the late 19508 and 1960s, growing government 
intervention in the economy led to the expansion of the government 
and public sector. The government and public enterprise sectors 
employed nearly 27% of the total labour force (1976 census) while 
the private sector share was nearly 73%. According to Hansen & 
Radwan (1982, p.62), the corresponding government share of 
employment was less than 10% in 1960. The large increase is due to 
the intervention policies which included nationalisation and 
employment-generating policies which guaranteed employment for 
graduates of higher education institutes. However, the later policy 
has resulted in overstaffing of the public sector and a strong bias 
towards University education leading to an excess supply of people 
with an academic education(9). 
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Figure 2.1 The intersection of submarkets in the Egyptian 
labour market 
I Public sector Urban. Rural. Agriculture 
private sector non-agricultural 
Government. private sector 
Public enterprises. 
Foreign sector 
(1) On the family level, this represents some family members 
working in the public and others in the private sector. 
On the individual level, these represent public sector 
employees with second jobs in the private sector. In 
principle, this is illegal except wi th permiss ion. 
However, this seems to occur on a large scale and the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) does not cover this aspect of 
the labour force (which is very important for measuring 
the number of hours supplied by an individual). This 
source of confusion is probably a factor in all economies. 
(2) Commuters, seasonal movement of labour:-
(3) Farmers shifting seasonally between agricultural and non-
agricultural activities. 
(4) Mainly agricultural labours working as unskilled labour on 
construction sites or small farmers in inter-sectorial 
trade and transportation. 
(5) ItTraheel It workers - a group of particularly mobile 
workers. 
Source: Hansen & Radwan (1982) pp.143-146. 
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Wage determination in the public sector is also linked to the 
educational attainment of the employee. Each educational level has 
a basic wage rate, which is set, and which can be supplemented by 
overtime pay, bonuses and incentives(lO). On the whole, however, 
the wage scale system of the public sector lacks flexibility(ll). 
Private sector wages are mainly determined by market forces. Again, 
there is a degree of government intervention : the imposition of 
minimum wages during the sixties and a cost of living allowance in 
the seventies has meant that wages in the private sector are not 
totally determined by market forces. According to Korayem (1984, 
p.73), there is also an indirect impact on private sector wages by 
the wage schedule set in the public sector. Wages set in the 
private sector take the public sector wage level into account. 
External migration has become one of the most important 
characteristics of the Egyptian labour market, especially since 
1973. The destination of the migrants is mainly the Arab OPEC 
countries where their stay is of a temporary nature. Although, most 
of the migrants before 1973 were teachers, scientists or from the 
technical professions, emigration is now dominated by construction 
and unskilled workers (12) • The total volume of emigration is a 
point of debate; the 1976 census estimated that there were around 
one million Egyptians, i. e. 9% of the total labour force working 
abroad (a figure that is considered too high), while other sources 
estimate the proportion at under 4%(13). 
2.3 The Egyptian Labour Force(14) 
The total labour force in Egypt increased by 42% from 1960 to 
1976 (7.8 million to 11.1 million), with 64% of the total increase 
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in urban areas (table 2.3). 
The size of the female labour force declined from 897 thousands 
in 1937 to 614 thousands in 1960 rising again to 988 thousands in 
1976. Female participation rates show a similar trend declining 
from 11.3% in 1937 to the lowest value of 4.~ in 1960 after which 
there was a gradual increase to 5.5% in 1976, with a rapid increase 
in the rate at the beginning of the 1980 decade: see the LFS trend, 
table (2.4). However, the increase since 1983 can be partly 
related to changes in the enumeration of females in the labour 
force. 
However, while the growth rate for the female labour force was 
high, the share of females in the total labour force still amounted 
to 9% in 1976 (calculated from table 2.3). Most of the increase in 
the labour force has been due to population growth. However, for 
females, especially in the urban areas, the increase in activity 
rates accounted for 51% of the increase. 
Inspite of this increase, a cross-national comparison of female 
activity rates (table 2.5) reveals that the Egyptian rate is 
certainly one of the lowest in the world at 5.5%. The participation 
rate for those aged over fifteen years is 6.4%. Traditional, 
cuI tural or religious barriers could be important factors. Other 
Arab Islamic countries have low activity rates(15). 
However, there is also reason to believe that there is 
considerable undernumeration of females especially in rural areas. 
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As an example, different coding practices of census data in Turkey 
and Syria have resulted in widely different female participation 
rates in agricultural areas which share a national border(16). 
There is also reason to believe there is similar undernumeration in 
the Egyptian rural sector. Ibrahim (1985], ci tes an example of 
this. The 1960 census recorded that females constitute 4% of the 
agricultural labour force, whereas a more detailed labour survey put 
this figure at 25%. Much the same situation exists in urban areas, 
where studies have shown that up to 40% of adult females take part 
in income generating activities(17). 
The rest of this section discusses the direct and indirect 
effects of recent governmental policies in Egypt, most of which have 
effected the female labour force. 
First of all, the nature of female work needs to be taken into 
account, most importantly for any planned governmental policies. 
Females work as unpaid family members alongside the work they share 
in the labour market: resposibilities at home include child-
bearing and child-rearing. Bindary et a1 (1973) suggested that 
female work could influence child-bearing and that the nature of 
the work determined whether this is a stimulus or disincentive. The 
conclusion reached is that agricultural work for females would seem 
to encourage large families, but industrial and commercial work 
tends towards small families. Agricu1 tural employment is readily 
available for females in rural areas : if the family is large, wives 
and children support the husband's income. Industrial and 
commercial work requires regular hours so that condi tions of work 
make child-rearing, when the children are young, and employment 
uncomplementary. 
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---------------------------------------------------Area Urban Rural 
Sex Males 
Year 1960 1976 
Number 2461 4219 
in labour 
force (ODDs) 
Growth of 
labour force 
(OOOs) 
Annual % 
growth 
rate 
1758 
3.4 
Females Males Females 
1960 1976 1960 1976 1960 1976 
280 630 4746 5925 345 358 
350 1179 12 
5.1 1.4 .2 
-----------------------------------
Activity 
rate 
Change in 
activity rate 
49 
2.3 
51 5.8 
2.3 
8.1 59.0 56.9 4.3 3.5 
-2.1 -.8 
-----------------------------------------------
Population 
component of 
change in 
labour force 
65 73 29 24 
---'------------------------------
Activity 
component of 
change in 
labour force 
6 51 -4 -20 
---------------------------------------------------
Total % 
change in 
labour force 
71 124 25 4 
----------------------'----'--------------------
Source: Tables 1-3 Nassef (1980). 
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Table 2.4 The Economically Active Female Population 
1937-1984 
------- -------- ,-------------------------Age Population Labour Force Participation 
Year Range (OOOs) (OOOs) Rate 
1937 5+ 7,954 897 11.3 
1947 5+ 9,575 649 6.8 
1960 6+ 12,389 614 4.8 
1976 6+ 17,979 988 5.5 
1977 5.3 
1978 6.0 
1979 5.4 
1980 5.7(16.7) 
1981 5.9 
1982 5.8 
1983 12.5 
1984 13.8 
----------------------------------------------------
Sources: Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Nagi (1971). 
1937-1976 census figures. 
1977-1984 LFS figures. Figure in bracket EFS rate: ever-married 
females 15-49. 
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(1) 
Table 2.5 A cross-national comparison of activity rates 
Continent Country 
Males 
Africa Egypt 54.4 
Algiers 39.5 
Nigeria 50.4 
America Argentina 55.5 
Honduras 49.2 
us 57.4 
Asia Iran 47.8 
Israel 43.3 
Malaysia 47.4 
Syria 41.2 
Activity Rate (%)(2) 
Females 
5.5 
3.8 
51.5 
21.9 
9.3 
38.5 
8.9 
24.2 
26.0' 
8.0 
Persons 
30.4 
21.5 
50.4 
38.7 
29.3 
47.7 
38.9 
33.7 
36.8 
24.9 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Europe France 54.2 32.3 
Poland 57.4 45.4 
Spain 51.3 20.7 
UK 59.4 35.4 
Australia 57.7 32.6 
Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics (1980). 
(1) Rates measured in 1970-80 decade. 
(2) Proportion of total population 
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in labour force. 
43.1 
51.2 
35.7 
47.1 
45.2 
Table 2.6 Hours of work and wages in Egyptian non-agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors, 1960-1976 
--------------------------------------------------Non-Agricultural Manufacturing 
Hours Wages Hours Wages Male/ 
(Per (Piaster/ Male Female Total Female 
Year Week) Week) Wage 
Ratio 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1960 49 238 
1961 48 236 
1962 47 229 47 219 117 212 .53 
1963 45 263 44 252 154 246 .61 
1964 44 279 44 271 171 264 .63 
1965 53 323 53 305 235 301 .77 
1966 62 343 62 336 247 334 .74 
1967 49 331 49 324 229 318 .71 
1968 50 336 50 363 246 356 .68 
1969 49 402 49 410 298 403 .73 
1970 55 401 55 406 258 397 .64 
1971 56 399 55 401 269 392 .67 
1972 55 450 54 468 320 458 .68 
1973 56 467 55 476 308 466 .65 
1974 60 531 59 534 336 524 .63 
1975 58 558 59 553 375 541 .68 
1976 56 652 56 663 498 651 .75 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics 
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Availability of medical contraceptive services is essential 
governmental policy if females are to take up urban jobs and 
opportuni ties available to them. The conclusion reached by the 
Egyptian fertility survey of 1980 is that contraceptives in at least 
the two largest cities Cairo and Alexandria, are easily available. 
Despite government policy to shorten the working week,(18) 
table (2.6) shows no observable trends in the average weekly hours 
worked per worker. This is in contrast to the trend observed in 
developed countries, which is one of a declining length of working 
week. The two Arab-Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973 undoubtedly had 
some effect in raising the hours worked by individuals. The rise in 
the male/female wage ratio, however, is expected to encourage 
greater female market participation. 
An important factor influencing the size of the female labour 
force is the status of females in Egypt. According to Nagi (1971), 
two major trends have resulted in the improvement of the status of 
females. The first concerns the open acknowledgement of the 
equali ty of the sexes in the 1962 national charter. The second 
trend, resulting from the extension of free education until 
university level, is towards increasing the educational attainment 
of females. The proportion of female/male enrolment increased from 
39% in 1966/7 to 40.9% in 1981/2 for primary level (6-12 years) i 
30.6% to 38.5% for intermediate level (13-15 years)i 30.1% to 36.7% 
for secondary level (16-18 years). For university level the 
increase was from 30.5% in 1972/3 to 33.8% in 1981/2(19). 
The extension of free education until University level has also 
meant that youths could delay entrance into the labour market(20). 
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This may lead to an indirect positive effect on female labour supply 
due to the need to support education of youths in the family. Even 
so, low income families may still not be able to forego the income 
which could be earned by having the youths working rather than 
continuing their education. 
Another incentive to continue education is the government 
policy of guaranteed employment for graduates of high education 
institutes (mentioned earlier). This policy should also delay 
entrance of youths into the labour market. Moreover, the combined 
effect of free education and a guaranteed employment policy should 
increase the supply of the educated labour(21). 
The period of military draft was lengthened during the interwar 
period, that is between 1967 and 1973. The effect was to decrease 
the supply of primary workers (adult males) and increase that of 
secondary workers (females, young and old pople). The entrance of 
secondary workers into the labour market could be attributed to the 
need to supplement family income since conscript's income was (and 
is) only nominal. During this period, Egypt may have experienced an 
"added worker" effect, though the causes are different from those in 
the developed countries(22). 
Another policy which may have an indirect effect on female 
labour supply is the facili tat ing of emigrat ion to the Arab 
countries. This has resulted in less pressure on the demand for 
jobs at home, thus possibly enabling females to seek employment. 
This has also meant that females find themselves head of households 
with greater responsibilities, thus possibly motivating them to seek 
employment in the labour market if childcare could be the 
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responsibility of another relative. 
2.4 Sources of Data 
Modern census taking in Egypt began with the 1882 census 
followed by a second census in 1897, after which it was taken every 
ten years until 1947. The 1957 and 1967 censuses were postponed 
because of the Middle East conflicts so that the last three censuses 
were taken in 1960, 1976 and 1986 (still to be published). 
Labour force statistics were collected during census years 
starting from 1897. However, their utility was limited because of 
the delay in release and because they are so far apart(23). There 
are other limitations concerning census data in reporting female 
activity rates. As mentioned before, census questionnaires ignore 
unpaid work of females either in household production or in 
agricultural activity. 
This partly led to the use of a census-type survey : the labour 
force sample survey. The first survey was carried out in 1942 and 
was taken twice per year in January and July until 1965 when data 
gathering took place yearly in October (the choice being so that the 
beginning of the calendar year and financial year (1st July) are 
avoided. 
The objectives of the survey are to: 
(1) measure the volume of the labour force; 
(2) ascertain the geographical, sex, age and industrial 
distribution of persons in the labour force; 
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(3) measure the percentage unemployed. 
The data is gathered at firms in which there are at least ten 
employees; the frame of the survey being taken from the latest 
census. There seems to be a defect in using this data set. As will 
be seen later (Chapters IV and V), about 40~ of households report no 
household cash income (i.e., total income - female earnings). The 
most probable reason is error in reporting of the wages of other 
family members. 
Other sources of data include several national surveys - among 
them the 1980 Egyptian fertility survey. A. full description of 
Survey Design is given in Volume I of publications produced. The 
survey is a nationally representative probability sample of 
households. The primary sampling units are shiakhasj districts in 
urban areas, and villages - rural units. The core of the survey 
was the individual questionnaire for ever-married females (15-49). 
A component of this contained an account of the work history of the 
female. There are six data files available for use. In this study 
use is made of one data file (VCOl) in which income data is 
available. The size of this is 1/3 of all the sample. Another data 
file (SR03) is also useful for a study of this kind, but income data 
is not available. 
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NOTES: 
(1) For the sake of comparison, birth rates for other countries are 
(for 1980) Algeria; 43.9, Kuwait; 37.3, Israel; 24.3, England 
and Wales; 13.2 (Source: Demographic Yearbook 1986). 
(2) Lewis (1954) and Mabro (1967) discuss whether this 
characterisation is applicable. 
(3) Marginal productivity of labour is defined as the increase in 
output resulting from the addition of one more unit of labour. 
(4) Textbooks on development economics such as Yotopouloa and 
Nugent (1976) deal with the labour-surplus hypothesis and its 
relevance to the present day employment problem. 
(5) Ikram (1980), pps.1l6-7 and 212-6. Lack of employment 
opportunities is undoubtedly one of the major push factors in 
migration, education being the strong pull factor. 
(6) Mabro (1967), pps.325-6. 
(7) 1 feddan = 4,201 square meters. 
(8) Hansen & Radwan (1982) Chapter 6 and for the interaction 
between the submarkets in the economy pps.143-6. 
(9) See Ikram (1980), Chapter 7. Nearly 5~ of those employed in 
the public sector are educated as compared to ~ in the private 
sector. 
(10) Extras over the basic wage rate can amount to a maximum of 50' 
in the government and 100' in public enterprises (see Korayem 
(1984), p.70). In 1975 a general cost of living allowance was 
introduced and in 1978 more freedom was given to public 
enterprises in setting the wage of the individual market. 
(11) Hansen & Radwan (1983), pps.14-15. Improvement to the system 
should include greater differentiation on the bias of 
specialisation in skills in short supply. The seniority system 
could also be revised in favour of an incentive system. 
(12) Hansen & Radwan (1983], ppa.82-92 contains information about 
immigration to the Arab countries. 
(13) See Hansen and Radwan (1982) and Serageldin et al (1983). 
(14) The labour force is defined as the total of employed and 
unemployed. Lower and upper age limits are usually included (6 
years or 15 years as a lower limit, 65 as an upper limit). To 
count a person as employed, some nations stipulate a minimum 
number of hours worked per week (Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics). The structure of the employed labour force 1960; 
1976 is thoroughly covered in Korayem (1984), pps.39-60. 
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(15) The explanation proposed by Youssef (l971) is that the low 
participation rates can be explained by the social structure of 
Middle Eastern Society. The favouring of sexual segregation 
has resulted, via social barriers and institutional mechanisms, 
in preventing women from taking part in public activities that 
bring them into contact with the opposite sex. 
(16) Bishrat [1985], pps.22-25. 
(17) Ibrahim [1985], p.13. 
(18) This came into operation officially in 1961 when the working 
week was shortened from 48 to 42 hours in public enterprises. 
See Korayem (1984), pps. 3-4. This policy was put in effect in 
1962. For more details see Korayem (1984), pps.4-5. 
(19) These figures are taken from Seatherum (1983), tables (4.1) and 
(4.6). 
(20) Korayem (1984), p.7. 
(21) Korayem (1984), pps.9-10. 
(22) See Korayem (1984) for further details. 
(23) See Nagi (1971), Introduction. 
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CHAPTER III THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Two trends in the industrialised countries have raised interest 
in work behaviour; the declining number of hours worked by males and 
the substantial increase 
females(l). Robbins' paper 
in labour force participation by 
(1930) has led to the approach of 
analysing the effect of wages and income on the supply of labour. 
This approach proposes that the individual divides the time 
available between work and leisure time: or using a more appropriate 
term for leisure : non-market uses of time. 
In this Chapter the basic labour-leisure choice model is 
presented in sections (3. I) and (3.2). Non-market uses of time, 
such as child-bearing, are considered to be of importance in the 
case of married females. Section (3.3) presents an extension of the 
basic model which stresses this aspect of female behaviour. 
3.1 The Basic Model 
Neo-classical labour supply theory assumes that the individual's 
behaviour is governed by a function, called a utility function(2), 
consisting of two variables; consumption goods and leisure time. 
The individual acts so as to maximise utility, which is bounded by 
two constraints: a time constraint and an income constraint. 
Following conventional consumer analysis, a function for the demand 
for leisure is defined from which a supply function for work time is 
obtained. 
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3.1.1 The Utility Maximisation Problem 
An individual is assumed to maximise the utility function, U: 
U = U(C, L) (3.1) 
Subject to: 
(1) An income constraint: 
PC = WH+I (3.2) 
and, 
(2) A time constraint: 
H+L = T (3.3) 
Where: 
C Market goods purchased 
L Amount of time spent in leisure or non-market activities 
P Price index 
W Wage rate 
I Assets or unearned income 
H Number of hours worked 
T Total amount of time available during the period 
C and L are considered to be Hicksian composites(3). 
Since H = T-L, the income and time constraints can be combined: 
or 
W(T-L) + I = PC 
WT + I = PC + WL 
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(3.4a) 
(3.4b) 
The term on the right hand side of (3.4b) shows the expenditure 
of this income on either market goods, valued PC, or on leisure 
time, WL, the shadow price of which is the forgone wage of the 
individual (4). 
The constrained maximisation problem can be solved by setting up 
a new function, the Lagrangian U*, which takes into account 
constraint (3.4b) on the original problem. 
Max U* = U(O,L) + ~ [W(T-L)+I-PC] 
Where ~ is known as the Lagrangian multiplier and is interpreted 
here as the marginal utility of income. 
The first order partial derivatives with respect to 0, L and ~ 
of the Lagrangian are set equal to zero, satisfying the first order 
conditions: (5) 
au* au ~W 0 aL = aL - = 
au* au ~p 0 (3.5) ac = ao - = 
au* W(T-L)+I-PC 0 a~ = = 
3.1.2 The Labour SU22lI Function 
The first order conditions (3.5), provide a system of three 
equations in six variables. For a given set of numerical values of 
W, I and P a unique solution for L, 0 and ~ is obtained. Assuming P 
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to be an exogeneous variable, then the demand for leisure time can 
be represented as: 
L = L(W, I) (6) (3.6) 
Since H=T-L, the hours function can be represented as: 
H = T-L(W, I) = H(W, I) (3.7) 
The simple model as represented by equation (3.7) is not one 
that is suitable for empirical application. As stated by 
Killingsworth (1983, p.19): "... the simple model focuses on the 
role of pecuniary variables - notably, the wage and property income 
- in labour supply decisions. However, this does not mean that the 
model implies that such factors "explain" ( ••• ) "all" ( ••• ) of an 
individual's labor supply or that individuals respond only to 
(changes in) pecuniary factors Moreover, as previously noted, 
the simple model also implies that "tastes" - that is preferences, 
or more technically indifference curves - affect labour supply 
decisions". 
Alongside wage and income variables, (7) other factors such as 
education and fBJIily size and composition, denoted by the array A, 
are added to the model to control for factors relating to 
differences in preferences. The extended model can be represented 
as: 
H = H(W, I, A) + € (3.8) 
Where € represents a random error term introduced into the model 
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to take into account errors: measurement errors. errors of omi t ted 
variables both observed and unobserved (including tastes). 
The form of the demand for leisure function and hence the supply 
of labour function depends on the form of the utility function U. 
In most studies. however, the specification of the labour supply 
function is assumed to be an emprirical problem(8); a linear 
approximation to the labour supply function is usually adopted: 
n 
H = «0 + a 1W + a 2 I + [ ai ai + ~ 
i=3 
Where: 
ai represent constant parameters 
~ normally distributed random error term 
n number of explanatory variables 
Let: 
(3.9a) 
B be an array denoting all the explanatory variables 
a be an array denoting all the ais 
<Xl' be the transpose of a 
(3.9a) is more simply stated as: 
H = a T B + ~ (3.9b) 
The parameters & are then estimated using least squares for the 
whole population, Le., working and non-working females. When a 
sub-group of working females is taken as a sample, least squares 
provides biased and inconsistent estimates. This is because a 
sub-group chosen on the basis of the individual's work status (an 
endogeneous variable since participation and hours are considered to 
be jointly determined) is not a random sample. For the hours 
function of workers, hours observed, H, have to be greater than zero 
for inclusion of the individual. 1. e., H >0. This problem is 
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presented statistically in section 3.2. 
The simple model represented by the function in (3.B) is 
adequate if the utility maximisation problem has an internal 
solution. In the case of the individual this means that H _0. For 
some sub-groups of the population; females, young and old people of 
both sexes - this is not the case. In the next section, the labour 
force participation decision is examined. 
3.2 The Labour Force Participation Decision 
Labour force participation is another dimension of labour 
supply. Ben- Porath [1973b] pointed out the need to examine the 
nature of the participation decis ion in order to es timate a valid 
participation function. There are two interpetations that can be 
given to the observed participation rate. 
Initially, many studies used a participation function where 
participation and hours are interchangeable measures of labour 
supply, 1. e.: 
p = p (W, I, A) + ~ (3.10) 
Where P denotes the labour force participation rate for a group 
or a dUDDY variable representing the labour force status of the 
individual. 
This model, which was proposed by Mincer (and used by others)(9) 
has an implicit underlying assumption of life-cycle labour force 
behaviour. Mincer (1962) presents a one period model of female 
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labour force behaviour in which the period ia a life-time. The 
timing decision of work activity is given by a profit maximising 
principle: a female works when it is financially profitable relative 
to non-market activity{IO). 
This approach implies that the labour force participation rate 
for a group of females represents an estimate of the average 
fraction of time that every female in that group wishes to spend in 
the labour force. Individual differences lie in the timing of 
labour force entry. This depends on variation in coata and 
opportunities due to random "transitory" factors such as presence of 
children or unemployment of the spouse. 
According to Ben-Porath (1973b) • this is not the only 
interpretation that can be given to the participation rate and might 
be one that is not true to the real situation{ll). The alternative 
view given is that the participation rate reflects individual 
differences in tastes among females that can be attributed to 
differences in the utility function. So, the labour force 
participation rate represents the proportion of females who want to 
participate in the labour market. 
Using U.s. census data, he concluded that current 
non-participation was a good indicator of permanent 
non-participation (12) • It seemed there was enough weight to the 
second viewpoint for further investigation. This prompted the 
development of a different empirical approach to the one outlined in 
the next paragraph. 
In the same way as for the hours equation, empirical 
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specification leads to the use of a linear probability of 
participation function: 
n 
P = «0 + «lW + «2I + t «iai + E 
i=3 
or more simply: 
P=<iTB+€ 
where: 
o , p , 1 
<i array denoting constant parameters 
B array denoting set of explanatory variables 
€ normally distributed random error term 
n : number of explanatory variables 
(3.lla) 
(3.llb) 
For this model, estimation using least squares on the 
unrestricted or untransformed dependent variable can lead to 
prediction of p that lies outside the zero-one range. A probit 
transformation of p transforms the dependent variable from a finite 
to an infinite range, thus overcoming this problem(13), 
Gronau (1973a) and Heckman (1974a) developed the second approach 
proposed by Ben-Porath. The conceptual approach is also based on 
the utility maximisation principle: the marginal value of a 
commodity equals its market price if some quantity of the commodity 
is purchased and the marginal value at zero quantities of a 
commodity is less than its market price if no amount is purchased. 
In terms of the participation problem, the probability of 
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participation is seen as depending on whether market wages exceed 
the shadow price (subjective evaluation) of time(14). 
A two equation model is developed. Labour supply behaviour is 
determined by: 
w = W (X. E:w) 
W* = W(Y. E:*) 
where: 
W potential market wage 
w* shadow price of time (own wage) 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
X array denotinK a set of variables determinin~ market wa~e 
(number = n) 
Y : array denotin~ a set of variables determinin~ own wa~e 
(number = m) 
normally distributed random error terms that embody 
specification errors 
The participation model is thus given by the inequality: 
W < W*(O) } 
W ) W*(O) 
if female does not work 
if female works (3.15) 
Where W*(O) is the own wage function when the female is working 
zero hours. 
For clearer exposition. let the functional form of W and W* be 
linear (15) : 
44 
-T-W = 0: X + E:w 
w* = ~ T Y + E:* I (3.16) 
Where a, ~ are arrays of constant parameters. 
The procedure is then to estimate the structural parameters a, 
/J. 
The first problem is identification of the system. The 
variables in X and Y are possibly overlapping endogeneous and 
exogeneous variables. The exclusion of one variable in Y that is 
present in i will at least ensure identification of the equations. 
The market wage is mainly determined by education and work 
experience, and, these variables also influence the own wage of a 
female. However, there is no theoretical guidance in choosing the 
identifying restriction. Assuming experience is the identifying 
variable, this variable is removed from the set of determining 
factors Y. 
However, there is still the problem that the shadow price of 
time is an unobservable variable, resulting in the need for indirect 
estimation of /3. 
Restating the participation condition: 
w ) W*(O) if a female works 
Where W*(O) is W* defined at zero hours worked (h=O). 
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Inequality (3.15) implies that the condition for work is: 
W - W*(O) ) 0 (3.17) 
By substituting equations (3.16) into inequality (3.17): 
(3.18) 
or 
T- -T- * (<< X - ~ Y» (€ - €w) (3.19) 
Letting Y T Z represent (<< T x - ~ T Y) (16), an expression for 
the probability of working is given by: 
P = Pr (y T Z ) €) (3.20) 
The specification of the distribution of € allows the use of 
maximum likelihood methods of estimation(l7). It is convenient to 
assume that ~ has a mean of zero and is normally distributed in the 
population as 8 whole. Then the transformed variable €/a has a 
mean-zero, following a standard normal distributionj a is the 
standard deviation of €. 
The probability that a given female with 8 predetermined set of 
characteristics. represented by Z works: 
P(p=l) = Pr (y T Z ) €) = 
_l
( y T
J 
z/o) 
e -t
2
/2dt = F ('1 T z/o) 2'" 
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(3.21) 
The probability that a given female does not work: 
P(p=O) = Pr (a T Z < ~) = 
I 
2fT J 
( y T z/o) 
e -t
2
/2dt = l-F (y T z/o) (3.22) 
Where a value of p=l is assigned to every female that works and 
a value p=O to every female that does not work. 
Setting up the likelihood function for a poulation of k females, 
where the first j are workers gives: 
j 
L = IT F (Y T z/o) 
i=1 
k 
IT [l-F (y T z/o)] 
i=j+l 
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(3.23) 
Probit maximum likelihood procedure is then used to estimate (0) 
normalised Y coefficients, since the estimation procedure uses the 
standardised cumulative normal transformation. 
The coefficients of the market wage function are then estimated 
using least squares. However, in the case of using a sample of 
workers. selection bias arises(lB) and. if education increases 
participation. then a higher proportion of those educated will be 
found in the sample of workers underestimating the effect of 
education on wages(19). This is also the case for the hours 
function of workers. 
Heckman (19BO) treats selection bias as a specification error 
(missing variable) problem and proposes an estimator that enables 
OLS estimation procedure free of selection bias. 
One can write the population wage function as: 
- T X W = ex + Ew (3.24a) 
and: 
E(WlX) = ex T X (3.24b) 
However. it would be reasonable to assume that the error term 
(tastes for work) E:w is higher among a sub-group of workers. so 
that: 
E(WlX.H >0) = ex T X + E(E:wlE > - Y T Z/O) (3.25) 
Stating that E: and EW are correlated means that: 
t 0 (3.26) 
Heckman's estimation procedure provides a value to expression 
(3.26): 
48 
E (WIX,H > 0) = a x + (o€W,E/o) ~ + E~ (3.27) 
Where: 
and: 
~ = f(- y T i/o)/ [l-F(- y T i/o)] 
Where f and F are the density and cumulative distribution 
function of the standard nonnal random variable. Heckman then 
suggests that ~ can be estimated from the probit on the 
participation function, and calculates the correction for 
selectivity bias in the hours function of workers as: 
E(HIV, H > 0) = e T V + 0 ~ + E~ (3.28) 
Where V array denoting a set of variables determining hours 
worked 
e array of parameters 
From (3.28), one can obtain a value for 0 and calculate values 
for a. 
From the coefficients of Ci and y/o in equations (3.23) and 
(3.24a), 0 can be calculated. Then from the relation Y • (Ci - i), i 
can be determined. 
Other empirical procedures include that of Heckman [1974]. This 
procedure allows for joint estimation of the probability of 
participation and hours of work. If a female works, her hours of 
work adjust to equate market wage and own wage (if she haa the 
freedom to set market wages) (20). However, this procedure waa not 
used widely because of computational expense. The method outlined 
previously (or a variation of it) is the one most commonly used and 
the procedure applied in the present study. 
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In the next section aspects specifically related to female 
labour supply are examined. 
3.3 Female Labour Supply 
The decision to work by females is one of many decisions that 
have to be taken within the household. Variables such as age at 
marriage, cumulative fertility, educational attainment and labour 
force participation are conditioned by economic . factors. These 
types of behaviour also strongly interact and have roots in a common 
set of attributes of the individual. Analysis should thus seek to 
specify and estimate these relationships simultaneously. A number 
of studies have attempted to place the participation decision into a 
broader framework(21). These will be discussed in this section. 
The relationship between the decision to work and the decision 
to bear children is considered to be important especially in less 
developed countries where high birth rates might place a burden on 
the national economy. The determination of family size is brought 
within the utility maximisation framework. Fertility phenomena are 
explained in terms of the price of children and real incomej the 
chanel through which fertility bears on labour force participation 
(or vice-versa) is through the price of children one part 
(possibly a major part) being the value of the mother's time. 
3.3.1 
Malthus' theory of population change marks the beginning of the 
association between pooulation change and economic indicators. 
Mal thus' hypothesis is that an increase in income should lead to 
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larger family size for two reasons: 
( 1) An increase in income would reduce child mortality 
enabling more children to survive to adulthood. 
Therefore, if the decrease in births did not outweigh 
the decrease in child mortality, family size would 
increase. 
(2) Increasing income would give greater motivation 
towards earlier marriage and less abstention during 
marriage. 
The development and spread of contraceptive knowledge increased 
the scope of family decision-making inducing Becker (1960) to 
analyse the determination of family size within an economic 
framework offering a generalisation and eKtension to Malthus' 
theory(22) • 
Children are assumed to be a source of satisfactionj in economic 
terms they are considered a consumption good (if they provide money 
income they are assumed to be a production good as well). Children 
provide utility via a utility function. There are costs attached to 
children and presumably a family determines the eKpenditure on each 
child the term given to this being "quality" of child. 
EKPendi ture on children would take the form of better health care 
and nutrition, investment in education and formation of attitudes 
(which requires time). 
Becker's hypothesis is that the demand for children has to 
relate to quantity of children and quality of children. The 
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dramatic decline of fertility in developed countriea over the paat 
century could be interpreted as being the result of a greater 
responsiveness of quality of children to quantity of children with 
increaaing income(23). 
Becker (1965) developed an approach to labour supply behaviour 
that incorporates the non-working time of an individual. The 
assumption of the time allocation model is that households combine 
time and market goods to produce cODUDodi ties that enter into the 
utility function (aa in equation (3.1». 
The following sets out a version of Becker's utility 
maximisation problem. 
Let: 
Zi commodity i produced 
Xi vector of market goods required to produce commodity i 
ti time input required to produce commodity i (ii is used if 
one assumes that time in different periods (weekdays, 
weekends) can be distinguished) 
Fi Household production function for commodity i 
Z Limit on resources 
The individual produces Zi via a household production function: 
(3.29) 
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Maximising the utility function, U : 
U = U (Z) • U (i) • U (x, t) (3.30) 
Subject to the constraint 
(3.31) 
Utility is, as in the basic model, a function of market goods 
and time. Thus the conclusions (derivation of the labour supply 
function) are the same. However, as pointed out by Killingsworth 
(1983, p. 42-3), the importance and most interesting application of 
this approach is its analysis of aspects of non-market uses of time. 
It defines the problem in a clear fashion, but essentially reaching 
the same conclusions as the basic model. 
The following sets out a model based on those developed by 
Willis (1973) Ben-Porath (1973a) that extends the Becker model. 
Children are treated as one of the commodities produced by the 
household. 
Let 
Ch services from children 
N number of children 
q constant 
C consumption level 
Then: 
(3.32) 
Where: 
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Zl production of children 
Zz production of consumer goods 
XN market goods required for children 
tN time required in child services 
Xc market goods required to produce commodity c 
tc time required to produce commodity c 
The individual maximises the utility function: 
U = U(Ch, C) = U(qN, C) (3.33) 
Assuming that the number of children is a measure of child 
services (3.33) becomes; U(N, C); subject to the production 
functions for children and commodities: 
(3.34) 
and resources constraints : 
(3.35) 
These constraints can be combined to form one constraint: 
(3.36) 
Where: 
tN time input in child services 
tc time input in commodity services 
tL time allocated to the labour market 
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T total time constraint 
I non-labour income 
P price index of market goods 
Willis (1973) considers whether the production functions are the 
relevant constraints on utility maximisation. In reality, household 
production and household consumption are determined simultaneously. 
Maximisation of utility is thus subject to the income constraint 
(3.36) and as previously described. demand functions are derived 
from optimising the Lagrangian: (24) 
Max U* = U(N, C) + A [(T-t~tc) W+I-P (xN + xc)] (3.37) 
Two functions are of interest in this study: the demand for 
children (family size determination) and the wife's labour force 
participation. The constraint faced by the family for the demand 
for children depends on the wife's labour force participation 
decision. Thus, the hypothesis proposed by Willis's model implies 
the following: 
N = N1 (A) + ~1 
NzciD + ~z 
L = L(C) + ~3 
Where: 
if L = 0 
if L = 1 
L labour force participation 
(3.38) 
A, B arrays denoting a set of variables determining the demand 
for children 
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C array denoting a set of variables determining labour 
force participation 
random error terms 
The choice of variables in arrays A, B and C has been determined 
according to assumptions regarding the nature of the 
joint-determination of these functions. This point is discussed in 
section (5.5.2). 
In the final section of this Chapter, the main determinants of 
female labour supply are discussed. 
3.3.2 Determinants of Female Labour Supply 
The main demographic factors influencing the size and 
composition of the supply of female labour are: (1) marital status; 
(2) size and age composition of the household and; (3) age of the 
female. 
Traditionally, division of labour in households has meant that 
married females have specialised in child-bearing and other domestic 
activities, while married males have engaged in "market" activities 
(hunting, farming, etc.) that provide a source of income; and 
leaving the married female with the risk of abandonment. Thus, 
near ly all societies have developed long-term protection for the 
female, in the form of a marriage contract(25). 
This means that, depending on the extent to which the husband's 
role is viewed as that of provider, one of the expectations of 
marriage of the female is that of partial or total financial 
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support(26). Thus market participHtion of married females is 
expected to be lower because of; (l) the availability of another 
source of income (husband's) and; (2) the increased responsibility 
of domestic work which provides a substitute to market work. 
Empirical studies treat marital status as a control variable. 
Females are classified according to presence of husband in the 
household: 
(l) Married females (husband present) 
(2) Single females, i.e., all other females. These include: 
(a) Married females, husband absent 
(b) Never-married females 
(c) Divorced females 
(d) Widowed females 
The participation rate for single females is higher than that 
for married females because: 
(1) Absence of the husband due to separation divorce or death 
is expected (due to marital instability or due to differing 
location for work) to increase participation due to 
increased financial responsibility. This will depend on 
perceived marital instability and other sources of 
income ( 27) • 
(2) Career interests may be the reason why some females might 
serve to increase their tastes for work. Again, financial 
pressure would also induce a higher participation rate(28). 
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One of the purposes of marriage is procreation. Females have a 
biological committment to the production and feeding of children. 
Females also are willing to spend much time and energy in caring for 
their children; they want their biological investment in production 
to be worthwhile. 
In addition to this, a mother is able to care for older children 
while she "produces" additional children rather than while she 
engages in other acti vi ties. That is, there is complementarity 
between bearing and rearing children. Such specialised investment 
in the household sector reinforces any biologically induced sexual 
division of labour. 
The complementarity of child-bearing and work has been studied 
by Bindary et al (1973) and McCabe and Rozenzweig (1976). In less 
developed countries a large portion of the labour force is employed 
in cottage industries and retailing occupations in which on-the-job 
child care is possible(29). The measure of a similar type of 
variable has been described by Bowen & Finegan (1969) as a feminity 
index; the relative availability of jobs commonly held by females. 
Thus for mothers, market participation is lowered because of: 
(1) The comparitive advantage females have over males in the 
household sector due to greater investment in household 
activity (or conversely the comparitive advantage of males 
over females in the market sector due to greater market 
investment - therefore higher wages). 
(2) The result of (1) is loss of market experience and market 
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producti vi ty. 
(3) Complementarity of child-bearing with child-rearing and 
domestic activity. 
(4) The increased amount of domestic work. 
The presence of children would tend to increase the mother's 
market participation because: 
(1) There is an increase in the need for money income. 
(2) Older children can provide assistance in domestic work. 
The quantitative impact of children on their mother's market 
participation would depend on their age and number. It is expected, 
though, that the presence of children, especially pre-school age 
children, would lower the participation rate as well as have the 
greatest effect on the mother's market participation(30). 
Life-time age-participation patterns of females are not easily 
predicted. Married females tend to interrupt their working lives 
during their child-bearing years. It seems that the process of 
family building starts early in adult life, when there would be an 
expected decline in participation(31). However, there are other 
reasons for a higher participation rate at young ages. The waning 
of vitality with life progression suggests that work should be done 
at younger rather than older ages. Life--cycle theory would also 
suggest that if the interest rate is greater than the rate of time 
preference then individuals will work earlier in life (see Appendix 
I, A3.2). Typical life-cycle patterns for married females are an 
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inverted U-shape when a plateau is reached in the early twenties and 
then a decline in rate occurs before retirement age (Bowen & 
Finegan, 1969). Another observed pattern is a double-peaked profile 
with the dips in the curve during peak child-bearing and just before 
retirement (see Chapter V). 
The three main economic determinants of labour supply are: (1) 
the wage ratej (2) income and (3) unemployment of spouse (other 
family member). 
The effect of a change in the wage rate or income is discussed 
in terms of income and substitution effects. An increase in the 
wate rate exerts two opposing effects on the hours worked by an 
individual. A rise in wages increases the individual's income, 
allowing her to consume more goods, including leisure time(32), thus 
reducing the amount of market work (the income effect). The 
increase in the wage rate also raises the price of leisure time 
since its price is taken as the individual's forgone earnings, i.e., 
the wage rate. This leads to an increase in the market work of the 
individual (the substitution or uncompensated wage effect). 
The decomposition of the supply of hours with respect to the 
wage rate is given by: (33) 
aH aH 
aw = S + H ar 
(3.39) 
Where: 
s 
total wage effect (wage effect taking the change of 
income into account) 
income effect 
substitution effect 
60 
aH aH aw and aI are observable quantities H cannot be ovserved, but is 
taken as the average hours worked in the sample under study (HAv)' 
From equation (3.39), 8 can be calculated. 
(3.40) 
Theoretically the substitution effect is positive (8 > 0) and 
the income derivative is negative (aR/aI < 0). Thus, the sign of 
the total wage effect in equation (3.39) cannot be predicted 
theoretically, but is determined empirically. 
evidence is summarised by Killingsworth(34). 
The empirical 
Summing up, the 
evidence points towards a slightly stronger income effect for males, 
and a dominant substitution effect for females. This implies that 
male labour supply schedules(35) are gently backward bending whereas 
female labour supply scheduels are strongly forward sloping (in 
developed countries). 
So far the discussion has concerned utility maximisation for an 
individual without regard to the effect of other family members. 
Two alternati ves as to how earnings of other family members are 
incorporated into the model are(36): 
(I) In a two member family model (husband and wife), the 
wife treats her husband's earnings as a type of 
income(37) • 
(2) The utility maximisation problem is redefined in terms 
of a family utility function with a family income 
constraint(38}. This type of model implies that there 
are two types of substitution effect relevant to the 
labour supply of a family member: 
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(a) Own-substitution effect (discussed above and 
represented by S). 
(b) Cross-substitution effect, which is defined as: 
S· . = lJ 
aH aHj 
aWj - Hjav aI i ~ j (3.41) 
where i, j represent the different family 
members. Assuming that the cross-substitution 
effects are zero, then the effect of a change in 
a family member's wage rate on another member' a 
labour supply is only an income effect. The 
result reached here is the same as the hypothesis 
stated in (1) , except that the husband's labour 
supply is also affected by his wife's change in 
wages. 
Unemployment affects female participation in two ways: 
(1) In times of higher unemployment job opportunities are 
less available and there would be lower expected 
earnings. These factors would discourage the female 
to enter the labour force - the discouraged worker 
effect. 
(2) On the other hand, unemployment might affect the 
earnings of the husband (if he himself is not 
unemployed). A need to supplement family income acts 
as a spur for the female to enter the labour force -
the added worker effect. 
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The existence of either of these factors is a matter of 
empirical determination. 
Finally, a factor that is considered to have an important effect 
on female participation is schooling(39). The relation between 
schooling and female participation is expected to be positive 
because: 
(1) Schooling increases a female's market earnings, 
increasing the opportunity cost of time, thus 
encouraging her to substitute time at home for time in 
market work; 
(2) Schooling gives access to cleaner more interesting 
jobs; 
(3) Years spent at school might also be a measure of the 
female's natural inclination towards work. Also 
schooling might itself increase the inclination or 
taste for work, especially in relation to domestic 
work. 
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(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
See Lewis (1957) and Long (1958). 
A utility function is defined as any monotonically 
increasing function of C and L. The Appendix (A3.1) 
contains a graphical presentation of the problem. 
This means that if prices of the bundle of goods C and the 
shadow prices of the different uses of non-market time, L, 
change in the same proportion, then C and L behave as if 
they were single entities Hicks (1968), pps. 312-313). 
The shadow price of time is defined as the price which is 
imputed as the true marginal value of time and which may 
differ from the wage rate. 
Second order conditions require the second order 
differential d2 U* to be negative. A mathematical 
derivation of this condition can be found in Green (1971), 
pps. 306-8. The derivation is not needed for the present 
argument. 
Similarly demand functions for C and ~ could be set up. 
Since much of the literature is concerned with the effect 
of wages and income on labour supply, this is presented in 
Appendix (A.3.2). 
The process of econometric specification is discussed in 
Killingsworth (1983), pps. 68-78. A labour supply function 
can be specified in three ways. 
(a) Adoption of an explicit utility function, then solving 
the first order conditions to obtain a demand function 
for leisure. 
(b) Derivation 
functional 
function. 
of a labour supply function 
relation obtained from the 
from a 
utility 
(c) Specifying the supply function, a priori. This is the 
method used in this research. 
The studies include Cain (1966) and Bowen and Finegan 
(1969) • 
In Heckman (1978) and Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) this 
analysis is given for Mincer's model and an explicit 
lifetime model is developed that explains timing of 
participation in terms of differences in interest rates, 
wage rates and the rate of time preference. 
See Ben-Porath (1973b) and Smith (1980) pps. 5-6. 
The hypothesis used is that the correlation between any two 
periods is strongly positive. 
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(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
The probit transformation is defined as the inverse of the 
cumulative standard normal distribution function. This 
linearises the original curve (which might be sigmoid in 
shape) so that ordinary regression procedures may be used 
to estimate the parameters. 
A graphical representation of the participation decision is 
presented in Appendix (A.3.l). 
Market wages usually have a semi-logarithmic specification 
because of the non-linear effect of the explanatory 
variables on wages. 
Layard et al (1980) describe & T Z (n in their 
terminology) as a set of characteristics predisposing the 
individual towards market work. 
Use of maximum likelihood methods of estimation are 
preferable to OLS for a reason stated earlier, in that they 
ensure predicted probabilities lie in the zero-one range. 
Also OLS estimates are less efficient than ML estimates 
because of heteroscedasticity and the standard errors are 
not consistent so the t-test is not reliable. 
Selection bias arises for two reasons: 
(a) Self-selection by individuals as in this case. 
(b) Consequence of action taken by the analyst: this is 
the case when time series analysis on the labour 
supply of married females requires stability of the 
family unit. 
(19) See Smith (1980). 
(20) Heckman's model relies on the market and own wage: 
(21) 
(22) 
W = & x + ~w 
W* = b i h + ~ y + ~* 
where h = number of hours worked. 
For working females market and own wage are equated so that 
one can solve for the hours equation: 
(y Z - ~) 
h = 
h = 0 if y Z < ~* EW 
Ner10ve and Schultz (1970), Denton and Spencer (1973), 
McCabe and Rosenzweig (1976). 
Becker (1981) adds elements of Darwinian theory in hi. 
general formulation of the demand for children. 
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(23) Studies that deal with this issue include Becker (1960, 
1981) and Willis (1973). 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
The problem is set out fully in Willis (1973). 
See Becker Chapter 2 ( 1981) for a fuller account of the 
role of females in the household. 
It is an Islamic duty for the husband to financially 
support his wife and children. 
Islamic duty places financial responsibility of single 
females on their nearest male kin. 
One of the few studies carried out on single females is 
that in Bowen & Finegan (1969), Chapter 8. 
In less developed countries, also, some or a great deal of 
child care may be accepted by relati ves or other family 
members. 
This is also confirmed by many empirical studies. 
See Layard, Barton & Zabalza (1980). 
Leisure is taken to be a normal cOlDlodi ty - an assumption 
that is reasonable. 
Mathematical derivation of this equation is found in Green 
(1971). pps. 310-11. However. in the labour supply 
problem, the sign of the income derivative is negative. 
Killingsworth (1983), Tables 3.2-3.5 and Table 4.3. 
This is a function of hours and earnings. 
Killingsworth (1983), pps. 29-38. 
The Husband does not view the wife's income in this way. 
An example of this type of study is Ashenfelter and Heckman 
(1974). For a two member family the hours supply functions 
would be: 
8m = H (Wm, Wf. Xm• I) + €m 
Hf = H (Wm• Wf' Xf' I) + €f 
where the subscripts • and f denote male and female 
respectively. 
Education differs from schooling in that knowledge can be 
obtained in places other than at school. Moreover school 
is not necessarily the most important training ground in 
obtaining the necessary skills of for shaping market 
productivities. Mincer (1974) develops a model relating 
schooling and experience to earnings. 
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CHAPTER IV: AGGRBGATB STUDY 
The purpose of this chapter is to study the differences in the 
work behaviour of females between the governerates of Egypt. An 
inter-governerate analysis is carried out using aggregated cross-
section data from two sources; the 1984 LFS and published data from 
the 1976 census. 
4.1 Introduction 
An important characteristic of the Egyptian population 
(mentioned in Chapter II) is that it is concentrated in about 5% of 
the total area of Egypt, mostly along the Nile Valley and the Delta. 
There are three main area characterisations: 
(1) by governerate; 
(2) by urban/rural area and; 
(3) by region: Lower Egypt, Upper Egypt and the Border 
regions. 
The region south of Cairo is know as Upper Egypt, while that 
north of Cairo is known as Lower Egypt. Egypt is divided into 
twenty five governerates (1976 census), which form the political 
divisions of the country. There are four governerates (situated in 
Lower Egypt) which are considered wholly urban: Cairo, Alexandria, 
Port Said and Suez. The other nine governerates in Lower Egypt are 
comprised of both urban and rural components. Upper Egypt is 
divided into eight governerates, all with urban and rural 
components. The remaining four govenerates, which are sparingly 
populated comprise the Border regions. 
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Table (4.1) shows the geographical distribution of the 
population in 1976. Nearly 65~ of the population live in Lower 
Egypt (including the urban governerates), while less than one 
percent inhabit the border regions. Furthermore, nearly 44~ of the 
population (16.1 millions) live in urban areas, making Egypt a 
highly urbanised country for its present state of economic 
development (1) • 
The geographical distribution is affected by the regional rate 
of natural increase or by migration (internal or external). 
According to Ikram [1980 :p.143] urban growth can be attributed to 
migration within Egypt rather than regional differences in fertility 
rates. Furthermore, the pattern of urbanisation has been dominated 
by the country's capital city, Cairo. The trend has been towards 
regional redistribution of the population from Upper to Lower Egypt, 
particularly from rural to urban areas throughout the country, and 
especially to the major cities(2). 
Table (4.1) shows that 44~ of males and 76~ of females in the 
labour force are situated in urban areas. This indicates a marked 
differential between the geographical distribution of the population 
and labour force between urban and rural areas for females. A 
higher proportion of females in the labour force compared to the 
total population is also found in the urban governerates and Lower 
Egypt. Table (4.2) shows that the urban participation rate is 
nearly four times that of the rural rate. Corresponding figures 
from the 1984 LFS indicate a higher urban rate, but a much lower 
differential. (3) 
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The lower rural rates may be attributed to the effect of 
urbanisation on female participation rates and possibly the 
underenumeration of females in rural areas. This is confirmed by 
participation rates from the 1980 EFS. A higher participation rate 
is also found in the urban governerates and Lower Egypt. 
Finally, tables (4.2) and (4.3) show differentials for the 
participation rates of the different marital groups; they indicate 
the highest rate for the group of never-married females and the 
lowest for married females with husband present. Regional and area 
differences in participation rates are least for married females and 
greatest for divorced and never married females (LFS). The regional 
differential in the EFS data is greater for all the marital status 
groups. Area differentials are also noticable for all groups, 
except for divorced females, being greater in all cases, for rural 
areas. 
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Table 4.1 The Geographical distribution of the 
population and labour force in Egypt. 1976 
----------------------------------------------------------
Region/ 
Area 
Numbers 
(OOOs) 
Labour Force 
Population Males Females 
% of Population to total 
Population 
Labour Force 
Population Males Females 
---------------- ._-------------------
Lower 23,690.5 5579 
Egypt 
Upper 12,672.8 3097 
Egypt 
Border 262.9 64 
Regions 
648 64.7 
152 34.6 
2 .7 
65 77.5 
(72.6) 
35 22 
(26.8) 
.7 .5 
(.6) 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Urban 
Area 
Rural 
Area 
All 
Areas 
16,036.4 
20,589.8 
36,626.2 
-------------
Source: 1976 Census 
3992 535 43.8 
5018 166 56.2 
9010 701 100 
44 76 
(65) 
56 24 
(35) 
100 100 
(100) 
,-------------------------------
Figures in brackets are the geographical distribution of the labour 
force for LFS data. 
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Table 4.2 
Marital 
status 
----
Region/ 
Area 
Urban 
Areas 
Rural 
Areas 
Lower 
Egypt 
Upper 
Egypt 
Never-
Married 
54.5 
(770) 
30.1 
(85) 
52.9 
(693) 
42.0 
(153) 
Participation rate of Females (25-59), by 
marital status, 1984 
Married Married Divorced 
husband head of 
present house-
hold 
13.3 23.3 30.5 
(1787) (166) (93) 
15.3 23.6 18.9 
(1142) (109) (30) 
14.1 23.0 28.3 
(1959) (165) (86) 
14.2 23.8 22.6 
(962) (110) (155) 
--
Widowed Single All 
Females 
--------------
14.3 
(287) 
21.8 
(296) 
18.3 
(407) 
15.7 
(174) 
28.5 17.6 
(1545) (3332) 
21.3 17.1 
(724) (1866) 
28.3 18.3 
(1690) (3649) 
20.4 16.0 
(565) (1527) 
------------------------------------------------------
All 
Areas 
50.4 
(855) 
14.0 23.3 
(2929) (275) 
26.5 
(123) 
17.3 
(583) 
25.7 17.4 
(226) (5198) 
----------.------------------------------
Figures in brackets are sizes of sub-groups. 
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Table 4.3 Participation rate by Females (15-49) by marital 
status. 1980 
----------------
Marital 
Status 
Married Separated Divorced Widowed 
Region/ 
Area 
Urban 
Areas 
Rural 
Areas 
14.3 
(1044) 
16.9 
(1509) 
17.2 
(47) 
20.6 
(105) 
28.6 
(26) 
27.6 
(50) 
17.7 
(14) 
29.3 
(19) 
All 
Females 
14.8 
(1131 ) 
18.2 
(1683) 
------------------------------------------------------------.--
Lower 
Egypt 
Upper 
Egypt 
---_._---' 
All 
Areas 
17.1 
12.9 
15.7 
(2553) 
25.0 
13.1 
15.4 
(152) 
32.7 
20.6 
28.0 
(76) 
26.5 
22.4 
25.0 
(33) 
18.3 
13.7 
16.7 
(2814) 
---------------------------------------------
Figures in brackets are sizes of sub-groups. 
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PART I: LFS STUDY 
4.2 Definition of Variables and Estimation Procedure 
4.2.1 Definition of variables 
The set of explanatory variables used to explain the labour 
force behaviour of married females are: (1) average weekly earnings; 
(2) average weekly earnings other than female earnings; (3) 
unemployment rate; (4) child per woman ratio; (5) proportion of 
females with educational attainment higher than primary level; (6) 
For single females a family size variable was also used. 
(1) Wage (W) 
Average weekly earnings of females are taken as a measure for 
the wage variable. The data included daily earnings as well as 
monthly earnings, but these were transformed into a weekly 
rate. The weekly rate was chosen for the sake of expendiency; 
hours worked are reported weekly. Average weekly earnings is 
an index of the wage a representative female worker can expect 
to receive if employed. A positive relationship is expected 
between hours worked and average earnings. 
(2) Income (CI)(4) 
Average weekly total earnings of other household members is 
taken as a measure for the income variable(5). It can be 
assumed that this is a male wage rate and is an index of the 
prosperity of the governerates. There is no data available on 
unearned income which might include cash income or assets. 
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The effect of male earnings and assets as a source of other 
income cannot be investigated. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that the impact of this 
measure of other income is more appropriate for married rather 
than single females. This could be the case for widowed 
females receiving pensions or divorced/separated females 
receiving maintenance. The data indicates that 33% of 
households report no cash income. For married females this is 
just under 30% and for single females this is over 40%. This 
seems to be in agreement with the remarks made in the previous 
paragraph. 
Income also acts as a control variable in that households 
reporting no cash income are excluded from the analysis. 
However, if income is considered to be an eondogeneous 
variable, that is earnings of other household members is 
affected by the work status of the individual. then the 
coefficient estimates are biased (as stated in Chapter III). 
(3) Unemployment (UN) 
The measure for the unemployment variable is the number in the 
labour force classified as unemployed to the total number in 
the labour force (the LFS also distinguishes between those 
unemployed with previous work experience and no work 
experience). This ratio represents the availability of jobs or 
job opportunities in general. The effect of unemployment on 
participation can either be positive or negative depending on 
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the relative strength of the added-worker and discouraged-
worker effect. However, if the unemployment rate is viewed as 
the probability of finding a job by the labour force entrant, 
then we would expect the discouraged-worker effect to 
prevail (6) . 
(4) Fertility (CPW, FMZ) 
The original data set does not assign to each female the number 
and ages of children in the household. However, from the 
household data twelve children variables were created so that 
to each ever-married female the number of chi Idren in each 
single year age group from one to twelve were assigned(7). 
Two measures of fertility were used: 
(a) For single females, average family size is used, and (b) 
for married females the ratio of the number of children aged 
less than five years to the number of married females aged 25-
49. 
Both these measures suffer from the defect that child mortality 
is not taken into account. The resul ts of the 1980 Egypt ian 
Fertility survey suggest that when the numbers of living 
children are compared between regions, fertility differences 
are reduced. Child mortality rates (children aged less than 
five years) in Upper Rural Egypt are highest (252 deaths per 
1000 live births) and lowest in Urban Lower Egypt (145 
deaths) (8) • So that, although the largest family sizes are 
found in Lower Egypt, Upper Egypt has more live births, (but 
also a higher child loss). In this study, reporting of live 
children is expected to be a more accurate measure than 
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children ever born, the effect of the variables on hours and 
participation is expected to be reduced. 
(5) Schooling (ED) 
The measure taken for schooling is the proportion of females 
with educational attainment higher than primary level 
(compulsory level). The expected relationship between 
schooling and labour force participation is positive for 
reasons stated earlier: a higher level of schooling means 
higher expected earnings and accessibility to better jobs. 
The aggregate measure thus acts as an index to the factors 
mentioned. Another factor explaining the expected positive 
relationship is that continued schooling is closely related to 
aptitude for work and probably increases motivation towards 
work. In this case the aggregate measure acts as an index to 
the propensty to and acceptability of work for females. For, 
it can be argued, if females are willing and allowed to 
continue education beyond the compulsory level, then this will 
also admit them to market work. 
4.2.2 Procedure of estimation 
The relationship between the set of variables described in the 
previous section and labour supply, measured by hours worked 
(workers and all females) and labour force participation is analysed 
through a set of inter-governerate regressions (for urban areas). 
As stated before, the border regions are inhabited by less than 
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l~ of the labour force population. On this basis the researcher 
used the governerates of Upper and Lower Egypt as the main subset. 
However, for the sake of comparison, a sample of all governerates is 
also used. 
In addition to an inter-governerate analysis, two other 
procedures were also considered by the researcher. The first 
procedure would involve estimating separate functions for the 
governerates of Upper and Lower Egypt respect i vely. This was not 
favoured since it would involve a reduction in sample size. 
For the second procedure, separate functions would be estimated 
for urban and rural areas. It seems justified to either treat urban 
and rural areas separately or to include an area variable that 
differentiated between these areas. First of all there is 
underenumeration of females in rural areas, particularly those 
engaged in agricultural activity. Secondly, the seasonal nature and 
average longer hours of those engaged in agriculture would provide a 
good case for the exclusion or separate treatment of rural areas. 
For these reasons it was decided to analyse urban and rural 
areas separately. However, a number of trial regressions for rural 
areas (and also trails using an indicator for type of area) provided 
insignificant results (as measured by the t-ratios and R2, the 
coefficient of multiple correlation). Therefore, certain criteria 
were adopted to exclude the agricultural sector from the analysis. 
The hours function for working females is estimated for 8 sub-
group of females engaged in non-agricultural activities. However, 
when using the group of participants and non-participants, another 
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cri terion had to be used so that the agricul tural sector in the 
economy is excluded. For this reason, a sub-group of females in 
urban areas is used. For the sample of all females there was also 
an additional problem; nearly 33~ of the females in the sample 
living in urban areas reported no household cash income (compared to 
54% of those living in rural areas). These households were excluded 
from the analysis. Again for the sake of completeness a sample of 
all females for all income levels is used. 
The labour force is defined as the number of persons who are 
working or seeking work during the reference week of the survey(9). 
The classification of whether a person is in the labour force is 
decided by comparing the answers provided by the respondent with the 
criteria set by those carrying out the survey(lO). 
The most direct measure for the estimation of the hours 
function of working females is the average hours worked per week for 
each governerate. However, a sub-group chosen on the basis of the 
individual's work status (an endogeneous variable) is not a random 
sample. Overall, the error term for the workers is expected to be 
positive, reflecting higher tastes for work, a factor that is 
contained in the error term (this is discussed in Chapter III). If 
the magnitude of the bias is considered to be of importance. an 
estimation procedure can be used to obtain the true estimates(ll). 
For the hours function of all females a value of zero hours 
worked is given to non-working females before aggregation. 
Considering the large number of non-working females, this measure of 
labour supply, to a large extent, reflects the degree of labour 
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force participation. Thus, the hours of work functions and 
participation functions are expected to provide similar results(12). 
The third dependent variable used is the participation rate for 
each governerate. This is defined as the proportion of females who 
are in the labour force to the total population under study. If an 
assumption is made that the age distribution of the governerates are 
fairly similar to each other. no consideration of the age factor is 
required. If this is not the case, then age becomes a determinant 
factor in the participation rate. 
Two procedures are possible: 
(1) A participation rate adjusted for age can be 
used( 13) • 
(2) A sub-J(roup that excludes the older sector of the 
population is used (containinJ( those aJ(ed 25-49 
years) • 
Al thoUJ(h the 8J(e distribution of the population is not used. 
use is made of the geographical distribution of the population. The 
use of population weiJ(hts to reduce heteroscedasticitv in regression 
residuals was adopted bv Bowen and Finelfan fl9691 (14) . However. 
their findinlfs indicate that weiJ(hted re«ressions produced similar 
results to ordinary least souares. Tn this study. weisrhted 
regression analysis is used to compare results with those of 
ordinary least squares regression; the population weight used was 
thst adopted by Bowen and Finegan: 
/ -Pl· / r p. 
v i' 
where: 
p. population in governerate , 
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L P. total population 
; 1 
Finally. for the sake of convenience, a list of the sub-groups 
used. as well as the functional form of the equation (if not linear) 
and estimation method (if not OLS) is presented below: 
1: Main sub-group; the governerates of Lower and Upper Egypt. 
For the function using all females (workers and non-
workers) those with no reported household cash income are 
excluded. 
lL: Main sub-group; logarithmic functional form. 
2: The all-region group; the governerates of Lower and Upper 
Egypt and the Border Regions. 
2L: The all-region group; logarithmic functional form. 
3: 25-49 sub-group. 
lW: Main group, weighted regression. 
11: All-income group. 
s: All single females. 
N: Never-married females. 
H: Married females, head of households. 
D: Divorced females. 
W: Widowed females. 
Before examining the performance of the model, clarification of 
the presentation of the results is needed. Stepwise procedure in 
regression analysis is used to estimate the hours and participation 
functions. Using this procedure two measures are available to 
evaluate the importance of the explanatory variables; the level of 
significance (t-ratio) and the contribution of the variable to the 
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coefficient of multiple correlation (R2). Added to this, since some 
of the variables in the equation were found to be statistically 
insignificant, it is felt that this presentation is concise. 
However, the sign of the coefficients of these variables are of 
interest. These coefficients are included in the results, but 
placed in brackets. The contribution of the significant variables 
to (R2) is indicated below their coefficient estimates. 
4.3 Results for Married Females 
The results for married females are presented in tables (4.4) 
to (4.6). The results for the main sub-group indicate that for the 
hours functions the set explanatory variables explain at least half 
the variation and hours worked between governerates and nearly 
thirty percent of the variation in participation rates between the 
governerates. However, consideration of the inherent biases 
discussed earlier should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
results. 
For working females, the set of explanatory variables is 
significant for all sub-groups. For the main sub-group, the 
equation explains about half (.52) of the variation in hours worked 
between governeratesj and the regressions are significant as 
indicated by the significance level of the F-ratio (indicated above 
the R2 value). As expected, results for the hours function for all 
females and the participation function provide similar resultsj 
namely the predominance of the education variable, and all 
regressiOns are significant (F ratio). Al though weighted least 
squares regression provides better results (as measured by R2), the 
coefficient estimates for the education variable are very similar 
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for both the hours and participation functions. The 25-49 age sub-
group also provided nearly identical coefficient estimates as for 
the main group. And, as expected, the explanatory power of the 
model is greater when applied to the all-region group. 
The remaining part of this section examines the effect of each 
variable on the work behaviour of married females. 
In all three functions, the contribution of the education 
variable to the explanatory power of the model is the greatest 
(except for the all-region group for working females). The results 
indicate, for working females, an increase in the average work week 
of one hour for a governerate having .05 of the proportion of 
workers with at least an intermediate degree higher than the 
national average. The corresponding result for the all hours 
function indicates an increase of nearly one and a half hours in the 
average work week. For the participation function the participation 
rate is nearly five percent higher than the national average. 
It is worth noting that the difference in participation between 
the governerates is determined in nearly all the functions by the 
education variable only. For the hours function, at least, although 
education can be considered a predominant factor, the average work 
week is determined by other factors as well. The predominance of 
the education variable may be partly attributed to the primary role 
of education in securing government jobs (or more pleasant jobs) and 
the expected association between education and wages. Higher 
education would also seem to indicate a greater preference towards 
market work. 
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Monetary incentives as determinants of labour supply are 
indicated by wage and income elasticities and coefficient estimates. 
The sign of the coefficient estimate of the wage variable is 
statistically significant in all the functions for workers, although 
the sign of the coefficient estimates is not uniform (both signs are 
compatible with the theory). However, the magni tude of the 
coefficient estimates are small (ranging from -.004 to .004) and 
this is reflected in the measure of the total wage elasticity (which 
is the coefficient estimate in the logarithmic equation). The 
responsiveness of hours worked to increases in the wage is weak; 
ranging from -.22 to .23: indicating an inelastic response of hours 
to gross wages. The coefficient estimates in the all-hours function 
are positive (when statistically significant). but again the 
elasticity of total wage to hours in this group is less than one 
(.49). This is also the case in the participation functin where 
total wage elasticity has a slightly higher value of .54. 
The results also show that the average work week is reduced by 
one hour in a governerate with an average wage of E£2.5 higher than 
the national average (main group 1). The corresponding increase is 
nearly three and a half hours and ten percent in the all-hours and 
participation functions respectively. 
The coefficient estimates for the income variable (in the 
workers function) are negative in sign: and, statistically 
significant for the all-region and economic equations. As for the 
wage variable, the magnitude of the coefficients are small: -.004 
and -.003; with corresponding income elasticities of -.54 and -.17. 
The all-hours function indicates the expected negative coefficient 
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estimates, but is statistically significant only for the all-region 
group; for the participation function the sign of the coefficients 
are negative, but statistically insignificant. The resul ts from 
these two functions show an inelastic response of hours and 
participation to income (-.1 and -.13 income elasticities). The 
results show that the average work week is reduced by about one hour 
in a governerate with an average income of E£2.5 above the national 
average. 
The effect of the presence of young children reduces the hours 
worked for workers. The coefficient estimates are negative and 
statistically significant in all the function for workers. A 
governerate which has a child per woman ratio of .1 (10 children per 
100 females aged 25-49) higher than the national average has a 
reduction in the average work week that is between roughly three-
quarter to one and a half hours. The elasticity of the fertility 
variable with hours worked is -.17 to -.53 indicating a small 
responsiveness of workers to the presence of young children. The 
coefficient estimates in the all hours and participation functions 
are positive (although not statistically significant) in almost all 
the equations, suggesting that female participation in a governerate 
rises with a higher child per woman ratio. The conclusion reached 
from these results is that fertility measures do not explain the 
variation between governerates, i.e., fertility is not a determinant 
of participation, or that the omission of child mortality in the 
child/woman ratio caused an error in measurement. 
Finally, the coefficient estimates for unemployment have a 
negative (those statistically insignificant) sign in all functions. 
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Table 4.4 Hours function for WOrkin, Married females. 
non-agricu1tural activities 
Explanatory il-Variables W er ED OPW Intercept 
Sub-group 
1 -.004*** (-.23) 20.7*** -8.6*** 36*** .52*** 
(.35)2 (.27)1 (.53}3 
1L -.22*** (-.25) .41*** -.17*** 5.3*** .51*** 
(.35)2 (.25)1 (.51}3 
2 .002*** -.004*** 7.4* -15*** 51*** .73*** 
( .69)3 ( .57)2 (.73)4 (.34)1 
2L .23*** -.52*** (-.1) -.53*** 5.S*** .67*** 
( .67)3 ( .54)2 (.23) 1 
3 -.004* (-.12) 20*** -7* 35*** .43*** 
(.33)2 (.24) 1 (.43)3 
1 .004* -.003* 3S*** .10** 
1L .13* -.17* 3.7*** .06* 
------
***. **. 
* significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Figures in brackets below the coefficient estimates are the R2 values. 
The number above the brackets denotes the order of entry into the 
equation. 
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Table 4.5 Hours function for all Married Females! 
urban areas 
Explanatory 
R2 Variables W eI ED UN Intercept 
Sub-group 
1 (-.22) .28*** (.15) (-.18) 1.7 .54*** 
(.54)1 
lW (-.09) .27*** (.16) (-.03) .19 .84*** 
( .84)1 
11 (-.09) 22*** (.1) (-.3) 2.2 .24** 
( .24)1 
2 -9.3** .30*** (.8) (-8) 4.1 .75*** 
(.75)2 ( • 68) 1 
3 (-.23) .29*** (.08) (-.13) 1.7 .57*** 
( .57) 1 
1 (-.35) (-.21) .8*** (.15) (-.18) 1.6 .54*** 
( .54)1 
1 .013*** (-.14) 2.7*** .46*** 
( .46)1 
lL .49*** (-.1) -.9*** .61*** 
( .61) 1 
***. **. * significant at the 1,.. 5% and 10% level. 
Figures in brackets below the coefficient estimates are the R2 values. 
The number above the brackets denotes the order of entry into the 
equation. 
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Table 4.6 
Explanatory 
Variable W 
Sub-group 
1 
lW 
11 
2 
3 
1 (-.5) 
1 .0004** 
It 
( .19) 1 
.54** 
(.45) I 
Participation function for Married Females. 
urban areas 
CI ED CPW UN Intercept 
(-.12) .76** ( .2) (-.3) .05 
( .26)1 
(-.12) .72*** (.18) (-.17) 
(.66)1 
(-.08) (.21) (-.02) -1** .24 
(1.17)1 
-.19 .9*** (.17) (-.17) 
(.49) 1 
( -.1) .76*** (.13) (-.3) .05 
(.31)1 
(-.21) .76*** ( .2) (-.3) .05 
( .26) 1 
(-.02) .07* 
(-.13) -3.8 
*. **. ***. significant at the 10%. 5% and 1% level estimates 
R2 
.26*** 
.66*** 
.17** 
.49*** 
.37*** 
.26** 
.19** 
.43*** 
Figure in brackets below the coefficient estimates are the R2 values. 
The number above the brackets denotes the order of entry into the 
equation. 
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indicating the prevalence of a discouraged worker effect. The only 
exception is the all-income group in the participation function. A 
governerate with an unemployment rate that is one percent above the 
national average has a lower participation rate of one percent lower 
than the national average. 
4.4 Results for Single Females 
The results for single females are presented in tables (4.7) to 
(4.9). The analysis is carried out for the sub-group of single 
females, Le., those females who are classified as never-married, 
married wi th husband absent, divorced or widowed. The hours for 
the working females function is estimated only for never-married 
females and for married females who are household-heads. The 
results obtained for the sub-groups of divorced, widowed and all 
single females provided insignificant results (measured by the R2 
value and t-ratios). The hours function for all females and the 
participation function are also estimated for each of the marital 
status categories separately, as well as all single females. 
For the sub-group of workers the model explains as much as a 
third of the variation between the governerates, for never married 
females; and over forty percent of the variation for married 
household heads. The explanatory power of the model (measured by 
the R2 value) is not as great for these two sub-groups of single 
females as for married females. 
For the all-hours and participation functions the model 
explains between one quarter to over ninety five percent of the 
variation between the governerates. The results also indicate that 
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the R2 value is lower for the separate marital sub-groups than for 
the all single group. Overall the results for these two functions 
are considered good. 
The remaining part of this section examines the effect of each 
variable of the work behaviour of single females. 
Education is considered, overall, the most important 
determinant factor in the work behaviour of single females. For 
workers the coefficient estimates are statistically significant for 
the sub-group of never-married females. However, the sign of the 
education variable is negative, indicating that the average work 
week is reduced by up to one hour for a governerate having .05 of 
the proportion of workers with at least an intermediate higher than 
the national average. 
The coefficient estimates for the all-hours function are 
positive and statistically significant except for the sub-group of 
never-married females. The average work week increases by two to 
four hours in a governerate having .1 of the proportion of workers 
with at least an intermediate degree higher than the national 
average. The corresponding increase in the participation rate is 
about 6 to 11 percent. The results for never-married females show 
a corresponding increase of 1.5 to 2 hours in the average work week 
and around 6~ in the participation rate; for married heads of 
households there is an increase of about 2 hours and 6~; for 
divorced females 4 hours and nearly 10' and for widowed females 3.5 
hours and over~. Thus among single females, never-married females 
indicate the least responsiveness to the education variable. 
Average family size in a governerate is considered to be the 
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second most important determinant of the work behaviour of single 
females. The coefficient estimates are negative when statistically 
significant. This is the case for the sub-group of never-married 
females in the workers function, all-hours function and 
participation function; and; the all-single group in the all-hours 
and participation functions. 
For never-married females, a governerate with an average family 
size of one individual above the national average reduces the 
average work week by between two hours. The corresponding reduction 
in the all hours function is five hours and in the participation 
function six percent. For all single females the corresponding 
reduction is one to three hours, and three to five percent in the 
all-hours and participation functions respectively. An increase in 
this ratio of 1 child per thousand women in a governerate increases 
the average work week by nearly one and a half to two hours. 
Overall, the monetary variables are not significant 
determinants of the labour supply of single females. The estimates 
of the wage coefficients are statistically insignificant, except in 
the economic equations which are presented in tables (4.8) and 
(4.9). The results show a positive, but small (less than 1) 
elasticity of total wages to hours and participation. The income 
coefficient estimate is statistically significant for household 
heads; having a negative sign as predicted by theory, and also being 
very small in magnitude. The income elasticities (obtained from the 
economic equations) are -.21 and -.12; again demonstrating a lack of 
responsiveness of labour supply to the changes in average cash 
income between governerates. 
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Finally, the unemployment variable, although not uniformly 
significant, shows statistically significant coefficient estimates 
for all sub-groups except never-married females. For the hours 
function for single females a positive difference in the 
unemployment rate of .01 increases the average work week by about 1 
hour; for married household heads the increase is nearly 5 hours and 
for divorced females there is a decrease of 2 hours. Similar 
results are found for the participation function, i.e., a positive 
or added-worker effect of unemployment on participation. The 
corresponding increase in participation for a difference of 1% in 
the unemployment rate is 7% for married heads of households and 3% 
for widowed females. These results are in contrast to those 
obtained for married females, where a discouraged-worker effect is 
exhibited. 
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Table 4.7 
Explanatory 
Variable W 
Sub-group 
N1 (-.1) 
N2 ( .08) 
N3 (-.06) 
HI ( .03) 
H2 ( .03) 
H3 (.17) 
Hours function for working Single Females. 
nop-agricu1tura1 activity 
CI ED CPW FMZ Intercept 
(-.001) -20** 
-1.9* 66*** 
( .21)1 (.29)2 
(-.3) -14** (-.3) 51*** 
(.13)1 
(-.03) -21*** 
-2** 68*** 
( .24)1 (.34)2 
(.004) (-.2) 13*** 31*** 
( .44)1 
( .004) (-.2) 14*** 31*** 
( .44)1 
(.02) ( .06) 19*** 26*** 
( .44)1 
***. **. * significant at the 1%. 5% and 10% level. 
(Figures in brackets below the coefficient estimates are the 
R2 
.29** 
.13** 
.34*** 
.44*** 
.44*** 
.44*** 
R2 
values. The number above the bracket denotes the order of entry 
into the equation). 
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MI. 4.8 leu" fupctipp for .11 SiMI • ...,1 •. 
wb9 ..... 
Explanatory 
Variabl.. W eI ED Int.rcept r 
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SlW 
SlI 
(.05) 12.8** 
(.66)3 
(-.003) (.07) 
(.17) (.26) 
24*** -2*** 4. '7** 
(.48)1 (.59)2 
41*** (.06) 
( .97)1 
26** (-.1) 
(.47)1 
(.2) 
.66*** 
.97*** 
.47*** 
52 (.04) (.01) 24*** -.9* 11. 7*** .6B*** 
S3 
Nl 
HI 
Dl 
WI 
SlL 
(-.06) (.26) 
(-.11) (-.lB) 
-.003*** 48*** 
(.11)1 (.39)2 
(.63)1 (.68)2 
20** -2.9** 
(.55)2 (-41)1 
( .31) -5** 
(.25)1 
19* (-.13) 
( .4B)3 
( .02) -21*** 41*** (.01) 
(.2) (.2) 
.26*~ (-.21) 
( .22) 
35** (.25) 
( .25)1 
27*** 
51*** 
1B*** 
BU 
5*** 
.9 
***. **. * significaDt at the 1~. 5% and 1~ level. 
.55*** 
.25** 
.4B*** 
.58*** 
.25** 
.22** 
(Figures in brackets below tbe coefficient estillates are the R2 
values. The oUliber above the bracket deDot. the order of entry 
into the equation). 
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Table 4.9 Participation function for Single Females! 
urban areas 
Explanatory 
Variables W eI UN Intercept ~ 
Sub-group 
Sl ( .09) ( .2) .7*** -.04** .4*** .67*** 
( .6)1 (.67)2 
SlW ( .005) (.01) 1.1*** (.1) .007** .98*** 
(.98) 1 
SI ( .19) ( .22) .62*** -.05 .14** .70*** 
(.70)1 
S2 (.01 ) (-.07) .66*** -.03** .33*** .75*** 
(.69) 1 (.75)2 
S3 (-.01) ( .21) .68*** -.04** .44*** .73*** 
( .67)1 (.73)2 
HI (-.08) ( .09) .62*** -.06** .56*** .69* 
(.58) 1 (.69) 2 
HI -.00005** .74*** .63*** (.09) .37*** .56*** 
( .56)3 ( .39)2 (.31) 1 
Dl (-.09) (-.11) .97*** (0.5) .14*** .76*** 
(.76) 1 
WI ( .22) .28** .62** ( .05) .09*** .33** 
(33)2 ( .21) 1 
SlL .25*** (-.12) -2.6*** .30*** 
( .30)1 
***. **. * significant at the 1%. 5~ and 10~ level. 
(Figure. in brackets below the coefficient estt.ates are the RZ 
values. The n~er above the bracket denote. the order of entry 
into the equation). 
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PART II: . CENSUS STUDY 
4.5 Estimation Procedure and Definition of Variables 
The most accessible data source available and the easiest to 
utilise is published census data. Early labour supply studies such 
as those of Mincer (1962) and Bowen & Finegan (1969) used census 
data for aggregate cross-section studies. And. as Cain (1966) 
pointed out. there are some empirical advantages in using 
aggregat ions - such as the eliminat ion of trans i tory factors in 
income data - even though it is theoretically more plausible to use 
disaggregated data. 
Apart from being a source of comparison to results obtained 
from the· LFS study. a census study using published data indicates 
the ease of adaptability and usefulness of this type of data to 
labour force studies in Egypt. 
The first data restriction of the census source is the 
inability to analyse by reference to marital status. The procedure 
of estimation therefore uses the participation rate of all females. 
There are two measures for the dependent variable: 
(1) Work status (those aged six years and over). 
(2) Occupational status (those aged fifteen years and over). 
An inter-governerate analysis is applied to all governerates 
and, as in Part I, to those governerates of Upper and Lower Egypt 
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(excluding the Border regions). The analysis is also applied to 
urban areas and rural areas separately. The justification of 
inclusion of a set of regressions for rural areas lies primarily in 
that reasonably good results were obtained. 
The set of explanatory variables used to explain labour force 
participation are: 
(1) LFW: 
(2) LMW: 
(3) UN: 
(4) ED: 
(5) MRR: 
(6) CHI: 
(7) CH2: 
(8) CH3: 
(9) CPW: 
(10) MIG: 
The logarithm of average female weekly earnings 
1977 LFS. 
The logarithm of average male weekly earnings 
1977 LFS. 
The proportion of males aged 6 years and over 
who are in the labour force and unemployed. 
The proportion of females aged 15 years and over 
who have reached the intermediate level of 
education. 
The proportion of females who are married. 
The proportion of the total population aged less 
than I year of age. 
The proportion of the total population aged 1-4 
years. 
The proportion of the total population aged 5-9 
years. 
The raio of children aged under 5 years to 
females aged 25-49 years. 
The proportion of the residents in the total 
population who are migrants. 
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The effect that some of these variables have on the 
participation decision has already been explained in Part I. The 
remainder of this section will expand on the definition and expected 
influence on the participation rate of those variables not 
previously discussed. 
The Proportion of Females Married (MRR) 
Fertility and labour force participation are both affected by 
marriage and in a more general household model, marriage decisions 
are made jointly with decisions affecting family size and market 
participation. The adopted measure for this variable is the 
proportion of females in each governerate who are married. This 
measure reflects the greater demand for home time or alternatively, 
is an indirect measure of the labour supplied by single females who 
have a higher market participation rate. 
Fertility Variables (CHI, CH2, CH3, CPW) 
The hypothesis that the demand on female time at home is 
greatest for pre-school children can be examined through the three 
variables CHI, CH2 and CH3 exerting a deterrent effect on the labour 
force participation rate for the two youngest age groups (CHI, CH2). 
Another measure used is the child per woman ratio (used in Part I). 
Migration 
Migration is viewed as an investment activity undertaken when 
the return outweighs the cost involved (Nerlove and Schultz, 1970). 
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It is argued that females, if equally educated as males, may have 
more to gain from leaving traditional rural areas for opportunities 
in urban areas. This would imply that migration to a governerate is 
directly related to the labour force participation rate. However, 
we are in this case assuming an equal age-sex distribution in 
migration. This most probably is not the case since it is usually 
young people who migrate. For this measure. though, it will be 
assumed that the sexes are equally present. However, the influx of 
migrants might also result in a decline of the availability of jobs, 
implying a direct negative effect on female participation. The 
overall effect of migration, therefore, cannot be determined 
theoretically. 
4.6 Results fram Census Data 
The results for the labour force participation of females are 
presented in tables (4.10) and (4.11)(15). 
Least squares regression indicate a good fit to the 
participation function, as represented by R2, the coefficient of 
multiple correlation. The equation explains between 70% and over 
90% of the variation in the participation rate between governerates. 
The signs of the coefficient estimates for the -two dependent 
variables are in agreement (see table 4.11). while the magnitude of 
the estimates are similar in most cases. The equations for urban 
areas are a bet ter fit than those for rural areas, but it can be 
said that all the results are good. The remainder of this section 
is concerned with the analysis of the effect of each variable on 
participation. 
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Female wages do not exert a significant effect on the 
participation rate. However, the sign of the coefficient estimates 
are positive as expected (except in one case). The coefficient 
estimates for male wages are statistically significant (at least in 
one equation) and exert a negative (income) effect on the 
participation rate. 
The coefficient estimate for the education variable is 
statistically significant in all the functions indicating, as in 
Part I, its primary importance. The sign of the coefficient 
estimate is, as expected, positive. The increase in the proportion 
with intermediate educational level of.l above the national 
average in a governerate raises the participation rate by between 7-
13% in urban areas and all areas; the corresponding affect is 
greater in rural areas where the increase is by as much as 25%. 
The deterent effect on participation of the marital status 
variable is statistically significant in most funct ions. A 
governerate with a .1 rate higher in the proportion married above 
the national average has a lower participation rate by nearly 3%. 
The effect is more pronounced in rural than urban areas. 
The coefficient estimates for the fertility variables are not 
statistically significant, overall. in the regressions for the 
governerates of Lower & Upper Egypt only. From the results for all 
governerates of Egypt, statistically significant coefficient 
estimates are obtained for the separate area regressions. For urban 
areas. the demand for home time of younger age children (CH2) has a 
positive effect on participation, while the income demands of older 
age children (CH3) have a negative effect on the participation rate. 
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A .1 (absolute) increase in the proportion of children aged 1-4 
years above the national average lowers the participation rate by 
about 10% - the corresponding rate is 15% for the CH3 variable. 
In the rural regressions the effect is negat i ve on the 
participation rate only for the variable CHI, showing an increase in 
the rate for the variables CH2 and CH3. A.1 increase in the 
proportion of children aged less than one year above the national 
average reduces participation by 11%, the corresponding increase is 
about 4.5% and 4% for CH2 and CH3 respectively. 
Finally, in terms of the magnitude of the coefficient estimate 
and the significance level of the t-ratio, the effect of migration 
on the participation rate in a governerate is negligible. This 
could be the result of the inadequacy of this measure for migration. 
Alternatively, a higher migrant participation rate could be offset 
by a resulting lower resident female participation rate. 
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Table 4,10 
Area 
Explanatory 
Variable. 
LWF 
UN 
ED 
MRR 
CHI 
CH2 
CH3 
CPW 
Intercept 
Labour Force Participatiop of female. Lower • Upper 
BU21. liZ!! 
All Are_ 
D1 D2 
,012 ,011 
(1,19) (1.15) 
-.021 -.02 
(1.66) (-1.B6)· 
-,34 -.29 
(-1.04) ( -1.19) 
1.15 1.13 
(6,15)*** (l0,5)*** 
-,23 -,19 
(-2,43)** (-2.57)** 
.68 
(, B) 
,09 
( ,23) 
,22 
( .44) 
.02 
( .B9) 
.19 ,20 
(1. B9) * (2,86)·· 
.95 . .96 
Urban Are_ Rural Are_ 
D1 
.05 
( .1) 
1.2 
(4,63)*** 
-,02 
(-,09) 
1.74 
(1,1) 
-1.18 
(-1. 73)* 
1.15 
( 1.19) 
-.02 
(-,16) 
,78 
D2 D1 D2 
.11 -,71 -.94 
( .25) (-1.53) (-2,7) 
1.2 2,6 1.89 
(5,78)*** (4,48)*** (4,28)*** 
.15 -2,53 -.19 
(.92) (-.21) (-2.8)*** 
-1.24 
(-1.2) 
,58 
(1.41) 
.25 
( ,59) 
-.04 ,002 
(-1.12) (.08) 
-,04 ,09 .17 
(-.37) (.95) ('06) 
,78 
.7 ,7 
***. **. * 1%. 5%. 10% level of .ignificance. 
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I!!Q1! iall Idmmu::: l2ts:! Parti50il!lUii2D 2t 1'-1121. all 111'.21 
.llrl§ 
Area All Areaa URaa Areas Rural Areaa 
Explaaatory 
Yariabl_ Dl D2 Dl D2 Dl D2 
L'IW -.5x10-3 .2x10-4 
(-.37) (1.1) 
.6x10-4 -.lx10-3 
( .63) (-.9) 
UN -.68 -.5 .16 .31 -.75 -.55 
(-2.7)** (-1.7)* ( .68) ( .9) (-5)*** {-4)*** 
ED .73 1.1 .86 1.3 1.1 1.1 
{4.8)*** (6.2)** (5.9)*** (5.9)*** (2.5)** (4.9)*** 
MRR -.2 -.31 -.03 -.13 -.2 -.1 
{-3.2)***(-3.7)*** (-.51)(-1.3) (-3.4)***(-2.9)*** 
CHI -.8 -.47 .46 1.3 -1.1 -.83 
(-1.4) (.7) (.082) (1.5) (2.5)** (-2)* 
CH2 .26 .2 -.3 -1.1 .45 .37 
( .96) ( .6) (-.8) (-2)** (2.5~* (2.3~* 
CH3 .44 .28 .7 1.5 .42 .23 
(1.46) ( .8) (1. 6) (2.2)** (2.2)** (1. 3) 
MIG -5xlO-5 .001 
(-.06) (1.3) 
Intercept .08 1.3 -.08 -.06 .02 .02 
(1.2) (l.6) (-1.1) (-.56) ( .6) ( .5) 
R2 .90 .95 .82 .87 .73 .81 
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NOTES: 
1. In Chapter 8, Ikram (1980) expands on some of the detrimental 
consequences of high urbanisat ion, such as poor hous ing 
conditions, shortage of housing and the deterioration of urban 
services (e.g., transport and education) which have a direct 
effect on participation and hours. 
2. See Ikram (1980), table (8.2). Seatherum [1983J also gives a 
discussion about internal migration and urbanisation: pps. 33-
53. 
3. This seems to indicate that the change in enumeration of 
females in the LFS (from 1983) concerned rural areas rather 
than urban areas. 
4. This variable is not available on the original data set. The 
researcher created the variable by using a fortran program 
selecting each individual (apart from the female) that belonged 
to the same household, and summing their earnings. 
5. Wages make up 70~ of income. See Rees (1979). 
6. See Bowen and Finegan (1969), pp. 76-78 and pp. 178-90 for 
married females. 
7. In earlier trials each of the child variables were used, but 
only those variables for children aged less than five years 
were found to be significant. 
8. Rural areas are excluded from the analysis for the sample of 
all females, so the variation is less since the child mortality 
rate for urban Upper Egypt is 193. 
9. This definition is widely used and accepted. But. as pointed 
out in many studies (for example, Bowen & Finegan [1969J), this 
definition encompasses paid workers only. even though they 
might work a minimal number of hours, while excluding many who 
work long hours for no pay such as housewives. 
10. The questions about participation refer to work status on the 
4th May. 1984. the hours and number of days worked during the 
reference week. 
11. The estimation procedure proposed by Heckman [1980]. relies 
firstly on probit estimates for the participation function. 
Unfortunately the computer package used by the researcher. 
SPSS-x. could not be adapted to produce probit estimates for 
the aggregate function. 
12. Although, as stated before. the estimates of the sample of the 
whole population will not suffer from selectivity bias, 
specification errors (most notably due to the omission of a 
migration measure) might arise. 
13. This has been used earlier. showing adjusted rates to be very 
close to unadjusted ones. 
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14. Heteroscedasticity arises when the OLS assumption of constant 
variance of the residuals is violated; a situation that often 
arises in practice. A discussion of this problem and its 
consequences is found in Koutsoyiannis (1986]: pp.181-185. 
15. Results for males; which can be used for comparison, but are 
not analysed in this section, are presented in Appendix II, 
table A4.1. 
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CHAPTER V: INDIVIDUAL STUDY 
In Chapter III the participation decision of an individual was 
assumed to rely on two behavioural functions; the offered (or 
market) wage and the asking wage (or shadow price of time). A 
female participates if the value of the offered wage function 
exceeds that of the asking wage function at zero hours worked. In 
the first part of this Chapter, an empirical procedure based on this 
approach (discussed in section 3.2) is applied to individual 
cross-section data from the 1984 LFS. The aim of this empirical 
procedure is to obtain the structural coefficient estimates for the 
offered wage and asking wage functions. Hours functions for workers 
and for all females are also estimated and a test for selection bias 
in the offered wage function and the hours of workers is applied. 
Finally, Heckman's proportionality hypothesis is also tested. 
The second empirical application examines a number of procedures 
that could be used to test the joint-determination of household 
decisions discussed in Section 3.3.1 of Chapter III. Bstimation of 
simultaneous equation systems present a number of problems. There 
is no theoretical guidance on model specification. And, once the 
model is specified, there is the problem of the appropriate 
estimation procedure. Two models are presented and empirically 
examined. The data used is individual cross-aection data from the 
1980 EFS. 
used. 
In the analysis the group of once-married females is 
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5.1 Introduction 
The empirical procedure in Part I uses individual data from the 
1984 LFS with Cairo 88 the area of analysis. Although Cairo 
represents the most urbanised area in Egypt, it is a city of 
contrasts: it can be assumed that the lifestyle and economic 
activity of those living in the old part of Cairo (founded in the 
wake of the Islamic conquests in the seventh century) differs from 
those in the newer part of Cairo (Giza and Heliopilis) which were 
established during this century. Cairo is the political, municipal 
and cultural centre of Egypt, with a population of over five million 
persons (5,074 thousand) in 1976 and containing 14% of Egypt's 
population. Those in the labour force (aged 15 years and over) are 
numbered at nearly one and a half million persons (1,430 thousand) 
which accounts for 13.9% of the total labour force in Bgypt. The 
number of females working in Cairo is counted as 189,509 females, 
which amounts to 27% of the total female labour force. 
The remaining part of this introduction examines the 
characteristics of the two sub-groups of females: married and single 
females. 
Table (5.1) shows the participation rates for the different 
marital groups. The difference in the participation rates between 
the two main sub-groups, married and single females, reflects the 
increased demand on the time of a married female who performs the 
dual role of mother and wife. Among single females there is also a 
large difference in participation rates indicating that marital 
status is also an important factor for this group. The 
participation rate is highest for never-married females (60.3%). 
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Table 5.1 Marital status and Labour Force Participation of 
Females. Cairo and Urban ESYpt. 1984 
Marital Status 
Married, 
husband present 
Single 
Never-Married 
Married, 
Head of Household 
Divorced 
Widowed 
Number in 
Sub-group 
3882 
(13482) 
1622 
(4440) 
562 
(14l3) 
303 
(719) 
129 
(305) 
628 
(2003) 
Number 
in 
Labour Participation 
Force 
500 
(1787) 
547 
(1316) 
339 
(770) 
73 
(166) 
42 
(93) 
93 
(287) 
Rate 
12.9 
(13.3) 
33.7 
(29.6) 
60.3 
(54.5) 
24.1 
(23.1) 
32.9 
(30.5) 
14.8 
(14.3) 
Figures in brackets are those for Urban Egypt. 
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As pointed out by Bowen & Finegan (1969, p.244), an explanation 
for such a high rate among never-married females is a stronger drive 
to labour force participation either as the result of financial 
necessity because of the lack of support or as the result of strong 
career interest. 
The prevalent situation in Egypt, whether as a result of 
cultrual or religious reasons, indicates that never-married females 
(and most probably many who constitute the other categories of 
single females) belong to some form of an extended family group. 
Table (5.2) shows the classification of those who are single females 
by faJIily status. Nearly 85% of this sub-group are classified as 
either being household head or daughter, i.e., belonging to a 
nuclear family. The incidence of a single female living alone is 
not very high as indicated by family size suggesting that the 
financial pressure explanation might be less important for single 
females in Cairo compared to their western counterparts. The demand 
for time for the different marital groups in the single sub-group 
might also be different in an extended family grouPi fBJDily status 
might be considered an important determinant factor in female labour 
force participation. 
The remaining part of this section exBJDines the life-cycle 
participation pattern of females. 
Table (5.3) presents the age-participation profiles for married 
females and figures (5.1 and 5.2) depict these profiles. There is 
no uniformity in the peak age of participation. However, the EFS 
and LFS profiles display a difference. The BFS profiles show that 
participation peaks relatively early in the life-cycle, after which 
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Table 5.2 Family Status of Females Categorised as Single, 
Cairo. 1984 
Family 
Status 
Household Head 
Daughter 
Daughter-in-law 
Sister 
Sister-in-law 
Mother 
Other Relation 
Visitor/Worker 
Number in 
Sample 
870 
707 
108 
97 
6 
B5 
35 
6 
109 
Percentage 
of Sample 
44.9 
36.5 
5.6 
5.0 
.3 
4.4 
1.8 
.3 
Table 5.3 Age-Participation Profiles. Married Females 
Area UrbanI Rura1 1 Cairo1 All Urban2 Rural2 Cairo2 All 
Age-Group 
15-19 6.4 
20-24 15.2 
25-29 17.9 
30-34 1B.1 
35-39 15.B 
40-44 14.1 
45-49 9.0 
50-54 6.0 
56-59 4.6 
All 13.2 
1 1984 LFS 
2 19BO EFS 
- not applicable 
6.7 
14.4 
17.5 
15.7 
16.2 
16.3 
16.3 
13.4 
9.6 
15.1 
Areas 1 Areas2 
6.5 3.5 11.4 B.7 B.9 
11.5 14.3 9.9 15.B 3.3 13.5 
15.7 17.B 19.6 1B.9 19.1 19.2 
14.4 17.3 17.4 24.7 22.7 21.2 
17.3 15.9 15.3 16.2 IB.B 15.8 
15.3 14.B 12.3 13.6 22.6 12.9 
B.B 11.4 9.7 9.0 n.B 9.4 
8.2 B.8 
3.8 6.5 
12.B 13.9 14.3 16.9 16.7 16.7 
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Figure 5.1 Age-Participation Profiles of Married Females, LFS. 
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Figure 5.2 Labour Force Participation of Married Females, EFS. 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
o ~----~----~------~----~------~----~ 
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
Age-Group 
112 
there is a sharp decline in the rate: the peak age-group is later 
for rural than urban areas. The curves can be characterised as 
inverted V-shaped curves. The LFS profiles resemble inverted 
U-shaped curves: participation in the middle of the life-cycle 
declines gradually after reaching a peak - this is especially the 
case in rural areas. 
Joshi and Owen (1981) have described the age-participation 
pattern in the UK during this century. Before World War II 
participation displayed a monotonic decline with age (they use ten 
year age-groups for females aged 15-64 years). From 1961. there 
emreges a second peak in activity rates after chUd-bearing years 
creating a bi-modal age-participation pattern. 
The bi-modal pattern is one observed by married females in Cairo 
(in the LFS and disregarding the youngest age-group in the EFS) and 
to a much lesser extent in rural areas (LFS). The return to market 
participation by married females could partly explain the rising 
trend in participation by females. 
The LFS profiles for single females also resemble inverted 
U-shaped curves, the peak of the curve being earlier in urban areas 
and Cairo than in rural areas (see table 5.4a and 5.4b and figure 
5.3). For the marital status groups of single females there is no 
distinctive U-shaped age-participation pattern over all age-groups. 
The pattern emerges for never-married females in the 15-44 age-group 
and disregarding the younger age-groups for widowed females. The 
bi-modal pattern is displayed by married household heads and 
divorced females (and never-married females although group sizes are 
too small). 
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Table 5.4a 
Area 
Age-Group 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
All Ages 
Age-Participation Profiles 
of Single Females. 1984 
Urban Rural Cairo 
7.3 15.8 6.5 
36.4 23.3 38.2 
44.6 22.2 50.7 
34.7 21. 7 42.3 
26.2 22.5 30.2 
23.1 24.6 26.9 
17.0 24.7 18.9 
13.2 19.9 16.3 
10.9 12.4 12.2 
22.3 19.5 24.9 
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All Areas 
10.3 
32.7 
36.6 
29.6 
24.7 
23.7 
20.1 
13.7 
11.5 
21.3 
Table 5.4b Age-Participation Profiles of Single Females by 
Martial Status. Cairo. 1984 
Marital 
status 
Age Group 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
Never-
Married 
7.2 (1361) 
41.0 (1053) 
62.8 (395) 
60.2 (93) 
61.1 (36) 
37.5 (16) 
66.7 (6) 
8.3 (12) 
50.0 (4) 
Married 
head of 
household 
4.7 (43) 
18.3 (142) 
30.3 (175) 
33.3 (153) 
24.8 (l09) 
26.3 (80) 
13.3 (45) 
22.2 (36) 
15.8 (19) 
All Ages 29.2 (2976) 24.6 (802) 
Divorced 
75.0 (4) 
33.0 (18) 
10.0 (20) 
42.9 (21) 
28.6 (21) 
50.0 (26) 
22.2 (18) 
40.0 (15) 
25.0 (8) 
33.8 (151) 
Figures in brackets are size of sub-group. 
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Widowed 
(0) 
(4) 
30.0 (10) 
29.2 (24) 
20.0 (45) 
18.9 (90) 
17.5 (114) 
11.7 (192) 
9.7 (153) 
14.7 (632) 
Figure 5.3 Age-Participation Profiles of Single Females, LFS. 
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Table 5.5 Age-participation Rates of Married Females by 
Presence of Dependent Children(a) , 1980 
Area 
Age 
Group 1 
All Areas 
2 1 
Urban Areas Rural Areas 
2 1 2 
15- 5.9 (102) 19.4 (103) 3.6 (28) 7.4 (27) 6.8 (74) 23.7 (76) 
19 
20- 14.7 (408) 22.1 (86) 5.6 (126) 33.3 (30) 18.8 (282) 16.1 (56) 
24 
25- 18.1 (398) 18.5 (54) 17.1 (170) 25.0 (28) 18.9 (228) 11.5 (26) 
29 
30- 24.4 (406) 16.0 (81) 22.2 (167) 20.0 (45) 25.9 (239) 11.1 (36) 
34 
35- 21.4 (257) 16.1 (137) 21.9 (114) 15.3 (72) 21.0 (143) 16.9 (65) 
39 
40- 16.7 (102) 16.5 (200) 17.9 (28) 13.9 (108) 16.2 (74) 19.6 (92) 
44 
45- 18.2 (33) 19.9 (186) - (11) 16.7 (90) 27.3 (22) 22.9 (96) 
49 
All 18.5(1706) 18.2 (847) 16.1(644) 17.3 (400) 19.9(1062) 19.0(447) 
Ages 
Figures in brackets are size of sub-group 
(8) Children aged less than 5 years 
1 Dependent children present 
2 No dependent children present 
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Figure 5.4 Age·Participation Profiles of Married Females, All Areas. 
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The presence of young children is considered to affect the 
life-cycle pattern of participation of married females. Table (5.5) 
presents the participation profiles by presence of dependent 
children. Participation rates for mothers are distinctively lower 
only for young mothers, the rates being higher in the older age 
groups for females with young children. An explanation for this 
could be that those who bear children later in the life-cycle are 
more career-minded and would tend to continue market participation 
even with the presence of young children. Another explanation could 
be that responsibility for young children is shared by older 
children. 
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PART I: LFS STUDY 
5.2 Definition of Variables and Estimation Procedure 
In this study an empirical procedure based on and adapted from 
the approach presented in Chapter III is utilised. The purpose of 
this estimation procedure is to examine a number of hypotheses 
within a unified empirical framework. The first step in the 
procedure is to obtain probit coefficient estimates for the 
reduced-form probability of participation function. As mentioned in 
Chapter III, statistical methods such as ordinary least squares are 
inappropriate for estimating relationships with a qualitative 
dependent variable. In application the transformation of p has a 
value of 5 added to the probit, so that the transformed variable is 
uniformly positive (spss-x package): 
T-T(p) = probit (y Z/o) + 5 (5.1) 
A second characteristic of this procedure is the use of grouped 
data. The SSPS-X package cannot handle data which is given in 
case-by-case form or which has only one observation per cell where 
the definition of a cell is one combination of the predetermined 
explanatory variables). This required the transformation of the 
explanatory variables so that the number of cells are reduced and at 
the same time ensuring that each cell contains many observations. 
This has meant, that, because there are up to six explanatory 
variables in an equation, each explanatory variable had to be 
redefined into as small a number of divisions as possible. Maximum 
likelihood estimates are obtained by relating the response 
probabilities to the explanatory variables, and solving the system 
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of equations from the likelihood function by numerical methods. 
Least squares regression is used to estimate the coefficients of 
the market wage function. Inclusion of the selectivity bias index 
in the market wage equations, which were calculated from the probit 
coefficient estimates, is used to test for the existence of 
selection bias in the estimated function. 
Coefficients for the shadow price of time are then calculated 
from the coefficient estimates of the reduced form participation 
function and the market wage function (the method of calculation is 
presented in the next section). 
The hours function for all females and that for workers is then 
estimated using least squares regression. Selection bias in the 
coefficient estimates for the sub-group of workers is tested by the 
inclusion of the selectivity bias index in the functions. 
Finally, the proportionality hypothesis proposed by Heckman is 
examined. The hypothesis proposed is that the hours worked are 
proportional to the gap between the offered wage and asking wage. A 
female with a greater probability of working is also more likely to 
work longer hours. 
The above procedure is applied to the following sub-groups: 
(1) Married females aged 25-49. 
(2) Single females aged 25-59 and to each marital sub-group of 
single females 
(3) All households 
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(4) Households reporting cash income 
The set of explanatory variables used to explain the labour 
supply of females are: (1) weekly earnings; (2) weekly earnings 
other than female earnings; (3) the presence of an unemployed family 
member; (4) age-group; (5) level of schooling; (6) number and age 
composition of children; (7) family size; (8) family status. 
(1) Weekly Earnings (WI IW) 
The measure of the wage variable, gross weekly earnings, is used 
in the hours function of workers and the hours function of all 
females. An imputed wage is also used. The use of an offered wage 
function is a means of dealing with two problems: 
(i) to obtain a measure of the permanent wage and; 
(ii) to obtain a value for the expected earnings of non-workera. 
The semi-logarithmic specification of the earnings function is 
adopted:(l) 
In W = «0 + «1 ED + «z AGE 
Where: 
IW imputed wage 
W earnings of worker 
ED schooling level attained 
AGE age-group 
and IW = In W 
(5.2) 
The expected growth of earnings with age is a reflection of the 
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self-investment activities (such as on-the-job training) that are 
continued after completion of schooling. Thus, in the case of 
females where attachment to the labour force is not continuous, 
information on years of experience. is necessary. However, this is 
not available in the LFS. Age is thus taken as a measure for 
experience. Correction for selectivity bias (discussed in Chapter 
III) is also applied. 
Where T = f(-Y T Z/o)/l-F(-Y T Z/o) 
F and f are distribution and density functions of the standard 
normal random variable family weekly earnings. 
(2) Income (INCGRP) 
From the variable gross weekly earnings of other family members, 
two income variables were constructed: 
(i) All households reporting household cash income are divided 
into two groups, taking the median of the income 
distribution as the point of division and using a 
categorical variable as the representation of income. 
(ii) A categorical variable, for all households is used to 
represent those reporting cash income and those reporting 
no cash income. 
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(3) Unemployment (UN) 
A dummy variable for the presence of an unemployed family member 
is used for the measure of the unemployment variable. It is more 
difficult on the individual level to assess whether the added-worker 
or discouraged-worker effect dominates. However, it might be 
possible to assume that married females are more sensitive to 
employment opportunities than single females. 
(4) Age (AGEGRP) 
The age of the female reflects different life-time work patterns 
of different cohorts. This makes it difficult to isolate a pure age 
effect. However, it is expected that a purely age effect haa a 
negative effect on participation which might also be compounded by a 
cohort effect. Age is entered as a categorical variable 
representing age level; the groups being the (25-34) and the (35-49) 
age groups. 
(5) Schooling (ED) 
A variable representing the level of schooling: primary level 
and below, and, greater than primary level is used as a measure of 
the education variable. A higher level of schooling represents 
greater employability and greater earnings. 
(6) Fertility Variables (DCH, NCH, AYCH, FMZ) 
The hypothesis that for married females pre-school children have 
the greatest impact on the mother's labour supply (because they 
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demand a greater amount of the mother's time) is tested using the 
following measures for the fertility variable: 
(i) 
(it) 
(iii) 
dummy variables for the presence of children aged less 
than 3 years (DeRl) , aged between 3-5 years (DCH2) and 
aged 6-11 years (DCR3)j 
numbers of children in the age-groups aged less than 3 
years NCHl, aged between 3-5 years (NCH2) and aged 
6-11 years (NCH3) and; 
age of youngest child, (AYCH). 
The number of children places pressure on the mother's time as 
well 8S the pressure for greater income. It is expected for 
younger-age children that the demand for the mother' 8 time would 
outweigh the need for additional income, while for 
older-agechildren, the need for income might be greater than the 
need for the mother's time. 
For single females family size is taken as the fertility 
variable. The demand for female time and for income might be 
similar to those of married females, but using this variable it is 
more difficult to assess its impact on participation. 
(7) Family Status (HEAD. SING) 
The family status of a single female might be expected to 
influence her labour force status. The pressure to work for a 
secondary member of the household might be less than that for a head 
of household. A dummy variable representing the status 88 household 
head is used. In the sub-group of single females, never-married 
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females have the highest participation rate. A dUIIIIIIY variable 
representing never-married status is used: the effect on hours 
worked is also expected to be positive. The inclusion of this 
variable is to examine the relative importance of being 
never-married in comparison to other variables. 
5.3 Results for Married Females 
The results for married females are presented in tables (5.6) to 
(5.10). Probit estimates for the coefficients of the participation 
function are presented in table (5.6). The chi-squared goodness of 
fit statistic (X2) shows that for four sets of results (1.1, 1.2, 
3.1, 3.2) the explanatory variables are a significant determinant of 
the probability of labour force participation. 
The results for the offered wage function presented in table 
(5.7) show that the two variables, schooling and age explain only 
lO~ of the variation in earnings between workers. However, this is 
to be expected. Age may not be a good measure for market 
experience. And, as demonstrated by Mincer the earnings-schooling 
relationship on the individual level is weak (but when averaged over 
groups of individuals, the relationship is stronger). The 
coefficients of the selectivity bias (T) index are not statistically 
significant (although marginal) and the wage coefficient estimates 
are essentially unchanged when T is included. These results 
indicate that in this data set selection bias in the offered wage 
function is not a problem. 
Table (5.8) shows that the set of explanatory variables explain 
between fourty and fifty percent of the variation in the all hours 
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function. The set of explanatory variables explain only ten percent 
of the variation in the hours of workers. Again, the effect of 
selectivity bias is found to be insignificant. The proportionality 
hypothesis proposed by Heckman is examined using coefficients from 
the hours of workers and the probability of participation functions. 
The ratio of these coefficients, presented in table (AD.I), support 
this hypothesis. Expect for one case, the coefficients are positive 
in sign. 
There is also close agreement in the magnitude of the ratio of 
coefficients, especially for those probit and hours coefficients 
which are statistically significant. 
Now follows the examination of results obtained for each 
variable. The results indicate that the level of schooling has a 
highly significant effect on the praticipation decision. 
Coefficients of this variable are significant at the l' level in all 
functions. The effect of this variable is, as expected, positive. 
An increase in the level of schooling increases the shadow price of 
time of a female by fifteen to fourty percent, which leads to an 
increase in the probability of participation of between fourty-seven 
and fourty-eight percent. The effect on hours is strongly positive 
and a female with a higher level of schooling has an average work 
week that is between 6.2 and 6.9 hours longer. In the hours 
function for all females the magnitude of the variable is the 
greatest. 
The employment status of other family members is also an 
important factor in the participation decision. Market uncertainty 
related to the unemployment of a household member causes an increase 
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fable 5.6 Prabit Anell!is: Labour Force Participetion of 
Married Feooeles. 25--49 
bpI_tory 1.la l.~ 2.1- 2.~ 3.1a 3.~ 
'aciable. PC PI PC PI PC PI PC PI PC PI PC PI 
ED 1.96 .48 1.9 .47 1.95 .48 1.9 .47 2 .48 1.9 .47 
(27)*** (23)*** (27)*** (23)**· (24)*** (21)*** 
UN -.4 -.16 -.3 -.12 -.4 -.16 -.3 -.12 -.12 -.05 -.04 -.02 
(2.2)**· (-1.5) (-2.3)*** (-1.5)"· (-.6) (-.2)*** 
AGBG1IP -.05 -.02 -.14 -.06 -.05 -.02 -.15 -.06 -.03 -.02 -.1 -.04 
(-.6) (-1.6) (-.6) (-1.6) (-3) (-.8) 
JNCGRP .7 .26 .5 .19 .68 .25 .5 .19 .7 .26 .5 .19 
(5.7)*** (5.7)*** (5.6)·" (5.7)*** (4.7)·" (5.4)··· 
DCBl -.14 -.06 -.2 -.08 
(-1. 7)* (5.7)·* 
DCH2 .03 .01 .09 .04 
( .4) ( 1.1) 
IICH3 -.02 -.01 -.05 -.02 
(-.3) (-.6) 
NCB1 
-.1 -.04 -.12 -.05 
(-.65)· (-1.8)· 
HCH2 
.03 .01 .07 .03 
(.4) (1.1) 00 
N 
HCH3 
-.04 -.02 -.06 -.03 r-4 
(-.9) (-1.3) 
AyeR 
.02 .01 .014 .008 
( 1.5) ( 1.03) 
Intercept .22 1.08 .25 1.1 -.009 .8 
(.7) (4.9)·" (.8) (5)*** (-.03) (3.9) 
X2 94 65 376 326 97 96 
df 85 82 262 240 121 125 
p .24 .91 0 0 .94 .98 
.** •• * •• significant at the 1'. 5'. l~ level. 
PC : Problt Coefficient 
PI : Participation Effect 
• boWleholds reporting cuh inca.e 
b aU bouaebolda 
c calculated fr_ the inverse to the probit trllDsfo~tiOD. i.e •• the 
atandsrd DO~1 cuaulative distribution 
Table 5.7 
Explanatory 
Variable 1.1 
ED .44 
(4.9)*** 
AGEGRP .34 
Offered Wage Function for Married Females. 25-49 
with Test for Selectivity Bias 
1.1 2.1 2.1 3.1 3.1 
.44 .44 .44 .42 .42 
(4.9)*** (4.9)*** (4.9)*** (4.9)*** (4.9)*** 
.34 .34 .34 .24 
(4.9)*** (4.9)*** (4.9)*** (4.9)*** (3)*** 
.25 
(3.2)*** 
-.001 T -.01 
(-1.5) 
Intercept 6.2 6.2 6.2 
(32)*** (32)*** (32)*** 
.11*** .11*** .11*** 
-.01 
(-1.5) 
6.2 6.4 
(32)*** (33)*** 
.11*** .10*** 
(-1.5) 
6.4 
(33)*** 
.10*** 
***, **. * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 5.8 Asking Wage Function for Married Females. 
Explanatory 
Variables 
ED 
UN 
INCGRP 
DCHI 
DCH2 
DCH3 
NCHI 
NCH2 
NCH3 
AYCH 
25-49(1) 
1.1 
.152 
.059 
-.103 
.021 
-4.4 x 10-3 
2.9 x 1(j"3 
(1) obs: (a T x - i T y) = (y z) 
To estimate /3: 
2.1 
.33 
.023 
-.039 
5.8 x 10-3 
-1. 74 x 10-3 
2.32 x 10-3 
(a) 
(b) 
If the variable is only in the probability of 
participation function then bi = ~ '1 
If the variable is in both equations then: 
b' = Oc' - (; ,. 111 
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3.1 
.43 
9.96 x 10-3 
-.058 
-1.66 x 10-3 
Table 5.9 Hours Function of All Married Females. 25-49 
Explanatory 
Variables 
1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 
ED 21 20 22 22 (34)*** (39)*** (37)*** (31)*** 
UN -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -.2 -.3 (-2.5)** (-1.8)* (-1.8)* (-1.5)* (-2) (-.2) 
AGEGRP -1.3 -.8 -.8 -1.3 -.5 -1 
(-2.5)** (-1.8) (-1.8)* (-2.5)** (-1) (-1. 6) 
I NCGRP 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.8 1.9 3.1 
(5.8)*** (4.8)*** (4.7)*** (5.8)*** (3.7)*** (5.6)*** 
DCHI -1 -.8 (-2)** (-1.9* 
DCH2 .6 .3 
(1.3) (.6) 
DCH3 -.4 -.15 (-.9) (-.4) 
NCR1 -.5 -.7 (-1.8)* (-2)** 
NCH2 .2 .5 (.7) (1.3) 
NCH3 -.1 -.2 (-.5) (-.9) 
AYCH .1 .01 (1.6) (1.1) 
w .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .001 (lS)*** (18)*** (17.9)*** (IS)*** (14)*** (12)*** 
Intercept -21 -21 -21 -21 -24 -23 (-16)*** (-16)*** (-17)*** (-16)*** (-18)*** (-20)*** 
R2 .49*** .46*** .4S*** .49*** .4S*** .48*** 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 5.10 Hours Function for Working Married Females. 25-49 
with Test for Selectivity Bias 
Variables 1.1 1.1 2.1 2.1 3.1 3.1 
ED 6.6 6.6 6.8 6.9 6.2 6.2 (4.4)*** (4.5)*** (4.6)*** (4.6)*** (3.6)*** (3.6)*** 
AGEGRP -2.7 -2.7 -2.1 -2 -2.4 -2.3 
(-1.9)* (-1.9)* (-1.5) (-1.5) (-1.3) (-1.3) 
INCGRP 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.7 
(1.7)* (1.7)* (1.6) (1. 67)* (1.6) (1.6) 
DCH1 -2.1 .2 
(-1.5) (-1.5) 
DCH2 -.4 -.4 (-.3) (-.4) 
DOHa -2 -2 (-1.7)* (-1. 7)* 
NCHI -1.1 -1 (-1.1) (-1) 
NCH2 -.02 -.02 (-.02) (-.02) 
NCH3 -.2 -.2 (-.3) (-.3) 
AYCH .24 .25 (1) (1) 
W .0003 .0003 .0003 .0003 .0003 .0003 (2.6)*** (2.6)*** (2.6)*** (2.6)*** (2.1)** (2)** 
T -.1 -.12 -.04 (-1.1) (-1.1) (-.3) 
Intercept 26 26 23 24 23 23 (6.8)*** (6.7)*** (6)*** (6)*** (5.8)*** (5.7)*** 
R2 .11** .11* .10* .10* .09* .09* 
***. **. * significant at the 1%. 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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in the shadow price of time of between two and twelve percent 
leading to a decrease in the probability of participation of two to 
sixteen percent. The effect of this variable is also negative and 
statistically significant in the all hours function. These findings 
represent strong evidence of the discouraged worker effect among 
married females in Cairo. 
The variable for age was not found to be statistically 
significant in the probit function, although some of the t-values 
are just marginal. The expected negative effect lowers the 
probabili ty of participation by two to six percent. The 
coefficients in the all hours functions are statisticslly 
significant in nearly all the estimated equations. The magnitude of 
the coefficients are large in some equations and as expected, the 
effect of this variable is negative. A female belonging to the 
older age group is expected to have a reduction in the average work 
week of nearly three hours. 
The effect of the level of household income is statistically 
significant in all probit functions. The effect of income on the 
participation decision is positive. The positive effect of this 
variable is contrary to theoretical expectation, so it might be fair 
to say that this variable is an inadequate measure of income. 
However, acquisition of earnings at low levels of income might 
increase the desire for greater earnings. A higher level of income 
lowers the shadow price of time by nearly ten percent increasing the 
probability of participation by nearly twenty-five percent. The 
effect of this variable is positive and statistically significant in 
the all-hours function and in some of the equations for workers. 
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The pressure of children exerts an effect on the participation 
decision of mothers only for young preschool children. The 
variables DCHl, NCHI are statistically significant in the probit 
function at the lO~ level. The presence of a child under three 
years of age raises the shadow price of time of the mother by two 
percent leading to a reduction in the probability of participation 
of six to eight percent. The effect of an addi tional child under 
three years of age reduces the shadow price of time by less than one 
percent, increasing the probability of participation by a further 
one percent. 
The variable for the age of the youngest child has at-value 
that is marginal and shows that as the age of the youngest child 
increases the mother's probability of participation also increases. 
The difference in the probability of participation of a mother who 
has a youngest child aged one year and one who has a youngest child 
aged ten years is 9% (the increase is l' for each additional year). 
The all-hours function shows that the t-value for DCHl, NCHI are 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for AYCH is found to 
be negative, when statistically significant. This is contrary to 
expectation. The hours for workers have statistically significant 
t-values for DCH3. The presence of a child sged 6-11 years reduces 
the working week of the mother by two hours and each additional 
child in that age-group causes a further reduction of .2 of an hour. 
An explanation could be that school-age children require some 
attention from the working mother. The coefficients for DCHI are 
not statistically significant, but the t-values are marginal. 
Overall, the results suggest that pre-school children have the 
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greatest effect on participation while older children, aged 6-11 
years, exerts the greatest effect on working mothers. 
The effect of wages on the hours of all females is statistically 
significant in nearly all regressions. An increase in the weekly 
wage rate of E£lO increases the work week by nearly 2 hours. 
However, in terms of elasticity measure(2) (coefficient taken from 
table 5.10) a value of .02 indicates strong inelasticity of hours 
with wages. 
5.4 Results for Single Females 
The empirical results for single females are presented in tables 
(5.11) to (5.16). Probi t estimates for the coefficients of the 
participation functions are presented in tables (5.11) and (5.12). 
It is difficult to assess the statistical performance of the 
participation model. The chi-squared goodness of fit statistics 
indicate that the functions in table (5.10) give a better fit to the 
model than those in table (5.11). A better fit to the model is also 
obtained for the individual status sub-groups rather than the 
sub-group of all single females. This might be expected since 
single females as a group are a heterogeneous group and their 
behaviuor is relatively more difficult to predict. 
The results for the offered wage function, presented in table 
(5.13), show that the two variables age and education explain up to 
twenty-five percent of the variation in wages. These results can be 
considered good. Selection bias does not cause a problem in 
estimation as shown by the t-value for the T-index. 
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Table (5.15) shows that the set of explanatory varaiables 
explain up to sixty-three percent of the variation in the hours of 
all females. The use of the actual wage rather than imputed wage 
increases the explanatory power of the model. (The results using 
the imputed wage are presented in Appendix III). For the hours of 
workers, the set of explanatory variables explain up to seventeen 
percent of the variation in the average work week. The problem of 
selection bias is not significant (as indicated by the t-value for 
the T index). 
Finally, the coefficient ratios in table (A5.2) are mainly 
positive, and all positive in sign when both coefficients are 
statistically significant. This supports the proportionality 
hypothesis. 
136 
Table 5.11 Probit Analysis: Labour Force Participation of 
Single Females. 25-59(1) 
Explana-
tOry 1.1 2.1 
Variable PC PE PC PE 
ED 1.6 .445 2.8 .497 
(16)*** (5)*** 
UN -.2 -.079 -2.2 -.486 
(-1.6) (-2.1)** 
AGEGRP -.4 ' "':'.155' .4 .155 
(-3.3)*** ( .8) 
INCGRP .2 .079 .13 .052 
(2.34)*** (.3) 
FMZ -.12 -.048 -.01 -.004 (-5)*** (-.1) 
HEAD .44 .17 (3.8)*** 
SING .4 .155 
(3.1)*** 
Inter- 3.3 -65 
cept (11) *** (.37) 
x2 277 37 
df 272 32 
p 0 .25 
3.1 4.1 5.1 
PC PE PC PE PC PE 
2 .477 5.6 .499 1 .341 
(-12)*** (2.1)*** (4.1)*** 
-.2 -.079 1.1 .36 -.4 -.155 
(-.9) (1.6) (-1.6) 
.07 .028 -.1 -.040 '-I -.341 
(.2) (-.2) (-3.6)*** 
.2 .079 .71 .261 .3 .118 
( .2) (1.5) (1. 6) 
-.11 -.044 -.5 -.192 -.1 -.040 
(-2.6)*** (-3.4)*** (-1.9)* 
3.7 .49 -.3 -.118 .3 .118 
(.8) (-.5) (1.5) , 
2.5 
(4.4)*** 
88 
80 
.26 
.3 
(.1) 
36 
41 
.69 
4.9 
(7.2)*** 
80 
80 
.48 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
PC Probit Coefficient 
PE Participation Effect 
Note: 
(1) Households reporting cash income 
1.1 All Single 
2.1 Married household head 
3 1 Never-married • 4.1 Divorced 
5.1 Widowed 
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Table 5.12 Probit Analysis: Labour Force Participation of 
Single Females. 25-59(1) 
Explana-
tory 1.2 2.2 3.2 4.2 5.2 
Variables PC PE PC PH PC PH PC PH PC PH 
ED 1.5 .43 1.6 .45 1.9 .47 2.1 .48 1.1 .36 (18)*** (5.8)*** (-13)*** (4)*** (5.3)*** 
UN -.1 -.04 -1.5 -.43 -.01 -.004 .3 .12 -.3 -.12 (-.8) (-2)** (-.1) (.6) (-1.6) 
AGEGRP -.3 -.12 -.08 .032 -.2 .079 -.2 -.079 -.7 -.26 
(-2.7)*** (-.3) (-.7) (-.7) (-3.4)*** 
I NCGRP 1.4 .419 2 .477 1.4 .419 1.7 .455 1.3 .403 
(13)*** 
FMZ -.1 -.039 (-4.5)*** 
HEAD .18 .071 (1. 7) *** 
SING .4 .155 (4.3)*** 
Inter- .7 
cept (2.4)** 
X2 615 
df 270 
p 0 
(7.7)*** 
-.002 -.008 
(-.02) 
-1.1 
(-1.2) 
251 
54 
0 
(7.8)*** (4.4)*** (6.7)*** 
-.12 -.048 -.2 -.079 -.02 -.008 
(-3.5)*** (-2.9)*** (-.7) 
.51 .195 .4 .155 .21 .083 
(1.3) (1.5) (1.2) 
.6 
(1.1) 
102 
89 
.16 
.34 
(.3) 
62 
60 
.41 
1.8 
(3.2)*** 
189 
108 
o 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
PC Probit Coefficient 
PE Participation Effect 
(1) All Households 
1.2 All Single 
2.2 Married household head 
3.2 Never-married 
4.2 Divorced 
5.2 Widowed 
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Table 5.13 Offered Wage Function for all Single Feaalea and by 
Marital Status 25-59, with Test for Selectivity Bias 
Explanatory 
Variables 1.1 1.1 2.1 2.1 3.1 3.1 4.1 4.1 5.1 5.1 
ED .5 .5 1.3 1.3 .24 .2 .6 .5 .65 .7 
(5.7)*** (3.7)*** (4.7)*** (4.6)*** (2.6)*** (2.5)*** (3)*** (2.7)*** (1.9)* 
AGBGHP .29 .29 .5 .5 .13 .13 .4 .4 .1 .2 
(3.7)*** (3.7)*** (3)*** (3)*** (1) (1) (1.98)* (1.9)* (.3) ( .5) 
T -.002 .005 .006 -.01 .04 en ('I) 
(-.3) (.35) (1.4) (-.6) ( .8) r-I 
Intercept 6.1 6.1 4.4 4.4 6.7 6.7 6 6 6 6 
(30)··' (30)*** (6.7)*** (6.6)**' (26)*** (26)*** (13)*** (13)**· (7)*" (7)**· 
&2 .06 .06 .25** .24** .02 .03 .21** .20** .06 .06 
***. **. * ai,.,ificaot at the 1'. 5' and 10. level 
Table 5.14 Shadow Price of Time for all Single Females and 
by Marital Status. 25-59(1) 
Explanatory 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 
Variables 
ED -1.7 -.94 -.84 -.8 -9.35 
UN .276 1.76 .108 -.272 4.0 
IN -.276 -.104 -.108 -.178 -3.0 
FMZ .166 8xl0-3 .059 .125 1.0 
HEAD -.607 -(19.98) .075 -3.0 
SING -.55 
(1) obs: (a T x - i T y) = (y z) 
To estimate /3: 
(a) 
(b) 
If the variable is only the probability of participation function 
.. .. .. 
then bi = -0 Yi 
If the variable is in both equations then: 
A A A A 
bi = OCi - 0 OCi 
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Table 5.15 Hour. Function or All Single F_lee. 25-59 
IxpllUlatory 
Variablea 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 
ED 11.7 20.8 17.6 22.0 12.9 16 12.6 11.2 14.8 17.0 
(21)'" (19)**' (13)'" (10)'" (8.9)'" (9.5)'" (3.3)'" (2.2)'" (7.7)**' (6.2)*** 
UN -4.7 -4.7 -2.9 -4 -4.5 -3.8 1.2 6.1 -1.4 -3.1 
(-5)'" (-3.8)'" (-1.98)" (-1.6) (-3)*** (-2.4)'" ( .3) (1.1) (-1) (-1.3) 
AGEGRP -2.5 -4.9 -2.8 -6.8 -2.9 -1.7 -3.3 -6 -3.6 -8.3 
(-3)**' (-3.8)'" (-2.5)" (-2.8)'" (-1.2) (-.6) (-1.4) (-1.7)' (-2.3)** (-2.7)*" 
INCGRP 9.8 1.9 10.3 1.4 10.8 -1 3.7 -.4 6.1 1.63 
(13.1)'" (1.96)** (10)'" (.7) (6.3)**' (-.6) (1.5) (-.1) (5.7)**' (.9) 
fMZ -.1 -.3 -.1 -.6 -.2 .2 -.5 -1 -.05 -.13 (-1.4) (-1.65)' (-.6) (-l.l) (-.5) ( .5) (-I) (-1.4) (-.4) (-.6) 
DAD 4.2 6.6 8.2 15 3.4 2.5 3.8 5.9 (4.9)**' (5)**' (2.4)*** (3.3)**' (1.4) (.7) (3.0)*** (3)**' 
.... 
SING 5.2 5.4 
"" 
.... (5.5)**' (4.5)**' 
w .002 .002 .001 .001 .01 .01 .01 .01 .001 .001 (12.6)'" (10)'** (7.5)'" (5.5)'" (13)'" (12)'" (6.4)'" (5.3)'" (7.3)**' (5.7)**' 
Intercept -26 -10 -23 -.5 -20 -6 -9 6.8 -17 -.9 (-12)**' (-3.5)*'* (-8)'" (-.1) (-4.2)'" (-1.1) (-1.3) (.6) (-4)'" (-.1) 
H2 
.45" .45" .38** .41" .55** .51*' .61" .63** .22" .22*' 
•••• ". * aicnificlUlt at the I~. 6~ and I~ level 
Table 5.16 Hours function for Workinc Sincle Fe.ales. 25-59 
with Test for Selectivity liaa 
ixpl.ator)' 
Variables 1.1 1.1 2.1 2.1 3.1 3.1 4.1 4.1 5.1 5.1 
ED 5.4 5.4 7.0 7.0 .1 -.1 9 9.6 10.9 10.9 
(3.9)'" (3.9)'" (2.6)'" (2.6)'" ( .1) (-.1) (1.4) (1.5) (2.0)*** (l.9)· 
AGIGRP -3.2 -3.2 3.5 3.7 -3.7 -3.7 -6.5 -5.3 -1.2 -1.1 
(-2)'" (-2)'" (1.2) (l.3) (-1.4) (-1.3) (-1.0) (-.8) (-.2) (-.2) 
INCGBP 1.6 1.5 -2.3 -2.4 .14 .2 -3.7 -Z.9 2.6 2.6 
(1.4) (1.3) (-.8) (-.9) (.l) (.1) (-.6) (-.5) (.5) (.5) 
iMZ .5 .5 .84 .84 .3 .3 .8 .7 .5 .5 
(1.64) (1.6) (l.I) (l.l) (.9) ( .9) (.6) (.4) ( .4) ( .3) 
BiAD 7.2 7.2 5.1 4.9 6.B 5.9 14. 14.2 
(4.5)'" (4.5)'" (1.65)'" (l.6) (l.l) (.9) (2.6)" (2.5)" 
SING 3.6 3.7 
(2.7)'" (2.7)'" N qe 
~ 
W .0004 .0004 .0003 .0003 .002 .002 .005 .005 .0002 .0002 
(2.6)'" (2.6)'" (l.5) (1.5) (3.3)'" (3.3)'" (1.8)'" (1.7)' (.7) (.9) 
T -.1 .2 -.1 -.3 -.2 
(-.6) (.8) (-1.3) (-1.1) (-.3) 
latercept 23 22 21 21 39 39 20 17.0 3.6 3.6 
(5.6)'" (5.1)'" (2.5)'" (2.6)'" (7.6)'" (7.7)**' (1.3) (1.0) ( .2) (.2) 
1t2 
.09' .Og' .03 .03 .03 .03 .17" .17' .U' .10' 
•••• ".' aianificant at the 1_. 5' and 10. level 
The remaining part of the section is an analysis of the effect 
of each explanatory variable on the labour supply of single females. 
The effect of education is as expected positive and 
statistically significant in all functions. The attainment of at 
least a secondary level certificate reduces the shadow price of time 
of all the individual martial status group (the value for widowed 
females is questionable). This leads to an increase in the 
probability of participation of between fourty-five and fifty 
percent for never4m8rried, married heads of households and divorced 
females; and about thirty-five percent for widowed females. For the 
all-hours function, never-married females display the greatest 
responsiveness to the level of schooling. For the hours of workers, 
the coefficient estimates are statistically significant only for 
married head of households and widowed females. The results 
indicate an increase in the average work week of about fi ve hours 
for a single female with a higher level of education. 
The effect of unemployment on the probability of participation 
is statistically significant for married household heads. The 
presence of an unemployed household member increases the shadow 
price of time leading to a reduction in the probability of 
participation of fourty-eight percent. The coefficients in the all 
hours function are statistically significant for the sub-groups of 
all single females, married household heads and never-married 
females. The sign of the coefficient estimates are negative 
indicating that a discouraged-worker effect is also prevalent 
amongst single females. 
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The size of the family has a depressing effect on the 
probability of participation of single females. An increase in 
family size of one individual increases the shadow price of time by 
up to sixteen percent, decreasing the probability of participation 
by as much as twenty percent (for divorced females). The negative 
effect of the size of family is also reflected in the coefficient 
estimates of the all hours functions, being greatest in magnitude 
for the sub-group of divorced females. The effect on the hours of 
workers is not significant. 
The status of being single reduces the shadow price of time by 
over fifty percent leading to an increase in the probability of 
participation of l~. The positive sign in the all hours function 
confirms the effect, which is translated into a reduction of four 
hours in the average work week. 
The coefficient estimates for the level of income is, as for 
married females, positive in sign. An increase in the level of 
income lowers the shadow price of time by up to twenty eight 
percent, increasing the probability of participation by eight 
percent. The positive effect of the income level is again reflected 
in the coefficient estimates for the all-hours function and 
translated into a one and a half hour rise in the average work week 
(for all single females, the coefficient estimates are not 
significant) • 
The effect of the wage variable on the hours function is as 
expected positive. From the all hours function, the effect of an 
increase in the weekly wage rate of B£l increases the working week 
by I hour for household heads and divorced females and by just under 
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10 minutes for never-married and widowed females. In terms of 
elasticity (calculated from the coefficients of table 5.16) t the 
range is from .019 for never-married females to .43 for divorced 
females. These results indicate a small responsiveness of hours to 
wages. 
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PART II: EFS STUDY 
5.5 Estimation Procedure and Definition of Variables 
5.5.1 Simultaneous Equations Systems 
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between 
labour force participation and fertility decisions in a framework 
where these household decisions are jointly determined. This 
approach implies that the analysis will take into explicit account 
the system of relations in which the participation equation is 
included. The validity of the simultaneous nature of household 
decision-making implies that application of least squares to a 
single equation produces biased (and inconsistent) coefficient 
estimates(3) . 
Construction of a simultaneous equation model raises a number of 
problems. The first problem is that of identification, that is 
model formulation. This means classifying the variables into 
exogeneous variables; variables that are not explained by the model, 
but are determined outside the model; and endogeneous variables i 
variables determined by the model. Choosing some variables as 
endogeneous to the model is to a certain extent arbitrary, the 
choice depending on the character and extent to which the system is 
being studied, the purpose for which the model is built, and, when 
applicable, the data available. 
The second problem concerns estimation of the parameters of the 
model which depends on the identification of the equations in the 
system. A function belonging to a system of simultaneous equations 
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is identified if it has a unique statistical form, that is if no 
other equation in the system contains the same variables as the 
function(4). The function may be exactly identified, in which case 
unique coefficient estimates can be obtained by applying indirect 
least squares. If the function is over-identified then unique 
estimates cannot be obtained by indirect least squares and other 
methods have to be adopted(5). One view, it must be noted, is that 
any over identified system can be exactly identified by the addition 
of a significant variable or the removal of an insignificant 
variable. The function may also be under-identified in which case 
the statistical form of the function is not unique. Least squares 
applied to each equation yields reduced-form coefficient estimates. 
5.5.2 Specification of the Models 
In this section two models based on the joint-determination 
approach, concerning fertility and labour force participation 
decisions, are presented. There is no theoretical guidance on model 
specification, that is, whether these systems are likely to be 
under-identified, exactly identified or over-identified. However, a 
number of approaches have been empirically tested. 
The approach adopted by Ner love and Schul tz ( 1970) is one in 
which a number of variables such as marriage, fertility, migration 
and labour force participation are specified as endogeneous to the 
model, but which also enter into the equations determining the other 
endogeneous variables. Each of the endogeneous variables are also 
determined by somewhat different exogeneous variables. The 
resul ting system is 
casual relationship 
one that is over-identified with no direct 
(making it unappealing in analysing the 
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empirical results). 
On the other hand, the approach adopted by McCabe and Rosenzweig 
(1976) is one in which the same set of exogeneous variables affect 
fertility and participation decisions: their view is that it is 
impossible to find exogeneous variables which influence labour force 
participation but not fertility decisions and vice-versa. The view 
that economic models are generally under-identified is one proposed 
by Liu (1960)(6). The argument is that most econometric models are 
incorrectly specified with few explanatory variables appearing in 
each equation. Removal of variables resulting in 
over-identification is fictitious because there are too many missing 
variables from each equation. 
McCabe and Rosenweig's (1976) approach is appealing because of 
the simplicity of the analysis and directness of the estimation 
procedure: least squares is applied to each equation at a time and 
reduced-form coefficient estimates are obtained. However, in this 
case fertility and participation decisions do not directly interact; 
a number of exogeneous variables affect each variable. In addition, 
occupational compatibility and child-bearing is also taken as one of 
the endogeneous variables in the analysis. 
In this study a four-equation system (based on Rosenzweig and 
McCabe) is utilised: 
i = 1, 4 (5.4) 
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Where: 
Dl CEB = children every born 
Dz PART = labour force participation 
D3 LOC = location of work 
D. CIND = compatibility index 
X array denoting set of exogeneous variables 
£' i = random error term 
These variables will be described in the next section. 
One model that has not been theoretically or empirically 
considered is the recursive model. A feature of this system, unlike 
the systems previously described. is that it is a casual system. 
There is a direct relationship between the endogenous variables: in 
this system it is assumed that fertility decisions affect labour 
force participation decisions. 
Setting out the model, let: 
Fl completed or planned fertility 
Fz lifetime participation 
Xl factors determining fertility 
Xz factors determining participation (not necessarily the same 
set as Xl) 
£'1' £'2 : random error terms 
cov (£'1 ,£'z) = 0 
Fl = F(Xl , £'1 ) (5.5) 
F2 = F(F1 , X2 • £'2) (5.6) 
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The measures used for lifetime participation, completed 
fertility and their determinants are described in the next section. 
In this section the theoretical validity of using such a model will 
be discussed. 
A view that is held by some economists is that systems are 
really recursive(7). Realistically, it is argued, events do not 
occur simultaneously - there is some adjustment at work. An 
important factor is the time period involved. 
In the household model, the appropriate planning period is 
considered to be the lifetime. Of interest in this thesis is the 
work behaviour of females. Therefore the arguement, which is by no 
means inconclusive, is that females do not consider market 
participation when planning the number of children they wish to 
bear, but market participation is effected by the number of children 
that are born. 
Completed fertility is determined by factors such as husband's 
and wife's educational level, expected earnings of the wife, age at 
marriage of the wife, family assets and possibily planned market 
participation of the wife. If planned market participation is of 
major importance, then the hypothesis is, to some extent, incorrect. 
Consideration could also be taken of the opposite view: labour 
force participation is unaffected by planned fertility, but 
fertility is affected by the participation status. 
The alternative recursive model would be set out as: 
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F2 = F(X2, £2) 
Fl = F(F2, Xl' ~1) 
5.5.3 Endogeneous Variables 
(1) Labour Force Participation 
(5.7) 
(5.8) 
In examining the joint decision of work and fertility, lifetime 
labour force participation is the variable of interest. The EFS 
data file contains information on current and past work history of 
married females. Table (5.17) represents the marital pattern of 
work. The figures indicate that around 25% of currently married 
females have participated in the labour market during some period of 
their lives. In order to construct a good index for lifetime 
participation information on the number of years spent in full-time 
or part-time employment is required. This would give the proportion 
of lifetime the female is engaged in labour market activities. 
However, this information is not available. A simpler lifetime 
index, for which data is also unavailable, would be a measure for 
the continuity of work: in this case, information is needed for the 
desire to work in the future for the construction of such an index. 
In this study, assuming Ben-Porath's hypothesis is correct (that 
is current participation is a good measure for permanent 
participation), then participation during a part of the life-cycle 
is taken as a measure towards life-time participation. 
Current participation is also used as an exogeneous variable. 
Labour force participation can be established from the variables 
last occupation or work status since marriage. The distribution of 
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married females according to occupation and work status are given in 
tables (5.18) and (5.19). The distribution by occupation of urban 
areas and Cairo are similar, but differ from rural areas where, as 
expected, the majority of working females are in agricultural 
activity. The same observation is found for work status. Nearly 
eighty percent of those who work in urban areas or Cairo are 
wage-earners; in rural areas nearly sixty percent of females who 
participated in the labour market are working on the family farm. 
Finally, location of work is another variable used. In rural 
areas fifty nine percent of workers work on the family farm and 
twelve percent work at home, i. e., the majority work in locations 
that are compatible with childcare activities. In urban areas and 
Cairo around eighty eight percent of workers work away from home. 
Whether these would engage in activities that are compatible with 
childcare cannot be ascertained from the data file. Distribution of 
the work force by location of work is presented in table (5.20). 
The dependent variable used is the location of employment (LOC), 
which is defined (for the sub-group of workers) to be equal to one 
if working outside the home and zero otherwise. 
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Table 5.17 
Area 
Pattern of Work 
Now and before 
Now not before 
Since and before 
Since not before 
Before only 
Never worked 
All Females 
Distribution of Married Females by Marital 
Pattern of Work 
Urban Rural All Cairo 
Areas 
89 (8.5) 175 (11. 6) 264 (10.3) 37 (8.2) 
54 (5.2) 86 (5.7) 140 (5.5) 21 (4.7) 
18 (1. 7) 22 ( 1.5) 40 ( 1.6) 7 ( 1.6) 
11 (1.1) 12 (.8) 23 (.9) 9 (2.0) 
63 (6.0) 105 (7.0) 168 (6.6) 29 (6.5) 
809 (77.5) 1109 (73.5) 1918 (75.1) 346 (77.1) 
1044 (100) 1509 (100) 2553 (100) 449 (100) 
Figures in brackets are the proportion of the sample. 
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Table 5.18 Distribution of Married Females by Occupation 
Area Urban Rural All Cairo 
Areas 
Occupation 
Professional 65 (6.2) 10 (.7) 75 (2.9) 28 (6.2) 
Clerical 40 (3.8) 5 (.3) 45 (1.8) 17 (3.8) 
Sales 12 ( 1.1) 19 (1. 3) 31 ( 1.2) 4 (.9) 
Agricultural 2 (.2) 171 (11.3) 173 (6.8) 1 (.2) 
self-employed 
Agricultural 1 (.1) 54 (3.6) 55 (2.2) 
employed by 
others 
Household 13 (1.2) 4 (.3) 13 (.5) 7 (1.6) 
Services 
Other Services 16 (1.5) 31 (2.1) 20 (.8) 8 (1.8) 
Skilled Labour 24 (2.3) 2 (.1) 55 (2.2) 10 (2.2) 
Unskilled Labour 2 (.1) 2 (.1) 
Did not work 871 (83.4) 1213 (80.4) 2084 (81. 6) 374 (83.3) 
All Females 1044 (100) 1509 (100) 2553 (100) 449 (100) 
Figures in brackets are the proportion of the sample 
- not applicable 
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Table 5.19 Distribution of Married Females by Work Status 
since Marriage 
Area Urban Rural All Cairo 
Areas 
Work Status 
Family Farm 2 (.2) 174 ( 11.5) 176 (6.9) 1 (.2) 
Family paid 1 (.1) 1 (.0) 1 (.2) 
cash 
Family paid (.4) 
kind 
Family 7 (.7) 4 (.3) 11 (7.6) 3 (.7) 
unpaid 
Other paid 139 (13.3) 56 (3.7) 195 (.6) 59 (13.1) 
cash 
Other paid 15 (1.0) 15 (0) 
kind 
Other 1 (.1) 1 (2.7) 
unpaid 
Se1f- 23 (2.2) 45 (3.0) 68 10 (2.2) 
employed 
Did not 872 (83.5) 1214 (80.5) 2086 (81. 7) 375 (83.5) 
work 
All Females 1044 (100) 1509 (100) 2553 (100) 449 (100) 
Figures in brackets are the proportion of the sample. 
- not applicable 
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Table 5.20 Distribution of Married Females by Place of Work 
Area Urban Rural All Cairo 
Areas 
Location of Work 
Family Farm 2 ( .2) 174 (11.5) 176 (6.9) 1 (.2) 
Other Farm 1 (.1) 50 (3.3) 51 (2.0) 
At home 18 (1.7) 36 (2.4) 54 (2.1) 9 (2.0) 
Away from 151 (14.5) 35 (2.3) 186 (7.3) 64 (14.3) 
home 
Did not 872 (B3.5) 1214 (BO.5) 2086 (81. 7) 375 (83.5) 
work 
All Females 1044 (100) 1509 ( 100) 2553 (100) 449 (100) 
Figures in brackets are the proportion of the sample. 
- not applicable 
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(2) Fertility Variables 
There are a number of measures to describe different aspects of 
fertility. Of interest in this study is the level of fertility; 
measrued by the number of children ever born to the mother. Since 
the theory concerns decisions about completed fertility levels, this 
means that the choice of age-group has to represent this phenomena. 
This is to some extent arbitary and relies in part on background 
knowledge of fertility behaviour in Egypt. This is provided by the 
published material from the EFS. 
Birth history data can suffer from omission of births, 
especially by older females. This is shown to be negligible in the 
EFS data, and so an upper age limit of 49 years (the maximum age 
reported in the survey) is used. Results from the EFS indicate that 
Egyptian females start their child bearing experience at roughly the 
same pace (measured by early marital fertility - the rate of 
childbearing in the first five years of marriage) regardless of 
background characteristics, after which certain groups of females 
start to regulate their fertility. In this case taking an age group 
of 35-49 seems to be justifiable. 
In Egypt marriage preceeds childbirth and, therefore, females in 
the same marriage cohorts have approximately the same length of 
exposure to childbearing. Selection of older marriage cohorts (for 
example those who have been married for at least fifteen years) 
would represent another measure of completed fertility. The 
different (and possibly desirable) characteristic of this group of 
females would be that they represent a broad range of ages. 
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Finally, an index that is used to assess the importance of the 
choice of occupation on fertility is used. This index is an ordinal 
measure of the child-rearing compatibility of the occupation chosen 
by the wife. The average number of children ever born to females 
aged 35-44 by occupation is used to represent this index, the most 
compatible occupations being assigned the highest number. 
5.5.4 Exogeneous Variables 
Having previously discussed the effects of some of these 
variables on labour supply behaviour, the description of the effect 
of the endogeneous variables on the demand for children is 
considered in more detail. It should also be noted that there is no 
data concerning the partner's or any of the family member'. 
unemployment status(8). 
(1) Wage Variable (WAGE) 
An in Part I of this chapter, a wage equation is used to 
estimate wages for workers and non-workers using a semi-logarithmic 
empirical specification: 
Where: 
In W = CO + a 1 YRSCH + a z AGE 
W gross monthly earnings 
YRSCH number of completed years of schooling 
AGE age cohort 
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(5.9) 
Analysing the effect of the wage 
children, McCabe and Rosenzweig (1976) 
rate on the demand for 
related it to the time 
intensity of child services CXn and commodity services <Xc' The 
response for desired number of children depends on the relative 
intensity of child services relative to commodity services (<<0 -
<Xc), A rise in wages will have two effects: 
(i) it will increase the price of children relative to 
commodity services if child time intensity is greater than 
commodity time intensity; 
(ii) it will increase household income which, assuming children 
can be treated in the same way 88 normal commodities, 
should increase the desire for children. 
Thus, the effect of child time intensity may be opposite in sign 
and outweigh the income effect. 
The relative intensity of child services relative to commodity 
services is influenced by a number of factors; the extent to which 
care for young children is the responsibility of persons other than 
the mother (older children or relatives); occupational compatibility 
with child rearing. 
These factors differ between societies, but it is assumed that 
in less developed countries child rearing is less intensive in the 
mother's time since a characteristic of many developing countries is 
the ready availability of relatives, older children and domestic 
servants for child care. 
countries the mother's 
It is also assumed that in less-developed 
occupation is more compatible with 
child-rearing. If this is the case, then a rise in females wages 
would increase the desired number of children. 
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(2) Income Variables (HHI, PCI, PCE, ASSET) 
Measures of income levels in the EFS data file that are used in 
this study are: 
( i) Annual household income (HHI) • This is divided into 
fi ve categories ( of equal group size) and ordered by 
increasing level of income. 
(ii) Per capita income (PCI). This is also divided into 
five categories (of equal group size) and ordered by 
increasing level of income. 
(iii) Per capita expenditure (PCE). This measure of 
economic well-being is correlated with income and is 
also a categorical variable. 
(iv) Physical asset (ASSET). The ownership of a toilet is 
considered to represent a measure for the level of 
assets owned by the household. This variable is 
divided into four groups according to the type of 
toilet available to the household; (a) flush-family 
only; (b) flush other; (c) other types and (d) none. 
Each of these measures have drawbacks. The relationship between 
per capita income and household income depends on the relation to 
family size. Household income might increase with family size since 
larger families have more potential workers. 
pattern emerges from the data(9). 
However, no clear 
The relationship between fertility and income is not 
straightforward. For parents children are a source of psychic 
income or satisfaction - a consumption good in economic terms 
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(Becker, 1960). Children may also provide money income. In this 
case, they can be termed a production good. Price theory indicates 
that an increase in income increases the amount spent on the 
commodity (unless it is inferior). That is an increase in income 
raises the amount spent on children through increases in the 
quantity (number) and quality. The investments in quality take two 
forms; good nutrition and health care and; provision of education 
and attitudes that enable the acquisition of further education and 
skills. Thus, theory does not guarantee that increases in income 
increases the desired number of children(lO). 
(3) Education Variables (LIT, YRSCH, ED, PYRSCH) 
Education of parents is associated with a number of aspects of 
fertility: 
(i) It may affect the individuals parent's desire for children 
as well as possibly the relative importance of the 
husband',s and wife's desire in the household decision 
making process. 
(ii) It affects parental productivity in child rearing and other 
acti vi ties. 
(iii)It affects the ability to control the number of births and 
possibly influence child mortality. 
Ben Porath (1973) analyses the effect of education on fertility 
through their affect on wages and income. Education is related to a 
higher cost of time of females resulting in a substitution effect 
against the desire for children. Education is also associated with 
a higher income (which might have a positive effect on the number of 
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children). The effect of education on fertility therefore depends 
on which of these effects is dominant. The husband's level of 
education is expected to be associated less with the cost of time 
(since their role in child rearing is much less) and more with 
income. 
Three measures of the wife's educational level are used: 
(1) Literacy (LIT)i indicating whether a female can read. 
(This takes a value of 1 if she can read and a value of 2 
if she cannot read). 
(2) The number of school years completed (YRSCH) i this is 
closely correlated with predicted wage level therefore it 
is not used in the model with the wage variable. 
(3) Attainment of at least a seondary level of schooling (ED). 
(This takes a value of 1 for those with a primary 
certificate or less and a value of 2 for those with a 
secondary or university certificate). 
The measure adopted for the husband's educational attainment is 
the number of school years completed (PYRSCH). If the husband's 
education is associated with his potential wage (income), then the 
effect on the desire for children cannot be predicted theoretically. 
(4) Age Variables (AGE, AGEM) 
In the demand for children function age at marriage is used. 
Age at marriage is taken as an indicator for the exposure to risk of 
conception. It is expected that the older the age at marrige the 
lower the number of children born. The measure taken for age at 
marriage is the marriage cohort to which the female belongs. 
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The variable used in the participation function is the age of 
the female (age cohort to which the female belongs). The age 
variable in cross-sectional analysis reflects differences between 
the cohorts as well as the stage in the life-cycle of the female. 
Taking the 35-49 age-group, it is expected that both effects would 
lead to a decline in the participation rate. 
(5) Additional Variables (HELP, COST) 
Certain expectations also play a role in the determination of 
family size. These expectation depend on what parents want from 
their children, and what they want to give them(ll). 
The variables used to measure these expectations are: 
(1) The expectation of help from children (HELP). 
coded I if yes and 2 if no). 
(This is 
(2) The desired level of education for their daughters (COST). 
This is a crude measure of the overall expenditure on 
children the family would expect to incur. 
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5.6 Results for the Joint-determination Approach 
The results for the models presented in section 5.5.2 are 
presented in tables (5.21) to (5.27). Table (5.21) is a 
presentation of the results for the wage function. The model 
explains at least half (except for Cairo) of the variation in wages 
between individuals. The regressions and coefficient estimates (in 
almost all cases) are highly significant. These results are 
considered to be good. 
Table (5.22) presents the average number of children ever-born 
in each occupation. The ordering of the mean number of children is 
used to construct the compatibility index (CIND). For urban areas, 
mothers working in professional and clerical occupations have the 
least number of children, while those in sales (which could be in 
the informal sector) have the highest number of children. For all 
areas professional and clerical workers have the least number of 
children, while those who work on the family farm and in sales have 
the highest number of children. These figures seem to indicate that 
the occupational compatibility hypothesis is to a certain extent 
correct. 
Now, the analysis for each model is presented; begining with the 
four equation model in which each endogeneous variable is determined 
by the same set of exogeneous variables. 
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Table 5.21 Wage Function for Married Females. 25-44 
Area Urban Urban (a) Rural Cairo All 
Areas 
Explanatory 
Variables 
YRSCH 074 .076 .083 .067 .084 
(16.4)** (17.2)** (10.6)** (7.2)*** (23.3)*** 
AGE .17 .16 .054 .15 .17 (8.3)*** (9.22)*** ( .87) (3.9)*** (8.1)*** 
Intercept 1.84 1.B6 2.01 2.04 1.7 
(17.1)*** (18.8)*** (7.8)*** (9.9)*** (17.7)*** 
R2 .50*** .51*** .56*** .38*** .59*** 
Number in 
sub-group 305 290 89 98 394 
(a) Once-married females 
***. **. * 1%. 5% and 10% level of significance 
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Table 5.22 Average number of children ever-born by 
occupation married-females. 35-49 
Area Urban Urban (a) Rural All 
Occupation Areas 
Professional 2.74 2.73 2.74 (27)2 (26)2 (27)2 
Clerical 2.50 2.50 2.50 (6)1 (6)1 (6)1 
Sales 7.86 7.17 7.67 7.75 (7)7 (6)7 (9)5 (16)9 
Agricultural-self- 7.46 7.4 
employed (65)4 (67)8 
Agricultural-employed 6.14 6.20 
by others (14)1 ( 15)4 
Household services 4.82 5.57 4.82 (11)3 (7)3 (11)3 
Other services 6.54 7.13 6.38 (11)6 (8)6 (13)5 
Skilled labour 6.00 6.20 7.43 6.77 (6)5 (5)5 (7)3 (13)7 
Not employed 6.06 6.11 6.97 6.54 (352)4 (321)4 (393)2 (745)6 
The figures in brackets are sample sizes. 
The number above the brackets represents the ordinal ranking of the mean 
number of children. 
(a) Once-married 
not applicable 
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Table (5.23) presents the set of household regressions for 
once-married females in urban areas. (A similar set of results for 
all areas is presented in Appendix III. No results are presented 
for rural areas since these were found to be insignificant). The 
set of exogeneous variables in each equation is significant (in most 
cases at the 1% level) in explaining the variance of each dependent 
variable. The emphasis in the analysis of the results in this model 
is to assess how each variable can provide some information on the 
relationship between female labour force participation and 
fertility. 
The first two equations in each set of household functions 
indicate that an exogeneous rise in wages reduces family size and 
increases the market work performed by mothers : the coefficients of 
the wage variable in both the CEB and PART equations are 
statistically significant. (The effect on work performed outside 
the home is not statistically significant). Thus, for mothers in 
urban areas, an increase in wages increases the price of child 
services relative to commodity services, Le., the relative 
intensity of child services exceeds that of commodity services. 
There are a number of factors which influence the relative intensity 
of child-rearing and commodity services. The results indicate that 
occupational compatibility is one of those factors. The coefficient 
estimates for the CIND equations are significant and negative in 
sign, reflecting the reduction in family size to those mothers with 
higher wages, most probably in those occupations which are least 
compatible to child-rearing. 
Of the three measures used for the educational variable, only 
the number of years of schooling is statistically significant in 
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both the CEB and PART equations. A rise in the number of years 
spent in education reduces family size and increases market work 
(the effect on the location of work is insignificant). However, 
literacy and attainment of a secondary certificate are significant 
determinants of labour force participation, but act in opposite 
directions. The compatibility index reflect these results. The 
greater the number of years spent at school, and, attainment of a 
secondary certificate places the female in occupations which are 
less compatible to child-rearing. It is felt that this reflects the 
wage effect of education. Thus, mothers wi th high wages (due to 
higher educational levels) are in the least compatible occupations 
with regard to child-rearing and have lower fertility levels. This 
is the expected situation in developed countries. 
The coefficient estimate for the husband's number of years of 
schooling is statistically significant, and negative in sign, only 
in the CEB equations. The effect of this variable on fertility 
levels will be discussed in more detail for the recursive model. 
The age variable is, as expected, positively related to fertility 
levels, but negatively related to market participation. One 
interpretation given to the coefficent in the CIND equations (which 
in most cases are statistically significant and positive in sign) is 
that those in the more compatible child-rearing occupations tend to 
enter (or re-enter) these occupations at older ages, whereas those 
with the least compatible child-rearing occupations. once leaving 
work are reluctant to enter at older ages. A second interpretation 
could be that young working females are entering the professional 
and clerical occupations than those in the older cohorts as a result 
of advancement in female education. 
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Table 5.23 Household Ilet:reaaiona of onc~_rried r~lea. 
35-49. Urban Areas 
Explanatory CD PART LOC CIND CiB PART LOC CIND 
Variables 
WAGE -2.27 .78 -.03 -1.97 -3.4 .18 -.33 -.41 
(-3.4)"· (8.6)"· (-.IS) (-10.6)··· (-3.9)··· (l.6) (-1.3) (-1.68)· 
LIT .45 .21 .11 -.64 
(1.14) (3.97)··· (.76) (-5.S)"· 
ED .69 .39 .25 -.93 
(.84) (3.S)U. (1.03) (-4.31)··· 
AGE .93 -.11 .041 .29 1.12 -.07 .OS .03 
(4.98)". (-6.65) •• • (.75) (5.6)··· (5.3).·. (-2.5) •• (1.4) (.56) 
PYRSCH -.12 .001 -.006 -.004 
-.13 .0001 -.007 -.001 
(-3.9)·'· (.2S) (.5S) (-.5) (-4.0)··· (.02) (-.63) (-.09) 0) (0 
..... 
BBINe • 53 -.003 
.03 .006 .54 .001 .02 -.005 
(4.7)··· (-.19) (.69) (.19) (4.87)"· (.07) (.59) (-.16) 
• 
ASSET • 34 .05 -.16 .07 .35 .05 -.15 .061 
(2.38)·· (2.4)·· (-2.24) ••• (1.69) ••• (2.41) ••• (2.52) ••• (-2.02)" (1.49) 
IDtercept 4.76 -1.72 .88 9.2 7.1 -.56 1.41 5.9 
(2.2)·" (-5.9·" (1.17) (15.5)·" (4.49)"·(-2.63) (2.9)··· (13.4)·" 
H2 
.31"· .24"· .12·" .37'" .31"· .24*" .13··· .34"· 
•••••••• 1~. 5~. 1~ level of aifDificance. 
Table 5.23 (cont'd) 
ixplanatory CD PART LOC CIND CEB PART LOC cum 
Variables 
WAGE -1.52 .79 -.056 -1.93 -1.6 .B -.05 -1.95 
(-2.2)*** (B.72)*** (-.3) (-10.5)*** (-2.3)** (B.B)*** (-.3) (-10.5)*** 
LIT .48 .21 .088 -.64 .4 .20 .12 -.65 
(1.19) (3.9)*** (.64) (-5.9)*** (1.0) (3.B)*** (.87) (-5.9)*** 
AGE 1.05 -.167 .04 .29 1.02 -.17 .04 .29 
(5.55)*** (-6.6)*** (.74) (5.7)*** (5.4)*** (-6.7)*** (.722) (5.6)*** 
PYRSCH -.081 .002 -.009 -.002 -.08 .002 -.01 -.002 
(-2.54)" (.43) (-.77) (-.2) (-2.5)** (.544) (-.9) (-.13) 
ASSET .08 .043 -.16 .05 .03 .037 -.16 .05 
(.55) (2.16)** (-2.37)" (1.3) (.18) (1.85)* (-2.3)** (1.3) 
PCI -.39 -.02 .035 -.04 
(-3.54)*" (-1.03)* (.85) (-1.3) 
PCB -.45 -.03 .05 -.03 0 
(-4.03)··· (-1.72)** to-(1.2) (-1) ~ 
Intercept 6.3 -1.7 1.00 9.2 6.04 -1.7 .89 9.3 
(2.44)"* (-5.9) (1.43) (15.6)"* (2.8)*** (-5.7)*** (1.25) (16.6)*** 
H2 
.29*** .24*" .12"* .37*** .30*** .24*** .13*** .37*** 
Table 5.23 (coot'd) 
Explanatory eiB PART LOC elMO 
Variables 
YRSCH -.202 .04 -.009 -.09 
(-5.4)*** (7.B)*** (-.B) (-B. 6)*** 
AGE .54 -.04 .033 -.04 
(3.43)*** (-1.71)*** (.72) (-.09) 
PYRSCB -.12 5.5 xIO-4 -.01 -.002 
(-3.98)*** (.13) (-.64) (-.2) 
BRINe .53 -9xl0-5 .019 -.002 
(4.85)*** (-.01) (.47) (-.07) 
ASSET .35 .04B -.17 .06 
r-4 
(2.4)*** (2.43)*** (-2.5)·* (1.5) r:-. r-4 
Intercept 1.46 .13 1.1 4.3 
(1.41)*** (.93) (2.97)*** (14.5)*** 
R2 
.31**· .21*** .13*** .31*** 
The coefficient estimate for the ASSET variable is statistically 
significant for all the endogeneous variables in three sets of 
household regressions. For the interpretation of this variable, the 
type of toilet available to the household is taken as a measure for 
the level of assets. A reduction in the level of assets increases 
family size and at the same time the work performed by the female, 
(but not outside the home). This relationship of the level of 
wealth with both the level of fertility and labour force 
participation is possible if the mothers engage in occupations that 
are compatible with child-rearing. This appears to be the case 
since the coefficient estimate in the CIND equations are positive 
and there is a reduction in the work performed outside the home. 
Finally, it is felt that all three income variables (HHINC, PCI, 
PCE) provide some difficulty in the analysis. All coefficient 
estimates for these variables are statistically significant in only 
the CEB equations (except for one case where the coefficient 
estimate for PCB is statistically significant in the PART equation). 
A higher income level (HHINC) increases family size. This might 
indicate that the responsiveness of an increase in income to 
increasing family size is greater than the responsiveness to 
increasing the expenditure on children. 
Increasing per capita income (PCI) and per capita expenditure 
(PCE) have a negative effect on fertility levels. A higher level of 
per capita monthly expenditure is associated with lower fertility 
levels. Thus, the evidence of the effect of income on fertility 
levels is not clear cut. Perhaps, most direct relationship is that 
between the husband's educational level, which is an indication of 
the husband's income level and is devoid of the complications 
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associated with the number of workers in the family and fertility 
levels. 
Next, the analysis focuses on the results for the recursive 
system of equations, which are presented in tables (5.24) to (5.27). 
Tables (5.24) and (5.25) represent the set of results for the 
determination of fertility levels for once-married females by 
age-group (35-49 years) and by number of years married respectively. 
For those females aged 35-49 years, the model explains up to fourty 
percent of the variability in fertility levels for those married for 
at least fifteen years, the model explans about a quarter of the 
variabili ty in fertility levels. The following paragraphs are the 
effect each variable has on the number of children born. 
The effect of wages on the number of children born is positive, 
and the coefficient is statistically significant especially for the 
equations of females married at least fifteen years (this sub-group 
includes females of a greater age-span). This would suggest that 
the income effect of a rise in wages outweighs the negative price 
effect (or that the price effect itself is positive), and 
furthermore, the income effect results in an increase in the number 
of children born. This finding, though using a different sub-group 
of married females, is different to the previous four equation 
system. This underlies the difficulty in trying to predict the 
effect of wages on fertility levels, where the price effect is not 
obviously negative. 
The coefficient estimates for the education variables are all 
statistically significant (except for females married for over 
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twenty years). Literacy reduces the number of children born by, on 
average, one child. A female with at least a secondary level 
certificate bears, on average, about two children less than a female 
with a lesser level of education. The number of years of schooling 
also has a negative effect on fertility levels, and could be a 
reflection of expected wages. Education is related to a higher cost 
of female time and the effect of all measures taken for education 
indicate that there is a substitution effect against the desire for 
children. Added to this, a higher level of education is also 
associated with greater contraceptive awareness. 
Husband's educational attainment has a significant effect on 
fertility levels. A higher educational level for the husband 
associated with higher wages, and also possibly greater 
contraceptive awareness, reduces the number of children born. The 
husband's education is less associated with the cost of time than 
the wife, so, it is expected that his educational level is 
associated with potential income. It would seem that the income 
effect acting through the husband's educational level acts to 
increase the quality rather than the quantity of children. 
Household income and asset holdings act in opposite directions 
on the number of children born. Coefficient estimates for HHINC and 
ASSET are statistically significant in all equations. However, as 
stated before, the variable HHINC might be affected by household 
size, so asset holdings might provide a better index towards the 
level of wealth. Increasing household income increases, while an 
increased level of assets reduces the number of children born. 
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Age at marriage is, as expected, a significant (and improves the 
explanatory power of the model when used instead of age) determinant 
of the number of children born since it is a measure for the length 
of exposure to risk of conception. The average number of children 
born is reduced by almost one child for each successive marriage 
cohort. 
Finally, the effect of certain expectation of the mother are 
examined through two variables: the expectation of help from 
children, and the desired level of education (a measure for 
expenditure) for their daughters. As expected, the expectation of 
no help from children reduces the number of children born. The 
higher the level of education desired for daughters, the lower the 
number of children born. 
Next, there is an assessment of the second function, the 
participation function in the recursive model, especially with 
regard to the effect of the imputed children ever born variable. 
These results are presented in tables (5.26) and (5.27). The set of 
exogeneous variables contribute more to the explanatory power of the 
model when the endogeneous variable is current rather than lifetime 
participation: they explain up to a third of the variation between 
females. 
The coefficient estimates of the imputed CEB variable in tables 
(5.26) to (5.27) are statistically significant for most equations; 
being significant at the 1% level for the 25-49 age-group and the 
10% level for the 35-49 age-group. On average, the probability of 
participation of a female is reduced by three to six percent for 
every additional child that is born. Table (5.28) presents results 
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for when the actual number of children born is taken as the 
variable. The coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant 
in all equations. 
These results indicate that completed fertility (i.e., the 
number of children born) is a significant determinant of both 
lifetime and current labour force participation. One must also take 
into account that individual variation (due to 'tastes' for example) 
are reduced, at least in part, when use of an imputed fertility 
equation is made. However, 
hypothesis proposed in this 
these resul ts do not contradict the 
recursive system: that participation 
decisions are dependent on the level of completed fertility. 
176 
Table 5.24 Children Ever Born, urban areas, once-married 
Females 35-49 
Explanatory 
Variables 
WAGE 
LIT 
ED 
YRSCH 
AGEM 
PYRSCH 
HHINC 
ASSET 
HELP 
COST 
.36 
( .66) 
.47 
( .88) 
1.05 1.06 
(2.99)*** (3.1)*** 
-.14 
(-3.92)*** 
.50 
( .80) 
.75 
(1.26) 
-1.48 -1.69 
(-2.43)***(-2.95)*** 
.07 
(.13) 
.62 
(1.8)* 
-1.12 -1.1 -1.04 -1.13 -1.1 -1.1 
(-8.15)*** (-7.9)*** (-7.68)***(-8.2)*** (-8.1)***(-7.9)*** 
-.13 -.10 -.10 -.13 -.13 -.14 
(-4.4)*** (-3.5)*** (-3.28)***(-4.3)*** (-4.6)***(-4.9)*** 
.48 .44 .53 .48 .31 .33 
(4.56)*** (4.4)*** (5.2)*** (4.59)*** (3.07)***(3.3)*** 
.405 .46 . 35 . 24 • 24 • 21 
(2.94)*** (3.41)*** (2.57)*** (1.87)*** (1.87)* (1.62) 
-.28 
(-1.19) 
-.26 
(-2.0)** 
Intercept 3.68 
(1.8)* 
2.96 6.53 6.6 7.58 7.54 
(1.47) (10.6)*** (4.39)*** (5.19)***(3.54)** 
.37*** .32*** .38*** .37*** 
(a) 
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
(a) All-married 
(b) When applicable 
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.39*** .39*** 
(b) (b) 
Table 5.25 Children-Ever Born. urban areas, once-married 
Females. by number of Years married 
Number of 15+ 15+ 15+ 15+ 15+ 2)+ 
years of 
Marriage 
Explanatory 
Variables (a) (a) 
WAGE 1.17 1.2 1.07 1.2 -.34 
(2.5)** (2.S8)** (2.39)** (2.4)** (-.4) 
LIT 1.29 1.3 .97 .71 
(4.1)*** ( 4.1)*** (3.12)*** ( 1.59) 
ED -1.97 (-3.4)*** 
YRSCH -.14 (-3.7)*** 
AGEM -.85 -.84 -.85 -.85 -.69 -.62 (-5.1)*** (-5.04)***(-5.35)***(-5.1)*** (-4.3)***(-2.69)** 
PYRSCH -.lS -.14 -.15 -.15 -.12 -.156 
(-5.6)*** (-5.1)*** (-5.8)*** (-5.6)*** (-4.3)***(-4.3)*** 
HHINC .38 .37 .25 .38 .46 .48 (3.96)*** (3.8)*** (2.7)*** (3.89)*** (4.86)***(3.72)** 
ASSET .38 .35 .25 .35 .32 .27 (3.1)*** (2.9)*** (2.1)*** (2.83)*** (2.58)** (1.63) 
HELP -.44 (-1. 97)*** 
COST -.24 (-1.95)* 
Intercept .71 1.36 3.5 4.98 6.1 6.3 
( .47) (.78) (1.96)***(4.2)*** (10.5)*** (2.25)** 
R2 .26*** .26*** .26*** .2S*** .25*** .23*** 
***, **, * significant at l~, S~ and 10~ level. 
(a) when applicable 
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Table 5.26 Current Labour Force Participation of 
once-married Females. urban areas 
Age Group 25-49 35-49 25-49 35-49 25-49 35-49 
Explanatory 
Variables 
WAGE .802 .77 .26 .17 (12.90)*** (8.4)*** ( 3 . 0) *** (1. 40 ) 
LIT .24 .24 (5.82)*** (4.3)*** 
ED .35 .40 (4.84)***(3.80)** 
YRSCH .04 (7.89)*** 
AGE -.13 -.17 .001 -.04 -.04 -.07 (-9.8)*** (-6.5)*** (.12) (-1.8)* (-2.2)***(-2.3)** 
CEB -.04 -.03 -.04 -.03 -.04 -.03 (-2.98)*** (-1.65)*** (-2.79)*** (-1.5) (-3.1)***(-1.64)* 
PYRSCH -.005 -.004 -.005 -.003 -.006 -.005 
(-1. 35) (-.7) (-1.3) (-1.7) (-1. 69)* (-.9) 
HHINC .018 .014 .02 .018 .02 .017 (1.4) (.76) ( 1.5) ( 1.0) ( 1.48) (1. 0) 
ASSET .006 .06 .057 .06 .055 (4.48)*** (4.3)*** (2.8)*** (4.4)*** (2.8)*** 
Intercept -1.90 -1.6 .07 .27 -.71 -.4 
(-9.8)*** (-5.5)*** (.8) ( 1.60) (-4.6)***(-1.5) 
R2 .33*** .24*** .32*** .21*** .32*** .24** 
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 5.27 Lifetime participation of once-married Females. 
urban areas 
Age Group 25-49 35-49 25-49 35-49 25-49 35-49 
Explanatory 
Variables 
WAGE .83 .79 .28 .05 (11. 5)*** (7.5)*** (2.8)*** ( .4) 
LIT .27 .30 (5.78)*** (4.7)*** 
ED .34 .48 (4.05)***(4.0)*** 
YRSCH .035 .03 (6.47)*** (4.1)*** 
AGE -.14 -.17 -.01 -.04 -.05 -.05 (-9.4)*** (-5.9)*** (-.8) (1. 7)* (-2.46)**{-1.5) 
eEB -.05 -.03 -.06 -.03 -.06 -.03 (-3.6)*** {-1.62)*** {-3.47)*** (-1.5) (-3.7)*** (-1.6) 
PYRSCH -.01 -.005 -.01 -.005 -.01 -.006 (-2.5)** (-.8) (-2.4)** (-.8) (-2.8) ***( -1. 0) 
RHINC .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 
(1. 75)* (1.36) (1. 9)* ( 1.5) (1. 8)** ( 1.58) 
ASSET .08 .08 .07 .08 .07 .07 {4.43)*** (3.31)*** (4.2)*** (3.25)*** (4.19)***(3.29)** 
Intercept -1.83 -1.76 .26 .28 -.64 -.23 
(-8.3)*** (-5.2)*** (2.49)*** (1. 44) (-3.1)*** (-.8) 
R2 .27*** .19*** .25*** .15*** .26*** .18** 
***. **. * significant at 1'. 5' and 10~ level. 
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Table 5.28 Labour force participation. once-married Females. 
urban areas. actual number of children born 
EndogeneoU9 Current Current Lifetime Lifetime 
Variable 
Age-group 25-49 35-49 25-49 35-49 
Explanatory 
Variable 
WAGE .82 .78 .85 .81 
(13.2)*** (8.4)*** (11. 9)*** (7.6)*** 
LIT .19 .21 .22 .27 
(5.1)*** (4.0)*** (4.8)*** (4.3)*** 
CEB -.004 -.001 -.01 .0007 
(-.8) (-.2) (-1.2) (.08) 
AGE -.13 -.17 -.15 -.17 
(-9.3)*** (-6.4)*** (-8.8)*** (-5.85)*** 
PYRSCH .001 .001 -.003 .0006 ( • 2) (.2) (-.8) (.13) 
HHINC -.003 -.002 -.003 .009 (-.3) (-.14) (-.2) (.5) 
ASSET .05 .05 .05 .07 (3.7)*** (2.4)** (3.4)*** (2.9)*** 
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1. The specification of the earnings function depends on the 
age-earnings profile. This is possibly the simplest 
specification. Alternative specifications would lead to a 
parabolic or Gompertz curve. 
2. Elasticities are calculated at the mean values: 
where: ~ wage elasticity 
x mean value of wage variable 
y mean value of hours worked 
3. The bias arising from the application of least squares to an 
equation belonging to a system of simultaneous equations is 
called simultaneous equation bias. It arises from the 
correlation (dependence) of the explanatory variables (X), with 
and the random variable £. Because of the dependence of ~ and X 
their covariance ~ 0: 
The problem of simultaneous equation bias is discussed in 
Koutsoyiannis (1986) pps.33l-335. 
4. For formal rules of identification see Koutsoyiannis (1986, 
pps.35-36l). Identification conditions for the systems used in 
this thesis are presented in Appendix III. 
5. In Chapter 16, Koutsoyiannis (1986) describes the indirect least 
squares method (used in the case when the equation is exactly 
identified) and the methods of instrumental variables and two 
stage least squares (used in the case when the equation is 
over-identified). These methods provide estimates for the 
structural parameters. 
6. See Koutsoyannis (1986), Chapter 21 for comparison of the 
alternative models and econometric techniques. 
7. See Johnston (1970, pps. 378-379) for a discussion on recursive 
systems. 
8. The data for husband's occupation does not yield this 
information. 
9. A review of the various income measures and the relationship 
with a number of variables such as family size and education of 
the household head is found in Chapter 3 BFS, Vol. III. 
10. The fertility decline in developed countries over the past 
century is attributed to a small quantity elasticity compared to 
the quality elasticity (Becker, 1960). 
11. There is also a risk factor (child mortality) involved, but it 
will not be included in this study. 
182 
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS 
Historical data on the female labour force in Egypt shows a 
trend that is characteristic of the development process. There was 
a decline in the crude activity rate from 11.3% in 1937 to 4.8% in 
1960 followed by a gradual increase to about 6% in 1980 and to 13.8% 
in 1984. Comparability of data is hampered by differences with 
regard to definitions used and age-groups covered. Before the 1960 
census, child legislations prohibited the employment of children 
under twelve years of age(1). Added to this there was probably a 
stricter definition of working females, especially those who worked 
on family farms. These factors could explain part of the decline in 
the activity rate which occured in the 1937-1960 period. It is felt 
that modifications in procedures regarding the enumeration of 
females in the labour force since 1983 (especially those females in 
rural areas) resulted, in part, in the observed increase in the 
activity rate. 
However, over half of the increase in the female labour force 
between 1960 and 1976 in urban areas can be attributed to the 
increase in the participation rate. The life-cycle pattern of 
female labour force participation indicates that married females in 
Cairo (both for the EFS and LFS) and to a lesser extent in rural 
areas (LFS) return to work after childbearing age. The return to 
market participation by married females could partly explain the 
rising trend in the activity rate. 
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In Chapter II, an outline of some developments that have 
influenced the female labour force was presented. And, from these, 
a number of conclusions were drawn. 
An inadequacy of job-creation for the fast increasing work-force 
has, it is felt, restricted opportunities for female employment 
outside the home. The existance of such a large proportion of 
unutilised labour has serious social and economic consequences since 
productive employment raises income and generates output, as well as 
provide intellectual rewards to the female(2). In addition, the 
presence of such a large proportion of unutilised labour raises the 
dependency ratio (from .79 to 1.43). 
The extension of free education until university level has 
greatly enhanced the status and employment prospects of females, 
especially in a labour market that is baised towards academic 
achievement. 
Female entry into the labour market has been facilitated by two 
major developments that resulted in the withdrawal of males from the 
labour market. The period of military draft was lengthened during 
the interwar period (1967-1973). After the 1973 war, the political 
climate in Egypt changed allowing a greater flow of emigrants to the 
Arab countries. The consequences of the eventual return of migrants 
is a serious issue. 
The aim of this study has been to analyse the labour supply 
behaviour of females in Egypt within a neoclassical utility 
maximisation framework. Functions for hours worked and labour force 
participation are obtained. A two equation model in which the 
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participation decision is based on the comparison of the market wage 
and shadow price of time is presented. A procedure is outlined to 
estimate the parameters of the model. Finally, a 
joint-determination approach to household decisions is presented to 
analyse fertility level and participation decisions. 
Three data sets were used to analyse the work behavious of 
females: cross-section survey data collected in Egypt in 1984 (LFS) 
and in 1980 (EFS) and the 1976 published census data. 
As mentioned in the introduction, policy formulation requires 
knowledge of the effect of economic and non-economic variables on 
the work behaviour of females. Of course, this depends on the fact 
that the statistical relationships observed represent a reliable 
base for formulation of policy. It is not possible to directly 
compare the results between the three data sets. However, 
conformity in the size, and magnitude of parameter estimates would, 
at least, indicate the validity of the observed relationships. 
First of all, the results obtained using the LFS and census data 
are examined (Chapter IV and V: Part I). 
The effect of gross wages on work behaviour seems to indicate 
that females are not very responsive to monetary incentives. Gross 
wage elasticities for married females ranged from .13, with respect 
to hours of workers, to .54 with respect to participation, on the 
aggregate level. On the individual level, the results indicate a 
gross wage elasticity of .02 with respect to hours. 
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Comparison of the elastici ty measures wi th those obtained form 
other studies would give a better indication of the Egyptian 
estimates. Mincer (1962) obtained a gross wage elasticity of 1. 33 
for aggregate regressions between metropolitan areas in North 
America using 1950 census data. Cain (1966) using aggregate census 
data for 1940 obtained a value of (.80). For Great Britain, 
Greenhalgh (1977) using aggregate data for 1971 obtains gross wage 
elasticities between 1.1 and 1.35. Finally, Layard et al (1980) 
using individual data from the 1974 General Household Survey obtains 
gross wage elasticities of .08 to .049. 
For single females, the effect of wages on the work behaviour of 
females is positive, but less responsive than for married females. 
The gross wage elasticity is (.25) on the aggregate level. On the 
individual level gross wage elasticity is less (.02) and for 
different marital status groups is lowest for never-married females 
(.02) and greatest for divorced females (.43). 
Income elasticities are also weak (-.1 to -.13) for married 
females and (-.12 to -.21) for single femaels. An inelastic 
response of participation and hours worked to income is 0180 
observed in the studies listed for the wage variable: -.83 for 
Mincer's study, -.4 for Cain's study; -.003 to -.32 for Layard et 
ali and -.88 to -.94 for Greenhalgh. The income variable on the 
individual level has the opposite effect on work behaviour (the 
coefficient estimate being pos i ti ve) • This is contrary to 
theoretical expectation. An explanation could be that this measure 
for income is not adequate. Overall, however, the elasticity 
magnitudes indicate that females are more responsive to their 
own-wage than to other income (or husband's wage). 
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To summarise, females are more responsive to changes in their 
own wage than income of other family members. The responsiveness is 
greater for married than single females. An inelastic response of 
participation and hours worked to own wage could be changed by 
changes in the wage system which. as stated in Chapter II. places 
too little emphasis on incentives and bonuses. 
Job opportunities. or the probability of finding a job, are 
important in the participation decision. In most cases a 
discouraged-worker effect is observed. This is the case for married 
females on the aggregate and individual level and for single females 
in all marital status groups on the individual level. For single 
females on the aggregate level an added worker-effect is observed, 
especially for divorced females and married household heads 
possibily the result of financial pressure. 
The strong. possibly major, influence of education on the 
participation decision and hours of work is the opposite of what is 
expected on the basis of economic need (if we expect better educated 
females to belong to higher income households). But, as stated 
before. educational attainment is associated with higher wages and 
also enterance to better quality work. The coefficient estimates 
from census data for 1976 is 1.13-1.15 which is very close to the 
estimates obtained by Schultz (1972) who used the same measure of 
education in regression on activity rates (Shultz's estimates range 
from 1.13-1.49). The LFS coefficient estimates are similar to those 
obtained from census data (.72-.9). The coefficient estimates from 
the EFS are lower (.34-.48), 
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For the single marital status groups divorced females have the 
highest coefficient estimates (both for individual and aggregate 
data). Coefficient estimates range from .62 to .97 for the 
education variable in the participation function. 
It is fel t that the relationship between labour force 
participation and fertility levels examined through a 
joint-determination approach using EFS provides a more informative 
picture of the fertility-participation decision than a 
single-equation approach. 
Aggregate results do not indicate any significant relationship 
between fertility levels and labour force participation for married 
females (LFS). However, there is a significant relationship between 
hours of mothers and the child per woman ratio. These results seem 
to agree with other studies such as Greenhalgh's (1977) and Layard 
et al (1980). Family size exerts a negative effect on the labour 
force participation of single females, and the relationship is 
significant for participation and hours worked. Census results also 
indicate the same results, i.e., that the child per woman ratio is 
not significant. However, other measures of fertility levels show a 
significant relationship with participation, but there is no 
uniformity. The results do not reject those obtained by Bindary et 
al (1973), who used 1960 census data for Egypt and indicated that an 
increasing child per woman ratio depresses participation in urban 
areas and increases participation in rural areas. 
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The results on the individual level indicate a clearer pattern. 
Participation of married females is effected by the presence and 
number of children under the age of three, but not older children. 
The probability of participation for a married woman is reduced by 
eight percent for the presence of a child under three years of age 
and by a further five percent for every additional child under three 
years of age. 
In the joint-determination approach, an increase in wages 
simultaneously increases labour force participation and reduces the 
number of children born. The fertil ity-wage-participat ion 
relationship is statistically significant. McCabe and Rosenzweig 
(1976) observed that for Puerto Rico increases in wages increases 
participation and number of children born (non-farm married 
females) • 
It would seem, that, for urban areas in Egypt there is no 
complementary between child-rearing and market work. 
The fertility-education-participation relationship is 
statistically significant for the measure of education: number of 
school years completed. It is felt that this reflects the wage 
effect through education. Husband's education is also important in 
the determination of the number of children born (but not the wife's 
participation decision). It is felt that this provides the moat 
direct measure of the household's income level. 
Finally, the results of the recursive model indicate a 
statistically significant relationship between completed ferti Ii ty 
and participation. The probability of participation is reduced by 
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three to six percent for every child born. 
The conclusion reached is that family size goals can be 
influenced through education which induces the females to 
participate in the labour market this would mean that employers have 
to be encouraged to like females and that education to secondary 
level becomes for females a main aim in government policy. 
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L See Nagi (1971) for further details regarding this and other 
legis tlations. 
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APPENDIX I 
A3.1 GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION OF THE LABOUR SUPPLY PROBLEM 
Figure A3.1 depicts a set of indifference curves ICI3. Each 
indifference curve is a loci of points showing the combination of 
income and leisure time which give the same level of satisfaction or 
utility. 
is the time constraint 
represent wage constraint at different wage levels 
Optimality for the different wage levels is at Mi' M2 and M3 
which in each case maximises utility because the individual is on 
the highest possible attainable indifference curve. 
In Figure A3. 2 one can see the case where there is 
non-participation. The indifference curves in this case are very 
steep and they show that there is a high subjective evaluation of 
non-market time relative to income. 
HN: represents the availability of non-labour income which 
could be husband's earnings. 
NW: represents the wage rate if the woman were to work. 
The optimum position is achieved at N where the woman is 
devoting all her time to non-market activities. 
A female only works when her potential wage exceeds the 
subjective evaluation of her time. 
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Hours of Leisure 
Figure A3.2 
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A3.2 LIFE-CYCLE MODEL OF LABOUR SUPPLY 
The models presented in Chapter III view the labour-leisure 
choice in a single period framework. In Mincer's model (1962), the 
one period framework is sufficient in explaining average market 
participation in terms of permanent income and wage rates, but 
realistically individuals are faced with variation in wages and 
other variables. 
However, as pointed out by Smith (1980, pI2), age-work profiles 
indicate a clear pattern. For females, US data show that this 
profile appears to be double-peaked: the two declines in 
participation being during child-bearing and before retirement. 
The life-cycle models developed explain timing decisions in 
terms of differences between rates of interest, time preference and 
wage rates. 
Heckman and MaCurdy's model consider distinct participation and 
hours functions over the life-cycle merging the Ben-Porath approach 
with the life-cycle approach. 
Heckman J s Model 
Let: 
C (t) 
L (t) 
Ut 
w (t) 
instantaneous consumption of goods at time t 
instantaneous leisure at time t 
utility function at time t 
wage rate at time t (assumed to be exogeneous) 
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I (0) initial assets 
r borrowing rate 
p rate of time preference 
T lifetime horizon 
A (0) lagrange multiplier 
The individual problem is then to maximise lifetime utility 
according to the following equation: 
u = J -pt [G(C(t), J(L(T») e dt 
o 
Subject to the constraint: 
1(0) = J [C(t) - W(t)(l-L(t») dt 
o 
In this case, prices of goods are assumed to be unity and L(t) 
is a fraction of 1. 
Optimising gives the conditions: 
G'(C(t» = e(p-r)t A(O) 
J'(L(t») e(p-r)t A(O) wet) 
A(t) = A(O)e-rt 
As before an equation for the demand for leisure time is 
obtained. 
L(t) = L(eP-r)t A(O) Wet»~ = 
L(t) = L* (e(p-r)t A(O) wet»~ if J'(L(t) = e(p-r)t A(O) Wet) 
l~ 
L(t) = 1 if J'(l) > e(p-r)t A(O) Wet) 
Where L* is the inverse function of J' 
The last equation indicates that participation occurs if 
h(t) = h (e(p-r)t A(O) Wet»~ 
T T 
HH = I h(t) dt = I h(e(p-r)t A(O)W(t) )dt 
0 0 
T 
P = I I(t)dt 
0 
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APPBNDIX II 
Table A4.1 Aggregate Study using Census Data, 1976 Males 
-----------------------------------Area All Areas Urban Areas Rural Areas 
-----
Explanatory 
Variables Dl D2 Dl D2 Dl D2 
-----------------
9x10-5 4x10-5 
(1. 65) (1.2) 
LFW -10x10-6 -3xlO-5 
(-1. 37) (-.7) 
UN -2.2 -1.1 -.1 -1.7 -2.3 -1.6 
(-2)* (-1. 6) (-.2) (-2.3)** (-2.5)** (-3)** 
ED -1.7 -1.4 -.9 -1.3 -4.5 -2.3 
(-3.4)** (-4.4)** (-45)** (-47)** (-4.2)** (-3.7)** 
MRR -.18 -.12 .39 .14 -.2 -.1 
(-.4) (-.5) (2.1)** (.56) (-.5) (-.7) 
CHI -7.3 -2.7 -4.1 -7.4 -2.9 .4 
(-2.4)** (-1.4) (-2.8)** (-4)** (-1.3) (.3) 
CH2 .60 .07 -.35 .01 -1.4 -.8 
( .45) (.08) (-.6) ( .02) (-1.4) (-1.4) 
CH3 -.36 -.24 .08 .06 -.3 .4 
(-.24) (-.24) (.9) (.5) (-.2) (.4) 
Migration .0005 .0008 
( .11) (.3) 
Intercept 1.06 1.08 .68 .82 1.2 1.1 
(3.4)** (5.2)** (3.8)** (3.6)** ( 4. 4) ** (7. 1) ** 
R2 .74 .77 .82 .77 .67 .65 
----------------------------------------------
***, **, * 1%, 5%, 10% level of significance. 
I C, 7 
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Table A5.1 
Variable 
ED 
AGEGRP 
INC 
DCHl 
DCH2 
DCH3 
NCHl 
NCH2 
NCH3 
AYCH 
INTERCEPT 
APPENDIX II!.1 
Ratio of the Probit Coefficients to the 
Coefficient of the Hours Function, Married 
Females 
Ratio(1) 
.296* 
.019* 
.292* 
.066* 
-.37 
.01 
.09* 
-.15 
.2 
.08 
.008 
* Coefficient statistically significant in both functions. 
(1) Ratio of the probit coefficient to the coefficient in the 
hours of workers function. 
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Table A5.2 
Sub-group/ 
Variable 
ED 
AGEGRP 
INCGRP 
FMZ 
HEAD 
SING 
Ratio of the Probit Coefficient to the 
Coefficients of the Hours Function. Single 
Females 
1.1 2.1 
.296* .4* 
.125* .11 
5 -.056 
. -.24 
-.012 
.06* 
.11 
Ratio(l) 
3.1 
20 
-.019 
1.42 
-.36 
.725 
4.1 5.1 
.62 .092* 
.015 .83 
-.19 -.2 
-.63 
-.04 .02 
* Coefficient statistically significant in both functions. 
(1) Ratio of the probit coefficient to the coefficient in the 
hours of workers function. 
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Table A5.3 Hours Function of all Married Females. 25-49 
(using IW) 
Explana-
tory 
Variables 1. 1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 
ED 21 17 20 18 (10)*** (6.5)*** (11)*** (7.8)*** 
UN -1.6 -1.7 -1.6 -.16 -.6 -.3 (-2)** (-1.8)* (-2)** (-1.8)* (-.5) (-.4) 
AGEGRP -1 -5.4 -2 -5 -15 -14 
(-.5) (-2.6)*** (-1.4) (-6.7)*** (-20)*** (-24)*** 
I NCGRP 2.5 3.4 2.5 3.4 3.6 2.2 
(5.3)*** (6.7)*** (5.3)*** (6.7)*** (6.2)*** (4.)*** 
DCH1 -1 -1.1 
(-2.1)** (-2.2)** 
DCH2 .14 .5 
(.3) ( .9) 
DCH3 -.03 -.3 
(-.07) (-.5) 
NCH1 -.6 -.8 (-1.9)* (-2.1)*** 
NCH2 .16 .4 (.5) (1.2) 
NCH3 -.1 -.2 (-.5) (-.8) 
AYCH .13 -15 (1.6) (2.1)** 
IW 1 12.7 4.6 11.6 55 56 ( .2) (2.2)** ( 1.1) (2.4)** (33)*** (40)*** 
Intercept -30 -102 -53 -96 -378 -383 
(-1) (-2.8) (-2)** (-3)*** (-33)*** (-39)*** 
R2 .40*** .44*** .40*** .44*** .44*** .41*** 
* ** *** , , significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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- Table A5.4 Hours Function of all Single Females using IW. 
Explanatory 
Variables 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 
IW 38.7 38.7 33.3 44.5 82 97 
(23)*** (10.2)*** (13.5)*** (19.8)*** (13)*** (12.6)*** 
UN 4.9 -3.2 -2.6 -4.7 -6.7 -5.7 (-5.1)*** (-1.3) (1. 76)* (3.69)** (-4)*** (-3)*** 
AGEGRP -14 -16.6 -11 -18 -13 -13.7 
(-15.9)*** (-7.2)*** (-9.4)*** (-14)*** (-4.6)*** (-6)*** 
I NCGRP 11.2 3.3 11.3 3.1 18.4 2.5 
(14.5)*** (1. 69)* (10.8)*** (3.1)*** (10)*** ( 1.5) 
-.2 -.9 -.1 -.4 -.8 -.6 
(-1.8)* (-1. 7)* (-.8) (-2.3)** (-2.2)*** (-1.5) 
HEAP 4.86 7.6 9.7 19.5 4.1 (5.4)*** (5.8)*** (2.4)*** (3.6)*** ( 1.5) 
SING 5.3 16.4 (5.5)*** (2.8)*** 
Intercept -267 -236 -288 -287 -591 -661 
(-22)*** (-8)*** (-14)*** (-18)*** (12)*** (-8)*** 
R2 .41 .37 .34 .40 .40 .34 
* ** *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. , , 
Note: In regressions the IW variable replaced the education 
variable. 
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Table A5.4 - cont'd 
4.1 
46 
(8.1)*** 
.9 
( .2) 
-21 
(-6)*** 
10.2 
(4)*** 
-1.3 
(-2.2)** 
4.1 
( 1.5) 
-306 
(-8)*** 
.48 
4.2 5.1 5.2 
48 22 25 
(6.4)*** (7.8)*** (6.2)*** 
6.3 -1.1 -2.6 
(1) (-.8) ( -1) 
-22 -8.2 -13.6 
(-4.9)*** (-4.8)*** (-4.3)*** 
-3.8 6.9 3.2 
(1) (6.2)*** (1. 7)*** 
-2 -.1 -.2 
(-2.6)*** (-.6) (1) 
2.7 4.2 6.5 
(.6) (3.2)*** (3.2)*** 
-295 -152 -153 
(-5.8)*** (-7.8)*** (-5.2)*** 
.49 .16 .15 
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APPENDIX III. 2 
Identification conditions for the simultaneous equations models 
The conditions for identification are: 
(1) The order condition. A necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for an equation to be identified: the total number of 
variables excluded from it, but included in other equations must be 
at least as great as the number of equations of the system less one. 
(2) The rate condition. In a system of G equations, any 
particular equation is identified it is ossible to construct at 
least one non-zero determinant of order (G-l). 
Model I The Four-equation system 
Number of variables (endogeneous and exogeneous) in the system, 
K=lO. 
Number of variables in a particular equation, M=7. 
Total Number of endogeneous variables (equations) = 4 
Order condition: 
(K-M) ) (G-l) 
(10-7) = 3 ) 3 
Therefore, the order condition is satisfied. 
Setting up a table of parameters of model, 4 determinants of 
order (4+1) = 3 are obtained. 
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As an example, take the first equation for (CEB) and form the 
following determinant: 
-1 0 0 
o -1 0 
000 
Hence, the equation is not identified. It also follows that: 
Hence, the system of equations is under-identified. 
Reduced-form coefficients are estimated using least squares. 
Model II The Recursive System 
The system contains two equations: 
CEB = «0 + <Xl WAGE + <X2 LIT + ~ AGBM + <X4 PYRSCH + <Xs HHINC + 
0(. ASSET (1) 
PART = 0C0 + <Xl WAGE + <X2 LIT + 0(3 AGE + <X4 PYRSCH + <Xs HHINC + 
<X. ASSET + DCEB (2) 
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eBB 
P~T 
_'s of the endogeneous variable 
eBB 
1 
-~ 
P~T 
o 
1 
The array is triangular: the main diagonal contains l's and the 
coefficient above it is zero. The system is recursive and equations 
are estimated using least squares. 
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Table A5II.l Household Regressions of once-married Females. 
All-Areas. 35-49 
Bxplana-
tory 
Variables CEB PART LOG CIND 
WAGE -1.68 .72 -.03 -1.89 
(-2.96)*** (9.2)*** (-.18) (-8.4)*** 
LIT .68 .26 .110 -.54 
(1.9)* (5.34)*** (.75) (-3.9)*** 
YRSCH 
AGE .86 -.13 .04 .34 
(5.65)*** (-6.3)*** (.75) (6.2)*** 
PYRSCH -.07 -.003 -.006 -.02 
(-2.58)*** (-.9) (-.58) (-1.57) 
HHlNe .38 -.003 .03 -.03 
(5.1)*** (-.3) 1.69 (-.9) 
ASSET .4 .047 -.IS .13 
(3.57)*** (3.1)*** (-2.23)** (2.9)*** 
Intercept 3.04 -1.67 .88 9.14 
(1. 7S)* (-7.1)*** (1.17) (13.4)*** 
R2 .19*** .10*** .12** .22*** 
20S 
Table A5II.1 cont'd 
Explana-
tory 
variables eEB PART LOC CIND 
YRSCH -.2 .04 -.005 -.11 (-5.6)*** (7.4)*** (-.36) (-78)*** 
AGE .58 -.012 -.09 -.055 (4.9)*** (-.7) (-2.0)** (1. 2) 
PYRSCH -.07 -.004 .02 -.02 (-2.64)*** (-1.1) (1.5) (-1.44) 
RHINC .38 -.003 .06 -.03 (5.1)** (-.3) (1.93)* (-.88) 
ASSET .41 .05 -.15 .12 (3.69)*** (3.3)*** (-2.36)** (2.65)*** 
Intercept 1.48 .05 1.2 4.9 (1.85)* (0.44) (-2.36)** (2.65)*** 
R2 .19*** .07*** .33*** .21*** 
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